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The aim of this thesis is to analyse Diogenes of Babylon's musico-ethical theories, to 
place them into their historical context, and to examine the possible influences on his 
thought. Earlier treatments of this Stoic's work have been hampered by the lacunose 
state of Philodemus' surviving text, the major source, and in some cases an opponent's 
views have been mistakenly attributed to Diogenes. Conversely, the state of the text 
together  with  erroneous  column  numbering,  have  resulted  in  part  of  Diogenes' 
philosophy being ascribed to his Epicurean opponent. 
Taking Professor Delattre's recently reconstructed edition of Philodemus’ De 
musica as my starting point, I attempt to more fully analyse Diogenes' theory of music 
and ethics. Following a short introductory chapter, I briefly examine Diogenes' other 
interests, analyse his psychology compared with that of earlier Stoics, and examine 
how that fits into Diogenes' view on music in education. 
I outline Diogenes' general view on music, and compare the musical writings 
of Plato, Aristotle and the early Peripatetics with those of Diogenes, particularly in 
relation to education, and outline areas that might have influenced the Stoic. I also 
look at later writings where they can be seen as evidence for Diogenes' work. An 
examination of views on poetry as reported by Philodemus elucidates Diogenes' claim 
that the mousikoi of music were analogous to the kritikoi for poetry. 
In the thesis as a whole, I argue that far from having a radical musical theory, 
Diogenes fitted easily into the traditional musico-historical context, but developed a 
more technical approach than those before him. 
In addition to arguing for Diogenes' orthodoxy, I suggest that Philodemus had 
two motives in writing this polemical work. In refuting the Stoic's claims regarding 












1    Introduction              5   
    Intention of thesis            5 
    Arrangement of chapters          6 
    Notes on the text            8 
2    Philodemus’ De Musica (1)                   10 
(i) Introduction            10 
    (ii) Diogenes of Babylon: his life and work      12 
    (iii) Stoic psychology           16 
    (iv) Oikeiōsis              27 
    (v) Natural perception vs. ‘knowing’ perception    36 
    Appendix: Speusippus and his influence on Diogenes’   
      theory at column 34 (T2.v.1)       50 
3    Philodemus’ De Musica (2)          55 
    (i) Diogenes’ views on the use of music generally    57 
    (ii) Diogenes’ theology in the De Musica      88 
    Appendix: [Plutarch]’s De Musica        94 
4    The relevance of Platonic thought        102 
5    The relevance of Aristotelian and Peripatetic thought   134 
    (i) Aristotle              134 
    (ii) Archestratus            154 
    (iii) Heraclides of Pontus          156 
    (iv) Theophrastus            165 
    (v) Aristoxenus            173 
6    Stoics versus Epicureans on poetry       190 
    (i) The use of Homeric tales          197 
    (ii) Philodemus’ On Poems and Diogenes of Babylon on  
the kritikoi              206 
7    Conclusions              219 
   
    Bibliography             224 
 





Intention of thesis 
 
In  this  thesis,  I  analyse  the  musico-ethical  theories  of  the  Stoic  Diogenes  of 
Babylon and attempt to place them into their historical context. 
In my MA thesis, I enquired into Plato’s philosophical views of music, 
and in particular the role of music as an educational tool, and in the course of my 
research it became  apparent to me that there was an active debate about the 
effect music could have upon the soul, and upon human behaviour. 
This debate about the ethical nature of music was taken up by Aristotle 
and his  school, and it continued into the Hellenistic period; indeed it is  still 
ongoing  today.  From  Professor  Delattre’s  newly  reconstructed  edition  of 
Philodemus of Gadara’s De Musica, in which Diogenes’ musical theories are 
preserved, it is clear that Diogenes of Babylon was aware of, and himself entered 
into, the debate. Earlier treatments of Philodemus’ writing have been hampered 
by the lacunose state in which the text survived, and in some cases it has been 
almost  impossible  to  ascertain  which  views  should  be  attributed  to  which 
philosopher.  With  the  advantage  of  new,  improved  methods  of  reading  the 
papyri,
1 it has now been possible to more accurately analyse Diogenes’ views on 
music and ethics, which, in turn, are harshly criticised by Diogenes’ Epicurean 
opponent, Philodemus of Gadara. 
 In the course of this thesis, I examine the writings of Plato, Aristotle and 
other Peripatetics where they can be seen as possible influences upon Diogenes’ 
writing. I also discuss some of the later musical writings, and in particular those 
of  Pseudo-Plutarch  and  Aristides  Quintilianus,  where  they  might  be  further 
evidence of Diogenes’ views, or where their own writings help to elucidate those 
of Diogenes. I also look briefly into the Stoic and Epicurean views on poetry, 
closely linked to music, and indeed in Platonic thought, and historically prior to 
Plato, almost inseparable from music. Until the fifth and fourth centuries BC, 
                                                 
1 On which, see the Introduction to chapter 2.   6 
music was provided merely to accompany the words of the poetry, and hence it 
was of secondary importance.  
From the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC, however, music began 
to  be  performed  without  words,  and  players  of  instruments  advertised  their 
expertise,  and  were  recognised  as  professional  musicians  in  their  own  right, 
rather than as mere accompanists to the singers or poets. Pausanias, in the second 
century AD, writes in his Description of Greece, of the celebrated flute-player 
named  Pronomos  ‘who  utterly  charmed  audiences  with  his  mere  stage 
presence’,
2 and of whom a statue was erected in Thebes. Pseudo-Plutarch also 
writes of the musical ‘innovators’ who turned aulos-playing ‘from a simpler to a 
more intricate art’.
3 When writers spoke about music, therefore, it became less 
clear whether they were referring to mousikē in the standard inclusive Greek 
way,  as  defined  in  Liddell  and  Scott,
4  or  whether  they  were  referring  to 
instrumental music alone, written for its own worth, not to accompany words, 
and not intended to have words written to accompany it. This differentiaion is 
important, as will become clear in my discussion. 
This separation of music and poetry, and the innovations that came with 
it, caused concern to Plato in particular, and as I will show, to Diogenes as well. 
I will therefore also briefly discuss what is in modern times referred to as the 
‘New  Music’  of  the  fourth  century  BC,  and  outline  some  of  the  arguments 
against this style raised by both Plato and Diogenes. 
 
 
Arrangement of chapters 
 
In order to gain an understanding of the arguments presented, and the issues and 
influences  involved,  I  commence  chapter  2  with  a  very  short  overview  of 
                                                 
2 Book IX, ‘Boiotia’, trans. Levi 1971. 
3 [Plutarch] De Musica 1141c. For more on the [Plutarchian] work, see below, chapter 3, passim 
and Appendix. 
4 Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R., revised H. S. Jones (1996) A Greek–English Lexicon. Oxford: ‘(i) 
[A]ny art over which the Muses presided, especially poetry sung to music; (ii) [G]enerally art, 
letters, accomplishment. Mousikē, grammata, gymnastikē as three branches of education.’ 
.   7 
Diogenes’ life and work, and list his main interests, such as these are evidenced 
in later writers. 
  I discuss Stoic psychology; how the Stoics regarded the soul, and ask 
whether Diogenes would have had to depart from conventional Stoic theory to 
hold  his  views  on  music’s  effects  on  the  soul.  Did  he  follow  his  teacher 
Chrysippus, or were his views more allied, perhaps, to the later Stoics such as 
Posidonius  (c.  135–51  BC),  whose  views  on  psychology  were  suggested  by 
Galen to have been developed along Platonic rather than traditional Stoic lines? 
The Stoic theory of oikeiōsis will also be very relevant to this discussion. 
  I ask the questions: ‘Does Diogenes discuss music without words, or only 
music with words, as did his predecessors?’ and does Philodemus discuss music 
on the same basis, i.e., what terms do they use – mousikē, harmonie, melos, for 
example,  and  do  they  use  them  in  the  same  way?  The  latest  editor  of 
Philodemus’  De  Musica,  Professor  Daniel  Delattre,  suggests  that  Diogenes 
speaks of music only in the ‘traditional’ way, that is, as ‘music and words’, while 
Philodemus  speaks  of  music  in  the  ‘new  way’,  that  is,  instrumental  music. 
However, I will argue that this is simply one of Philodemus’ ‘tools’ to refute his 
opponent,  and  whilst  Diogenes  only  rarely  speaks  of  instrumental  music,  he 
nonetheless  does,  and  far  from  confusing  music  and  poetry,  as  Philodemus 
claims,
5 Diogenes more often discusses the two together in his theory. This will 
be examined more fully below. 
  In chapter 3 I look at Diogenes’ view on music generally, his beliefs on 
its public and private use, and his quasi-historical analysis, and discuss how, for 
him, it fitted into every part of Greek life. In this respect, Diogenes  will be 
shown not to have deviated in his views from earlier writers on the subject. I also 
investigate  the  possibility  that  Diogenes  could  have  seen  music  as  a  kind  of 
medicine or therapy, contrasting his claims with other discussions of therapy and 
medical treatment, and the De Musica of Aristides Quintilianus where relevant. 
  In chapter 4 I compare Plato’s musical theory with that of Diogenes’ 
particularly in the realm of education and suggest that Diogenes must not only 
have  had  good  access  to  Plato’s  writings,  in  particular  the Republic  and  the 
Laws, but that he must have  studied them closely. The possible influence of 
                                                 
5 E.g., col. 119.   8 
Damon of Athens is also developed in as much as he is quoted as an authority by 
both Plato and Diogenes, but I will query the importance which has traditionally 
been assigned to Damon. 
  In  chapter  5,  I  compare  Diogenes’  theories  to  those  of  Aristotle  and 
members  of  the  Peripatetic  school  such  as  Archestratus,  Heraclides, 
Theophrastus  and  Aristoxenus.  Aristoxenus  was  arguably  the  most  important 
musical  theorist  of  early  times,  and  so  one  would  have  expected  Diogenes’ 
writings to indicate that he had at least read Aristoxenus’ works if Diogenes was 
so interested in music. As I will show, however, there would seem to be very 
little, if indeed any at all, Aristoxenian influence in Diogenes’ theories. 
  Stoic and Epicurean thoughts on poetry are outlined briefly in chapter 6. 
Two  aspects  in  particular  are  investigated  in  this  chapter:  the  first  being  the 
different  ways  in  which  Diogenes  and  Philodemus  use  the  traditional  Greek 
myths. Having stated so forcefully in the De Musica that music is an unnecessary 
pleasure, it might be surprising to see Philodemus use it as an important didactic 
tool, and I will look at his usage in comparison to Diogenes’ more traditional 
approach. The second aspect of my investigation is to clarify Diogenes’ claims 
that there is an analogy between the mousikoi in music and the kritikoi in poetry, 
and to analyse Philodemus’ criticism of this claim. 
  The short final chapter draws together my conclusions, and also raises the 
suggestion that Philodemus had more than one motive for writing this refutation 
of Diogenes’ musical philosophy. I will suggest that Philodemus not only wished 
to  refute  the  views  of  the  opposing  school,  but  he  took  the  opportunity  to 
vigorously defend the Epicurean school against accusations of ignorance.  
 
Notes on the text 
 
For discussion of particular passages from the Philodemian De Musica, I quote 
the Greek text as well as translation (my own unless otherwise stated). I also 
quote the Greek text as well as translation where specific details of the Greek are 
relevant to my argument, or where the Greek text is not easily accessible. For 
discussion of very short extracts, I quote translation only, or insert particularly 
relevant Greek in parentheses.   9 
For all other texts, unless otherwise stated, I quote translations, and text if 
relevant, from the Loeb Classical Library series.
6 
All  abbreviations  of  ancient  works  comply  with  those  in  the  Oxford 
Classical  Dictionary,  3rd  edn,  edited  by  Simon  Hornblower  and  Antony  
Spawforth (Oxford: 1996), or where not given in the OCD, comply with the 
Liddell and Scott Greek–English Lexicon.
7   
The following marking are used in the Greek of Philodemus’ De Musica: 
 
[  ]  indicates supplied characters 
*  indicates small blank space in the papyrus line 
_  indicates doubtful character 




                                                 
6 The Loeb Classical Library, published currently by Harvard University Press. 
7 Ninth edn, revised and augmented by H. Stuart Jones and R. McKenzie (Oxford: 1996).   10 
Chapter 2 
 
PHILODEMUS’ DE MUSICA  (1) 
 
(i)   Introduction 
 
The  primary  evidence  for  my  investigation  into  Diogenes  of  Babylon’s  ethico-
musical  theory  is  the  polemical  treatise
1  entitled  De  Musica  by  Philodemus  of 
Gadara. An Epicurean philosopher of the first century BC (c. 110–40 BC), his work 
is almost the only surviving evidence of the views of Diogenes of Babylon. Along 
with  many  other  texts,  this  work  was  buried  in  the  Villa  of  the  Papyri  in 
Herculaneum during the Vesuvian eruption of AD 79. The work was first uncovered 
along with many other papyri during the excavations of the eighteenth century, and 
first published in Leipzig by Johannes Kemke in 1884. The more legible columns, 
which form the later columns were subsequently re-edited by van Krevelin in 1939, 
Rispoli in 1969, and Neubecker in 1986. 
Following the setting up of the Philodemus Translation Project,
2 the whole 
treatise has recently been reassessed and reconstructed by Professor Daniel Delattre
3 
using new techniques for reassembling the columns, discovered independently by 
himself and Professor Dirk Obbink (many of the papyrus rolls had been sliced open 
and  copied  following  their  discovery,  and  subsequently  stored  and  read  in  an 
incorrect  order),
4  and  also  utilising  updated  multi-spectral  imaging  facilities  for 
                                                 
1 I use this word guardedly as Delattre (2007) suggests that it is a ‘gross impropriety to assign the 
word “treatise” to any of Philodemus’ works’. He asserts that the philosopher’s writings are not at all 
of the style of a monograph, as the word ‘treatise’ has come to be used, but very much of the style of 
a defence of the Epicurean school against their adversaries (see Introductory chapter, p. 4). This will 
indeed be confirmed in the passages discussed. See also my Conclusion, where I will argue that this 
work was indeed a defence of the Epicurean school against claims of ignorance. 
2 Created to edit and translate Philodemus’ three aesthetic works: Janko (2000: vi).  
3 Professor Delattre started his work on the De Musica for his own Ph.D.  
4  Obbink  2002:  v–ix;  Delattre  (2007)  Introduction  ‘Le  máterial  papyrologique  nécessaire  à  la 
construction du Livre IV de La Musique  de Philodème’.   11 
reading  the  papyrus  columns.  The  reconstructed  text,  French  translation  and 
commentary has now been published by Les Belles Lettres (December 2007).
5 
Delattre’s reconstruction shows that the surviving text, rather than consisting 
of the remains of four books, as was thought by the first editor (and generally not 
challenged by subsequent editors), in fact consists of just one book, the last of a 
series of four, believed to have been dedicated to the analysis and criticism of the 
musical  philosophy  of  various  writers.  Book  IV  deals  with  that  of  Diogenes  of 
Babylon. Professor Delattre very kindly allowed me to read his reconstruction in 
advance of its publication, and it was made clear to me that it is possible to read and 
analyse,  as  a  coherent  whole  (albeit  with  some  long  lacunae),  the  musical 
philosophy  of  Diogenes  as  reported  by  Philodemus.  Delattre  has  located  some 
thirty-one direct parallels within the text of Book IV between Philodemus’ report of 
Diogenes’ thought, and his refutation (some of these had already been identified as 
closely allied by Von Arnim in his Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta Book III), and 
using  his  knowledge  of  Philodemus’  writing  techniques  (on  which  see  below), 
Delattre has been able to offer plausible suggestions as to what might have been 
written in many of the lacunae in this very damaged text. 
Reconstructions of other Herculaneum papyri containing Philodemus’ works 
have confirmed Philodemus’ critical methodology, and this has enabled scholars to 
assume certain practices with confidence.
6 The methodology consists of three basic 
stages, and these are followed in this treatise. 
1.  Statement of opponent’s views and arguments, usually in the third-
person singular – he says, he affirms, etc. (In this treatise, Diogenes’ 
claims are laid out in columns 1–54.
7) 
                                                 
5 In the Collections des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l’Association Guillaume 
Budé. The Summer 2008 newsletter of the Friends of Herculaneum Society states, ‘Professor Delattre 
also described his elation when more recent multi-spectral imaging produced pages of new readings, 
even though he had just completed his edition and would now have to revisit the whole text.’ It will 
be exciting to be able to learn more about Diogenes’ views, if indeed this becomes possible, in due 
course. 
6 Janko 2000; Obbink 1996, for example. 
7 All references to columns will be to numbers as they appear in Delattre 2007, unless otherwise 
stated.    12 
2.  Philodemus then criticises his opponent’s theories. (In this work, the 
refutation occupies columns 55–142.) 
3.  A final resumé of the opponent’s claims, with their refutations, and 
conclusion generally follows. (In this work, this occurs in columns 
143–152, although Delattre suggests that this final section rounds up 
not just this book (IV) but probably the previous three books also.)
8 
 
The De Musica IV is clearly a philosophical work, dealing with educational theory, 
psychology, and, to a lesser extent, theology. It is not a technical musical treatise. 
Unlike the work of Aristides Quintilianus or Aristoxenus, for example, there is no 
discussion of musical intervals, or harmonic theory (although there is brief reference 
to the latter at column 48, see below, page 41), but rather in the manner of Plato’s 
Republic and Laws, there is discussion of harmony between the soul and the body 
(column 10, see chapter 4, below), the use of music within education, the limit to 
which  one  should  take  one’s  musical  studies,  and  not  pursue  it  as  a  profession 
(column 14), a matter also discussed by Aristotle in his Politics Book VIII. These 
discussions will be analysed in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
 
(ii)  Diogenes of Babylon: his life and work 
 
Diogenes of Babylon (traditionally c. 240–152BC)
9 was the fifth scholarch of the 
Stoa, following Zeno of Tarsus.
10 A pupil of Chrysippus,
11 and teacher of Panaetius, 
Mnesarchus,  and  Dardanus,  he  was  interested  in  linguistics,  music,  education, 
philosophical psychology, rhetoric, ethics and political theory.
12 
Although none of his writings are still extant, he is known to have written on a 
number of subjects: 
                                                 
8 Delattre 1999. 
9 Cicero, De Senectute VII.23. 
10 Diogenes appears in the Herculaneum Index Stoicorum at 48.3–8; Der neue Pauly s.v. 15; see also 
Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 355.  
11 D.L. VII. 84 ; Blank 1994: 55. 
12 D.L. VII. 55–8; Cicero Leg. III; Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 355.   13 
•  On  Voice  referred  to  by  Diogenes  Laertius  at  his  Lives  of  Eminent 
Philosophers  VII.55 and 57. 
•  On Language, again attested by Diogenes Laertius at VII.55–8. 
•  On the Dialectical Art, again attested by Diogenes Laertius at VII.71. 
•  On  the  Governing  Part  of  the  Soul,  recorded  by  Galen    in  De  Placitis 
Hippocratis et Platonis II. 
•  [On  Music,  reported  and  refuted  in  book  IV  of  Philodemus’  own  De 
Musica.]
13 
•  On Law referred to at Athenaeus 526c–d, and Cicero Laws III.13–14. 
•  On Athena referred to by Philodemus in his De Pietate. 
 
There is no known biography of Diogenes,
14 and he is probably best known for his 
participation in the embassy that was sent to Rome (together with Carneades and 
Critolaus) in 155 BC to negotiate a reduction in the fine imposed upon Athens for 
the sack of Oropus.
15 
It  is  suggested,  however,  that  Diogenes  generally  ‘reformulated  the  early 
scholarchs’  position  so  effectively  that  his  became  the  orthodox  Stoic  position 
during the second and first centuries BC’.
16 The fact that Diogenes is Philodemus’ 
principal opponent in his De Rhetorica, and also the De Musica IV would seem to 
support this suggestion. Diogenes’ writings or at least his views must have survived 
in some form for Philodemus to have known about them, and they must have been 
thought sufficiently important or influential for Philodemus to consider them worth 
attacking.
17  There  is  always,  of  course,  the  possibility  that  no  other  Stoic  wrote 
sufficiently on the subjects; I have been unable to find any writings on music by 
another Stoic, except, perhaps, for a reference by Diogenes Laertius at VII.4 to a 
work entitled Pythagorean Questions in his list of works by Zeno of Tarsus. This 
                                                 
13 Whilst it is clear that Diogenes wrote about music, however, he did not necessarily write a work 
specifically on that subject. His discussion might have been included within another work. 
14 Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 356. 
15 Cicero, Acad. II.137; Pausanias VII.11, 4–8; Blank 1994: 56; OCD s.v. Diogenes of Babylon; 
Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 356. 
16 Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 358. 
17 It is thought by some scholars that much of Philodemus’ writing might in fact be notes taken from 
the lectures of his teacher, Zeno of Sidon (e.g., Janko 2000: 5, Sedley 1989: 103–4).   14 
reference  gives  no  indication,  however,  as  to  whether  or  not  music  is  actually 
discussed in this work. However, if it was, then the very title suggests that any 
musical  theory  would  have  displayed  a  Pythagorean  influence,  and  an  anecdote 
preserved by Plutarch would seem to support this. In his De Virtute Morali, Plutarch 
writes that Zeno, on going to the theatre with his scholars to hear one Amoebus sing 
said: 
 
[T2.ii.1]  Come, let us observe what harmony and music gut and sinew, wood and 
bone set forth when they partake of reason, proportion and order.
18 
 
Cleanthes, Zeno of Citium’s pupil,
19 and second head of the Stoa, wrote a 
Hymn to Zeus,
20 a philosophical hymn, which also functions as an expression of 
Stoic doctrine,
21 but there is no mention of a work on music in his list of writings 
preserved by Diogenes Laertius. There is a mention at column 53, line 9 in the 
Philodemean De Musica, of Cleanthes, but the papyrus is too damaged for more 
than a few words to be read. There is, however, a further mention of the same 
philosopher later in the same work, and I will discuss this more fully below, in 
section iii. 
Cicero attests at Laws III.13–14 that Diogenes made important contributions 
to Stoic political thought, stating that ‘on the topic of magistrates there are certain 
special points which have been investigated. . . by Diogenes the Stoic’, and affirms 
that no Stoic before Diogenes had written on practical political problems. 
Diogenes  also  ‘developed’  or  indeed  perhaps  ‘reformulated’  the  standard 
Stoic definition of the τέλος or ‘end’ insofar as he appears to have restated it in a 
more  clear  or  definite  form.  Stobaeus  reports  at  II.76.9–15  that  ‘Diogenes  [of 
Babylon  represented  the  end  (telos)  as]  reasoning  well  in  the  selection  and 
disselection  of  things  in  accordance  with  nature.  .  .’  (this  definition  is  repeated 
                                                 
18 Plutarch, De Virtute Morali 443A = SVF I. 299. This translation by W. C. Hembold in the Loeb 
edition. 
19 D.L. VII.176. 
20 For a short discussion on which, see below, chapter 3, section ii. 
21 Thom 2005: 13.    15 
verbatim at D.L.VII.88). Chrysippus’ own definition of the telos, as reported by 
Diogenes  Laertius  at  VII.87  was  ‘living  in  accordance  with  nature.  .  .  living 
virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course 
of nature’. Diogenes’ definition does not appear to differ in any material way from 
Chrysippus’,  but  seems  to  lay  more  emphasis  on  the  role  of  selection,  perhaps 
simply clarifying Chrysippus’ original intention.
22 
It could be argued that Chrysippus’ wording of ‘experience of the actual 
course of nature’ in actuality does imply the notion of selection made possible by 
experience  or  knowledge.  This  would  seem  to  be  confirmed  as  Chrysippus’ 
intention by Epictetus, who quotes a passage from Chrysippus which states ‘the god 
himself  has  given  me  the  power  to  select  things  according  to  nature’.
23  Both 
Diogenes and Chrysippus, therefore, make use of the word ‘select’, and so it would 
appear that there is no fundamental difference in their respective definitions. 
The Stoic definition of telos was attacked by the Academic Carneades
24 for 
its obscurity and lack of clarity, the main criticism being the meaning of τὰ κατὰ 
φύσιν, ‘things according to nature’, the phrase inserted by Diogenes in his own 
definition
25  (and  both  Cicero  and  Plutarch  accuse  the  Stoics  of  inconsistency  in 
terminology
26).  The  definition  was  further  refined  by  Antipater  (Diogenes’ 
successor),  Panaetius  and  Posidonius,  perhaps  all  in  reaction  to  this  criticism. 
However, there is nothing to suggest that Diogenes’ own definition was a reaction to 
criticism. Bodily and external goods have no moral value for the Stoics – they are 
merely  preferred  or  dispreferred  ‘indifferents’.  For  the  Stoics  these  preferred 
indifferents include ‘wealth, fame, health, strength and the like’ (D.L. VII.104, trans. 
Hicks (1995[1925]) in the Loeb edition). 
                                                 
22 Long 1967: 69, pace Pohlenz 1959: 186, who suggested that Diogenes was the ‘first to concentrate 
on the problem of moral choice’. 
23 SVF III. 191; Long 1967: 68. 
24 See Plutarch Comm. Not. 1072. 
25 Cicero De Finibus III.31; Plutarch, Comm. Not. 1069D. 
26 E.g., Plut. De Stoic. Repugn. 1034–5, 1047–8; Cicero De Finibus III.52, where Cicero states the 
Stoic view as ‘if the meaning is clear, we should be relaxed about the words we use’ (trans. Woolf 
2001).   16 
The  end  is  therefore  about  one’s  internal  being  –  as  Long  states,
27  
‘Diogenes. . . makes no concession to external goods  as a source of happiness. . . 
happiness must be made internal, a concomitant of the rational state of mind which 
is the natural possession of the mature human being.’ And Diogenes Laertius at VII. 
89 follows his statement of Diogenes’ definition of the telos with: 
 
[T2.ii.2]    By  nature  with  which  our  life  ought  to  be  in  accord,  Chrysippus 
understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man. . . and 
virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition choiceworthy for its own sake, and not 
from hope or fear or any external motive.     
(Trans. Hicks, emphasis mine) 
 
In  the  discussion  on  virtue  that  follows,  Diogenes  Laertius  gives  no 
indication that he is moving from one view to another, which would suggest that 
there was no disagreement among the early Stoics in this respect. 
The evidence discussed thus far indicates that there is no reason to suppose 
that Diogenes was unorthodox in his ethics. 
 
(iii)   Stoic psychology 
 
The Stoic view of the soul as outlined by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers at VII.110 is as follows: 
 
[T2.iii.1]  According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five 
senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and 
the generative faculty. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends 
to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are 
causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and 
unnatural movement of the soul, or again as impulse in excess.     
(Trans. Hicks, modified) 
                                                 
27 1967: 72.   17 
 
Although he refers to ‘the Stoics’ generally, and does not give his exact 
source  for  this  definition,  Diogenes  (Laertius)  continues,  citing  Zeno’s  On  the 
Passions, and Chrysippus’ treatise of the same name as authorities two lines further 
on in this discussion. And with regard to the location of the soul or ‘governing part’, 
Chrysippus  ‘went  to  great  lengths  to  defend  the  heart  as  the  location  of  the 
governing part of the psuchē’.
28 Galen records that Chrysippus said ‘The heart is the 
location of the part where all these parts [of the psuchē which extend to the rest of 
the body] meet, which is the governing part of the psuchē.’
29 Philodemus, in his On 
Piety reports that Diogenes supported Chrysippus’ view, in Diogenes’ own work On 
Athena. If Diogenes supported Chrysippus in this area, then it may be that he did so 
in other areas also. At any rate, the evidence so far discussed would suggest that 
Diogenes views did not largely differ from his predecessor (although it has to be 
conceded that this is not a strong argument). The relevant passage of Diogenes’ On 
Athena now only exists as paraphrase within Philodemus’ writing, and is discussed 
briefly in chapter 3, below. Philodemus writes: 
 
[T2.iii.2]  [Diogenes says that] some of the Stoics say that the ruling faculty of the 
will  is  in  the  head,  for  it  is  wisdom,  and  therefore  is  called  Metis:  but  that 
Chrysippus says that the ruling element of the soul is in the breast, and that Athena, 
who is wisdom, was born there, and [Diogenes says that] it is because the voice 
issues from the head (that) they [i.e. the people] say [that Athena was born] from the 
head [i.e. of Zeus], and [that they say that she was born] with the help of Hephaestus 
because wisdom comes by art (technē).
30  
 
From this extract it is clear that Diogenes’ search for an explanation for the 
claim that Athena came from Zeus’ head shows that he did not accept the obvious 
explanation that the mind is in the head. Whilst following his predecessor’s views 
                                                 
28 Algra et al. 1999: 564. 
29 PHP III.1.12, trans. Algra et al. 1999: 567. 
30 Trans. Obbink 1996: I.18, slightly modified.   18 
about the governing part of the psuchē, therefore, Diogenes did not follow blindly; 
he still sought an explanation for their beliefs.   
 




1.  Good / bad, has occurred, and 
2.  It is appropriate to act in a certain way. 
 
Emotion is, therefore, not involuntary, but consists of a series of evaluative 
reasonings, judgements following the acceptance or rejection of a proposition or 
first  movement.  The  judgement  involved  in  emotion  is  distinguished  from 
appearance  by  the  idea  that  belief  or  judgement  involves  the  assent  of  mind  or 
reason  to  the  appearance,
32  and  thus  the  proposition  contained  within  that 
appearance. Emotions are therefore voluntary for the Stoics in that we are free to 
question and evaluate the appearance (first movement) and either assent or withhold 
assent. 
All  action  is  voluntary,  i.e.,  what  distinguishes  humans  from  non-rational 
animals is that all their impressions are rational and that there has to be assent before 
the initial impression can lead to an action. Music, therefore, would seem to require 
some rational quality to be of any psychological value to the Stoic, as the soul would 
have (a) to understand the rational impression for it to be able to (b) assent to or 
reject the proposition it posed.  This would seem to highlight four problems: 
 
1.  How can music without words be rational, if, as I believe, and shall argue, 
the  music  under  discussion  is  occasionally  wordless,  or  is  at  least  being 
discussed  without  reference  to  words  in  some  instances?
33  If  words  were 
                                                 
31 Galen PHP IV.1.17–2.4; D. L. VII.111; Sorabji 2000: 2. 
32 Plutarch Against Colotes 1122c. 
33 The vocabulary  is quite specific, and appears  to omit  any reference  to words – in column 34 
(T2.v.1)  the  words  used  are  ἡρμοσμένον  καὶ  ἀνάρμοστον  the  same  words  as  in  the  Speusippus 
fragment (T2.App.1). Sextus (T2.iii.4) uses μέλος – tune, again no reference to words at all. For 
further discussion on music without words, see below, chapters 4, 5 and 6.   19 
involved none of the parties would need to account for the music’s effect on 
the hearer / listener: for Philodemus, the refutation would simply be that the 
words were the thing that affected the listener
34 – the music being rather 
incidental,  although  in  Philodemus’  view,  the  music  would  rather  have 
detracted from the words’ effect on the hearer. 
2.  When  there  are  words,  how  can  the  music  that  accompanies  them  add 
anything to the effect as far as reason is concerned? 
3.  How could music have an ethical value inherent within it, and, if it could 
4.  How could this be understood by the soul if the human cannot verbalise that 
value? 
 
As mentioned above, there is a mention of Cleanthes, the earlier Stoic at 
column 142, where Philodemus berates Cleanthes for saying: 
 
[T2.iii.3]  . . . that the poetical and musical patterns (παραδείγματα) are better and 
that  even  though  philosophical  discourse  is  able  to  express  divine  and  human 
matters adequately, it does not as prose have expressions proper to sublime divine 
objects, while metres and melodies and rhythms come closest to the truth of the 
contemplation of the divine.
35 
 
Cleanthes  clearly  had  something  to  say  about  music,  therefore,  and  as 
Delattre remarks in his footnote to this passage, it is very likely that Philodemus is 
responding to a claim made by Diogenes about Cleanthes’ beliefs. I would suggest 
further that as it was included within Diogenes’ own section, then it is likely that 
Diogenes  shared  the  belief  with  his  predecessor.  As  Scade  states,
36  Cleanthes’ 
                                                 
34 Indeed, on occasions Philodemus does use this argument. See below, page 61 and n.16. 
35 Trans. Thom 2005: 5, as amended. Philodemus remarks, ‘a more ridiculous statement than which 
is not easy to find (οὗ καταγελαστότερον οὐ ῥάιδιον εὑρεῖν). 
36 2007: 218. This scholar and I first met at a meeting of the London philosophy seminars in the 
2006/7 series, where we both gave papers. During this meeting we discovered that we had both read 
Long 1996 [1991] (for more on which, see below, section 2.v), and had independently come to the 
conclusion that it was very much under appreciated. I thank Paul Scade for allowing me to use a copy 
of his chapter 3 from his thesis where he discusses the Long paper. I also thank him for discussing   20 
passage  clearly  shows  that  the  Stoic  regarded  musical  harmony  as  a  rational 
phenomenon; it also indicates ‘the structural side of music by emphasising rhythm 
and  metre’,
37  and  the  passage  continues,  “[Cleanthes  says]”  ‘It  is  not  that  ideas 
[alone]  are  not  helpful,  but  when  they  are  set  to  music,  the  stimulus  from  the 
thoughts themselves, accompanied by melodies is even greater’. Plato himself at 
Philebus 17c ff. (below, T2.v.4) was similarly concerned with the rhythm and metre 
in his view of music, and I will discuss this more fully further below. 
That music had an effect on peoples’ behaviour was widely accepted,
38 as 
illustrated by Sextus at M. VI.8, where he talks about music’s soothing effect: 
 
[T2.iii.4]  Thus, Pythagoras, having noticed on one occasion that the youths who 
were in a state of drunkenness differed not at all from madmen, advised the flute 
player who was with them in their revels to play the ‘spondean’ tune (σπονδεῖον 
μέλος); and when he had done as instructed, they suddenly changed and became 
sober just as if they had been sober from the beginning. (Trans.Bury 2000[1949]) 
 
But a plausible answer to item 4 in the above list is important if Diogenes is 
not to be regarded as taking a similar view to that of the later Stoic, Posidonius’ 
view  as  represented  by  Galen  at  PHP    V.6.22–3.
39  Here,  Galen  suggests  that 
Posidonius, like Plato, believed the soul to comprise both rational and irrational 
parts, and cites the effect of music on a group of drunken youths, calmed by the flute 
player changing from the Phrygian mode to the Dorian mode, but claiming that it 
could only affect the irrational:
40 
                                                                                                                                        
Long’s views further with me, and for their possible impact on our understanding of the musical 
philosophy of the early Stoics, and Diogenes of Babylon in particular. 
37 Scade 2007: 218. 
38 This belief is attested to followers of Pythagoras at Iamblichus VP 110–11. At Laws VII. 790e, 
Plato refers to the tunes with which mothers put their fractious babies to sleep; at 791ab he refers to 
dances in ritual to the deities that invoke calm and relief to the frenzied soul. Aristotle, at Politics 
VIII. 1340a, remarks that it is clear that people are affected by many kinds of music; and at 1342a–b 
he suggests that the Phrygian mode induces ecstasy and emotion. 
39 De Lacy 330–1 = Posidonius fr. 168 E–K. 
40 In fact an incident almost identical to that reported in T2.iii.4, apart from the main protagonist, and 
one that was in fact in all likelihood the same, and indeed was reported by a number of other authors. 
See also chapter 3, T3.i.21–4, below.   21 
 
[T2.iii.5]  …For obviously opinions held by their [the drunken young men] rational 
faculty  were  hardly  changed  through  instruction  from  a  musical  instrument;  but  
since  the  emotional  element  of  soul  is  irrational,  they  are  aroused,  and  calmed 
through irrational movements. You see, the irrational is helped and harmed by what 
is irrational, the rational by knowledge and ignorance.         
               (Trans. Kidd, emphasis mine) 
 
According  to  Galen,  Posidonius  rejected  Chrysippus’  views  on  emotion  and  the 
psychology of action, preferring instead the tripartite psychology of reason, spirit 
and appetite.
41 However, apart from Galen, no ancient writer suggests that this was 
the  case,  and  it  is  quite  possible  that  Galen  is  either  deliberately  or  mistakenly 
misunderstanding Posidonius’ position. At De Fin. I.6, Cicero includes Posidonius 
with no comment in his list of Stoic writers. ‘For what in the case of the Stoics, has 
been left out by Chrysippus? Yes, we read Diogenes, Panaetius and not least our 
friend Posidonius.’ Had Posidonius been notorious for departing from Stoic views in 
such a fundamental theory, surely Cicero would not have included him in his listing 
so casually.
42 
Yet, at PHP V.1.10–11,
43 Galen states that Posidonius was too ashamed of 
Chrysippus’ views on emotion to follow them, and turned instead to the theories of 
the ancients – ‘Posidonius. . . both praises and accepts the Platonic view and refutes 
Chrysippus.’
44 
Diogenes certainly follows Plato in much of his musical writings, as will be 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4 below. However, with regard to the division of the 
soul, I would argue that there is nothing to suggest that he followed Plato rather than 
orthodox Stoic thought, even though Vander Waerdt asserts that Diogenes ‘divided 
the soul into separate parts along Platonic lines’ and anticipated the modifications on 
                                                 
41 Cooper 1998: 71. 
42 See also Tieleman 2007: 108, who uses the same Cicero passage to support his argument for the 
orthodoxy of Panaetius. Tieleman writes, ‘Cicero. . . would not have mentioned Panaetius (or any of 
the others) if the latter had in his view differed significantly from Chrysippus on these subjects.’ 
43 De Lacy 294.15–25. 
44 PHP V.1.5.   22 
Stoic psychology,
45 citing the De Musica IV columns 51–2, 76 (part), 67, and 77.3 
[40–1, 56, 57, and 69.3] as evidence of this.
46 Teun Tieleman has also indicated his 
disagreement  with  Vander  Waerdt’s  theory,  stating,  ‘And  Obbink  and  Vander 
Waerdt. . . take [Diogenes] to have been a dualist throughout. This is a mistake 
however.’
47 
It is indeed a mistake, because: only columns 51–2 [40–1] of the columns 
cited by Vander Waerdt as evidence of Diogenes’ dualism appear within the report 
of Diogenes’ own theory – the other three form part of Philodemus’ refutation, and 
all are situated within discussion on music and education, which I shall discuss in 
more  detail  in  chapter  4.  Columns  51–2  [40–1]  appear  almost  at  the  end  of 
Diogenes’ reported theory, and could almost have been lifted directly out of Plato’s 
Laws VII. 802b–c and II. 669b–e. They discuss the legislators, experts in poetry and 
music, who would be considered fit to regulate the music, and then move on to the 
voicing  of  concern  about  the  dangers  of  inappropriate  musical  imagery  with  its 
inherent moral danger. The inferiority of the writers of music compared with the 
Muses is also emphasised. The early part of each column is very damaged, and 
Delattre suggests that column 51 might well have commenced with something like 
‘It is necessary, as Plato suggests, that. . .’
48 However, there is no mention here of 
the parts of a soul. 
The remaining three columns cited by Vander Waerdt, above, form part of 
Philodemus’ refutation, and column 76 [56] indeed contains a reference to ‘parts of 
the soul’ – the wording is μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς. At column 77, 2–3 [69], the wording is 
simply ἔκαστον τούτων, here the specific reference to ‘parts of the soul’, whilst 
plausible  in  the  context,  has  been  supplied  by  the  editors  of  the  text.  As  stated 
above, I will discuss these columns further within my discussion on education in 
                                                 
45 1991: 208nn. 53, 53; Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 355n. 4. 
46 For ease of discussion and reading, all column numbers have been converted to those in Delattre’s 
new edition (2007). The numbers in square brackets are those quoted in Vander Waerdt’s discussion, 
taken from Delattre 1989. 
47 Tieleman 2003: 243–4. 
48 Delattre 2007 commentary to column 51. See my more detailed discussion of these columns in 
chapter 4, below.   23 
chapter 4. However, at no place within these columns is there a specific mention of a 
tripartite soul, but merely to ‘parts’ of the soul. 
It is true that in an earlier column (8), which directly corresponds to the 
column 77 [69] mentioned above, Diogenes discusses in a very Platonic fashion the 
place  of  music  and  gymnastics  within  education,  each  benefiting  the  soul  and 
body.
49  In  column  8,  Diogenes  certainly  uses  the  same  wording  as  Plato  in  his 
references to  ‘parts of the soul’, but again there is no suggestion of any division 
between  the  ‘rational’  and  ‘the  irrational’  part,  or  a  number  of  distinct  parts. 
Although the restoration τὰ [μέρη τῆς] ψυχῆς is again speculative, the phrase used in 
the corresponding line of Philodemus’ refutation uses the same wording (μέρη τῆς 
ψυχῆς, col. 77, 40–1). This phrase also occurs at Chrysippus SVF II. 841 (= Galen 
PHP V.2.49–50 and 3.1 = p. 304 De Lacy), within Galen’s criticism of Chrysippus 
for  failing to  describe  the  parts  of  the  soul  in Chrysippus’  own  treatise  entitled 
Therapy and Ethics. In his treatise, Chrysippus writes that ‘the soul will also be 
called beautiful or ugly in terms of the proportion or disproportion of certain parts 
(μερῶν)’. But Galen criticises Chrysippus, claiming he was not able to define these 
parts, but was forced to define them in terms of their activities, wrongly in Galen’s 
view (PHP V.2.47–9). He quotes Chrysippus as saying: 
 
[T2.iii.6]  Ἔστι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη δι᾽ ὧν ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγος συνέστηκε καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ 
διάθεσις. καὶ ἔστι καλὴ ἢ αἰσχρὰ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μόριον ἔχον <ὅυτως> ἣ 
οὕτως κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους μερισμούς.    
 
They are parts of the soul through which its reason and the disposition is constituted. 
And a soul is beautiful or ugly by virtue of its governing part being in this or that 
state with respect to its own proper divisions. (Trans. De Lacy) 
 
Galen proceeds to ask Chrysippus to state ‘the proper divisions’ to ‘relieve 
us of our difficulty’ (PHP V.2.50–1), and goes on to attempt his own analysis of 
these parts using examples of the different (physical) parts of the eye and the ear to 
                                                 
49 For a discussion on these columns, and their similarities to Platonic thought, see chapter 4, T4.1.   24 
explain that ‘nothing is composed of its own activities and states that parts (μόρια) 
comprise rather ‘bones, cartilages, nerves, membranes and a number of other things’ 
(PHP V.3.4–7 = De Lacy 306, emphasis mine). 
Later in the same work (PHP V.4.2–4 = De Lacy 312) Galen states: 
 
[T2.iii.7]  My purpose is to show that it is not a single part of the soul nor by virtue 
of a single power of it that both judgements and affections occur, as Chrysippus 
claimed, but that the soul has both a plurality of powers. . . and a plurality of parts.
                (Trans. De Lacy) 
 
It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  Galen  regards  Chrysippus  as  a  psychological 
monist, even though Galen also cites him as speaking of parts, and throughout his 
criticism  he  compares  Chrysippus’  theory  with  that  of  Plato,  Aristotle  and 
Posidonius. Therefore the fact that Diogenes also refers to parts does not mean that 
he is not a psychological monist, like Chrysippus. Diogenes can also be seen to be 
following the standard Stoic psychology of action in the wording of his column 14: 
 
[T2.iii.8]   εν.[. . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  
δὲ καὶ [δ]ιδαχ[η. . . . .  . . . . .  
πρὸς ἀρετη[. . . .  . . . .  . 
βούλεσθαι κα[. . . . .  . . . . .  . 
ὁρμάς τινας ἐ[μποιεῖν· ἐ- 
πειδήπερ πρά[ξεις καὶ κα- 
τὰ προαίρεσίν ε[ἰσιν, ὡς 
τύπ[ῳ λαβεῖν, πρ[οαιρ]έσεις 





   25 
Moreover, an education. . . . . towards virtue. . .wish . . .  engender certain impulses; 
[and] since moral actions arise through deliberate choice, to grasp the matter in 




Philodemus’ criticism at columns 89, 27–90, 14 is more expansive: 
 
[T2.iii.9] . . . ουθαι πρ[ο]αιρε[σ        27 
. . . δι]αφέρε[ι τ]ῶι συγ[χω- 
ρήσει]ν, κἂν βούληται [ταύ- 
την] ὁρμὰς ἐμποιεῖν, καὶ          30 
πρ[οαιρ]έσεις εἶναι πάθη τι- 
νὰ με]τὰ δυνάμεως, ὅτι πο- 
τὲ τα]ὐτό ἐστι. τὸ δ᾽ ἀρχὴν εἶ- 
ναι] τοῦ λαβεῖν τὰς προαι- 
ρέ]σεις ταύτας καὶ τὰς δυνά-          35 
μ]εις τὰ πάθη, πρὸς ἀνδρεί- 
α]ν μὲν θάρσος,  πρὸς σω- 
φροσύνην δὲ αἰσχύνην 
κ]αὶ κόσμον, ἄλλα δὲ πρὸς 
ἄλλα, γελοῖόν ἐστι συγχω-          40 
ρε]ιν· οὐχ ὅτι γὰρ τοῦ λαβεῖν 
τ]ὰς εἰρημένας δυνάμεις ὡ[ς 
ὄντα τοιαῦτα πάθη δώσει 
τις ἀρχάς, ἀλλ᾽  ἀρετὰς ἢ τῶν 
ἀ]ρετῶν [ἀ]ποτελέσματα·          45 
ἀλλὰ] μὴν τὰ θάρση καὶ τὰς          1 
αἰσχύ]νας καὶ κοσμιοτήτα[ς 
καὶ τ]ὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη προσ- 
αγορ]εύει· καὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς δι ᾽ 
                                                 
50 Emphasis mine.   26 
ὧν λ]αμβάνουσι τὰς δυνά-          5 
μεις], οὐ μόνον λέγων ὑπὸ 
τῶν κυρίων γίνεσθαι πρά- 
ξεω]ν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ὁ- 
μοι]ωμάτων ἀγνοεῖ, διὰ 
φύ]σεώς τε νομίζων, ὡς εἶ-          10 
πεν], ἀρετάς τινας ἐνγίνε- 
σθαι], καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τὴν ο- 
. . . .]φόρον ἀνδρείαν ἢ δι- 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .            14 
 
[Diogenes] differs in that he will grant that, even if he claims that <music> inspires 
impulses, and that intentions are certain affections (pathe) accompanied by capacity, 
that  [sometimes]  it  is  [the  same  thing].  For  that  the  origin  of  acquiring  these 
intentions  and  strength  are  affections  –  audacity  leading  to  courage,  shame  and 
reserve to temperance, and so on – it is laughable to grant this. For far from someone 
granting that the origins of acquiring the aforementioned powers are such affections, 
he will insist that they are virtues or the effects of the virtues. Yet Diogenes calls 
boldness and shame and reserve and such things affections; and in saying that the 
impulses  through  which  people  acquire  the  powers  come  about  not  only  from 
actions in the strict sense, but also [from] things like them, he goes wrong, as also 
when he believes, as he says, that some virtues come to be in people as a result of 
nature, and still more. . .courage. . . 
 
 
As  Philodemus  sees  it,  Diogenes  disregards  the  distinction  between  the 
virtues and the affections from which they come. His refutation makes it clear that 
Diogenes’ psychology of action is orthodox Stoic. It seems clear also that Diogenes 
did not adopt Plato’s psychology, and the fact that Diogenes also argues that music’s 
ethical value can be recognised by a ‘knowing sense’ (see below, T2.v.1), whilst 
asserting  that  these  ‘parts’  are  inseparably  linked,  would  seem  to  confirm  that   27 
Diogenes cannot have adopted Plato’s psychology. It is noted that Diogenes also 
appears to use terminology and arguments that bears a significant resemblance to 
Aristotle  in  Politics  VIII,  and  Poetics.  Janko  suggests  that  Aristotle’s  theory  of 
tragic catharsis was, in fact, an important part of Diogenes’ musical philosophy,
51 
and I will discuss this further in chapter 5 below. However, the point should be 
made that simply because Diogenes draws upon certain parts of earlier philosophers’ 
theories, this does not necessarily imply that he accepted the full theory. 
 
(iv)   Oikeiōsis 
 
Diogenes  himself  clearly  believed  that  wordless  music  indeed  has  psychological 
value    (a  value  also  argued  for  in  respect  of  poetry  by  Crates,  and  refuted  by 
Philodemus – see chapter 6 below, entitled ‘Stoics versus Epicureans on poetry’), 




τὸ εὐήκο[ον παῖδα κ]|αὶ ὅλως 
εὐαί[σθητον γίνεσθα]|ι ὑπὸ ῥυ- 
θμοῦ καὶ μουσι[κὴ ἀφ]|ίησιν, 
ὡς ἔχουσά  τινας ἀ[ρετ]|ὰς συγ- 
γενεῖς· ἰσχύειν γὰρ [ἐν] | πᾶσιν        5 
μάλιστ[α] τὸ  οἰκεῖο[ν κ]|αὶ προσ- 
φύεσθαι [τ]άχι[στα καὶ ῥ]|ᾶιστα 
τὸ ὅμοιον, ὡσπερ [γ᾽ αἰσθ]|ητά 
τινα προσφερόμ[ενο]|ν εὐθὺ 
τῆς οὐσίας· ἐξ ὧν δ[ὴ καὶ τ]|ὰς        10 
ἀπολαύσεις κα[ὶ τὰ πά]|θη 
καὶ καθόλου τὰς [αἰσθή]|σεις 
 
                                                 
51 Janko 1992a: 347, a suggestion that I will refute.   28 
σφ]οδροτάτας ἔσε[σθαι δι]|ὰ ταύ- 
την ἅμα δὲ κα.[. . . . .τ]|ῆς [ἡ- 
δο]νῆς δυνα[μ. . . .  .]| κα[. .          15 
. . ] οὐ μικρὰν το[. . . .  . σ]|υμ- 
. . . .  . . .]ι πρ[. . . .  π]|άθος 
ἀπ]αθεστατ[. . . .  . . . .]|ιν ἀ- 
ναισθητς[. . . .  . . . .]|ιτων 
κατα|[. . . .  . . . .  . . . .  .           20 




[for] music also allows [the child] to acquire  a good ear, and in general, a keenness 
of perception under the influence of the rhythm, given that it [the music] possesses 
certain in-born natural virtues ; for he says  that what is strongest in all things is 
what is proper, and it is what is similar that is assimilated most swiftly and easily 
being  borne  directly  to  [one’s]  being  like  certain  sensibles;  and  as  a  result  our 
enjoyments and our affections and in general our sensations will be most strong on 
account of this [music?]. . . 
 
With regard to the word ‘virtues’, as stated above (p. 16), for the Stoics, the 
only ‘good’ or ‘virtue’ was moral good/virtue. And Sextus reports at M. XI.22 (SVF 
III.75 part): 
 
                                                 
52 Janko (1992b: 125) differs in his reconstruction of this column; at line 1 he chooses not to insert ον 
παῖδα within the lacuna; at line 3, Delattre argues for μουσική being in the nominative, and so the 
subject of the sentence, but Janko has it in the genitive – μουσικῆς. Also at line 3 for ἀφίησιν Janko 
reads  αἴσθησιν. Janko’s translation of these lines reads, ‘what is easily heard and in general easily 
sensed  [and  the]  sensation  (?)  from  rhythm  and  music,  as  if  it  (sc.  the  music)  has  some  inborn 
virtues’. One would expect ‘ἔχουσά’ in line 4 to also be in the genitive to agree with ‘μουσικῆς’, but 
Janko states, ‘But the clause ὡς ἔχουσά τινας ἀρετὰς συγγενεῖς’ is not within the oratio obliqua, and 
appears to be a gloss by Philodemus, restating Diogenes’ point in Epicurean terminology’.  At line 
12, Janko replaces αἰσθήσεις with ἐκστασέις. Delattre acknowledges Janko’s variation, but clearly 
does not agree with it, and I follow Delattre’s text for the translation. See Delattre 2007: vol. I, 32, n. 
7. For further discussion, see below, pp. 35–6.   29 
[T2.iv.2]  The Stoics. . . define the good (ἀρετήν) as follows: ‘Good is benefit or not 
other than benefit’, meaning by benefit virtue and virtuous action, and by not other 
than benefit, the virtuous man and his friend. For virtue which is a disposition of the 
commanding faculty, and virtuous action, which is an activity in accordance with 
virtue, are benefit. . . (Trans. Long and Sedley 1987 60G) 
 
I would suggest that like Plato, Diogenes believed that music was a gift from 
the gods; the etymology of μουσική would for the Stoic confirm its link with the 
muses, Μοῦσαι. At Column 38, Philodemus reports that Diogenes in his own treatise 
wrote at great length of music’s first use – that of honouring the divinity, on which 
see  further  chapter  3,  section  ii  below.  And  he  states  that  for  Diogenes  the 
etymology  confirms  music’s  relation  to  the  divine,  citing  the  word  θεωρέιν 
[watching], and its link to θεός [god].
53 The Muses are related to the gods, and so 
music is similarly related, by association. This etymological connection is reiterated 
by [Plutarch] in his De Musica at 1140D–E.
54     
The Stoics used the writings of Homer and Hesiod to try to ‘recover the 
serious thoughts about the world by removing the veneers from the ancient poets’ 
fictions  and  superstitions’
55  and  reinterpreting  the  myths  in  their  attempts  to 
understand nature and traditional religion, and I would suggest that for the Stoics, 
these myths provided an account of the origin of music, with or without words. The 
later Stoic writer Cornutus (first century AD) used etymology in his Compendium of 
Traditional Greek Theology,  assuming that ‘Greek gods have names and epithets. . . 
because in their original usage these names represented the way people understood 
the world. Etymology enabled the Stoic philosopher to recover the beliefs about the 
world held by those who first gave the gods their present names.’
56 Plato, also, in his 
Cratylus, especially at 391b–410e, discussed the etymology of the Gods’ names. For 
example  at  404c  Socrates  states  that  ‘Hera  is  the  lovely  one ( ἑρατή),  for  Zeus, 
                                                 
53 Philodemus ridicules this claim at col. 118, as I will discuss in chapter 3, section ii. 
54 There is nothing specific to suggest that [Plutarch] is using the Stoics as a source here. However, 
there are various passages in the [Plutarchan] De Musica that have similarities to Diogenes’ writings, 
for discussion of which see chapter 3, section i below. 
55 Long 1996 [1992]: 74. 
56 Long 1996 [1992]: 71.   30 
according to tradition, loved and married her; possibly also the name may have been 
given  when  the  legislator  was  thinking  of  the  heavens,  and  may  be  only  a  thin 
disguise of the air (ἁήρ). You will recognise the truth of this if you repeat the letters 
of Hera several times over.’
57 This is not to suggest that the Stoics took the myths as 
true, but rather sought to uncover the truth that lay behind the myths. 
Philodemus also writes at De Pietate col. vi that ‘It was things in Homer and 
Hesiod that Chrysippus tried to harmonise with Stoic doctrines, that is the divine 
names and myths transmitted by the poets.’  And  at  column  43  of  the  De  Musica 
Diogenes cites the etymology of the muse Erato as proof of music’s privileged link 
with virtuous love. 
 
[T2.iv.3]  ὄτι δὲ τὸ [μέλος συμ- 
βάλλε[τ]αι πρὸς [τὴν ἐρωτι- 
κὴν ἀρετήν, αἱ[ρεῖν προση- 
κόντως καὶ μία[ν τῶν Μου- 
σῶν, Ἐρατώ γε το[ὔνομα. 
 
Appropriate proof of the fact that melody contributes to the management of erotic 
love is also provided by one of the Muses actually being called Erato. 
 
 If music was given to humans by the gods, then by its very nature it must be 
‘good’, i.e., morally good (unless contaminated by man), as part of Nature itself. For 
the Stoics, the gods are providential and beneficent,
58 and so something given by the 
gods must at least be capable of being used for moral good. Of course, being good 
as in morally good, being conducive to good, and being capable of being used for 
moral good are three different things, and the reference to aretē in the context of 
music (T2.iv.1) may be surprising. But it would appear that Diogenes might have 
drawn a direct analogy between virtuous action and the correct intervals of a Greek 
                                                 
57 Plato, Cratylus 404b, Trans. Jowett in Hamilton and Cairns eds. (1989) at 441. 
58 Cicero De Nat. D. II.75–6; Clement Paidagog. I.8.63.1–2 = SVF II.1116.    31 
musical scale, as suggested by Long
59 regarding the Stoics generally (see T2.v.3 
below), and I will discuss this suggestion further in the next section of this chapter. 




[T2.iv.4]  That it, virtue, can be taught is laid down by Chrysippus in the first 
book of his work On the End, by Cleanthes, by Posidonius in his Protrepticus, and 
by Hecato; that it can be taught is clear from the case of bad men becoming good. 
                   (Trans. Hicks) 
 
 
The phrases ‘assimilated’ and ‘easily being borne’ in extract T2.iv.1 suggest 
that Diogenes is applying the Stoic concept of οἰκείωσις – ‘natural affinity’ –  to 
musical theory.
60 
The concept of oikeiōsis, or natural affinity/appropriation, is ‘in all cases 
concerned not with mere acquisition or appropriation, but with the establishment and 
recognition  of  a  more  intimate  and  fundamental  relationship’,
61  an  account  of  a 
human’s personal and psychological development. 
Cicero De Finibus III.16 states that: 
 
[T2.iv.5]  Every animal, as soon as it is born (this is where one should start), is 
concerned with itself, and takes care to preserve itself. It favours its constitution and 
whatever  preserves  its  constitution,  whereas  it  recoils  from  its  destruction  and 
whatever appears to promote its destruction. In support of this thesis, the Stoics 
point out that babies seek what is good for them and avoid the opposite before they 
ever feel pleasure and pain. This would not happen unless they valued their own 
constitution and feared destruction. But neither could it happen that they would seek 
                                                 
59 Long 1996 [1991]: 202–23.  
60  Although  Janko  (1992b:  126)  suggests  that  in  this  context,  it  would  appear  to  go  against  the 
standard Stoic theory of emotion; on his arguments, see below, pp. 35 ff. 
61 Kerferd 1972–3: 183.   32 
anything  at  all  unless  they  had  self-awareness  and  thereby  self-love.  .  .  (Trans. 
Woolf, my italics) 
 
So (in T2.iv.1), Diogenes is perhaps suggesting that the soul instinctively 
recognises  and  actively  seeks  the  goodness  or  virtue  inherent  in  the  music,  and 
because virtue is ‘naturally ingrained in human beings’,
62 this virtue in the music 
attaches all the more easily by natural affiliation. According to the Stoics, nature 
initially endows humans sufficiently to orientate themselves towards goodness and 
virtue, by way of rational selection among indifferents. Therefore even an untutored 
response  to  music  might  be  a  recognition  that  it  has  a  rational  basis,  because 
according  to  the  Stoics,  in  Nature  everything  does.    But  achieving  moral virtue 
would be the result, ‘not just of undistorted development of our natural endowment, 
but at least as much of education and training’,
63 something also emphasised by 
Plato and Aristotle. At Eth. Nic. 1179b20–32 Aristotle writes: 
 
[T2.iv.6]  Now some think it is nature that makes people good; some think it is 
habit; some that it is teaching. The [contribution] of nature clearly is not up to us, 
but results from some divine cause in those who have it, who are the truly fortunate 
ones. Arguments and teaching surely do not prevail on everyone, but the soul of the 
student needs to have been prepared by habits for enjoying and hating finely, like 
ground that is to nourish seed. . . [W]e must already in some way have a character 
suitable for virtue, fond of what is fine and objecting to what is shameful.   
                (Trans. Irwin (1999)) 
 
Although  the  concept  of  oikeiōsis  was  probably  first  introduced  by  the 
Stoics,
64 the word did occur in writings of earlier philosophers in a similar context. 
Pembroke, who traces the modern discussion on the origin of the concept, states that 
‘not all instances of a word so versatile as oikeion are likely to have much relevance 
                                                 
62 Algra et al. 1999: 677. 
63 Striker 1996: 294. 
64 Kerferd 1972–3.   33 
to the problem [of tracing its use in the Stoic  sense]’,
65 but his discussion does 
suggest  that  similar  concepts  might  have  been  identified  by  at  least  Plato  and 
Aristotle, although not having the same importance to these philosophers as to the 
Stoics.  At  Protagoras  326a2–b2,  Plato  uses  similar  vocabulary  in  a  context  not 
unlike that with which we are concerned: 
 
[T2.iv.7]  The music masters by analogous methods instil self-control and deter the 
young from evil-doing. And when they have learned to play the lyre, they teach 
them  the  works  of  good  poets  of  another  sort,  namely  the  lyrical,  which  they 
accompany on the lyre, familiarising (οἰκειοῦσθαι) the minds of the children with 
the rhythms and melodies. By this means they become civilised, more balanced, and 
better adjusted in themselves and so more capable in whatever they do, for rhythm 
and harmonious adjustment are essential to the whole of human life.   
        (Trans. Guthrie in Hamilton and Cairns (1999)) 
 
Thus, the teacher, who as will be seen below (discussion of [T2.v.1]), has 
learned to understand the benefits to be obtained from music that encourages virtue, 
must ensure that the developing children are exposed to only the right kind of music 
if development is not to be impaired. 
Given that Diogenes had  extended  Chrysippus’  definition of the telos, to 
underline  the  importance  of  appropriate  selection,  perhaps  he  also  develops  the 
Chrysippean  theory  of  personal  oikeiōsis,  which  accounts  for  the  natural 
development of a properly taught child through the various stages until it reaches the 
age of reason, by finding a place for music within this development.  If so, the 
reason for Diogenes’ emphasis on a proper education and moral training becomes 
instantly clear. 
For  Chrysippus  the  capacity  for  virtue  remains  latent  within  a  human,
66 
despite  the  corrupting  influences  around  it.  The  transitional  stage  in  personal 
oikeiōsis, is from the potentially rational, to the rational, and coming ‘to terms with 
                                                 
65 1996 [1971]: 132–41 at 136. 
66 Gill 1998: 119.   34 
oneself’. That is when one realises the difference between the primary natural goods, 
health and wealth, which, although preferable, are still matters of indifference, and 
the true ‘good’, i.e., virtue, which is the only good. The consistency of ‘selection 
and disselection of things in accordance with nature’ allows Diogenes to find a place 
for music within Chrysippus’ doctrine of personal oikeiōsis, and to his including the 
notion of virtue within certain music being recognisable by the soul. Before the age 
of reason, the child will be drawn naturally to the image of virtue represented by the 
music by assimilation. As Cicero writes at De Finibus III.21, ‘A human being’s 
earliest concern is for what is in accordance with nature.’ The baby will, after all, 
seek what is good for them and avoid the opposite before they ever feel pleasure or 
pain.
67 Thereafter, I would suggest, the teachers will ensure the child is exposed only 
to the right or appropriate music to habituate the child’s ear to choose that kind of 
music,  and  to  see  value  only  in  appropriate  music,
68  until  at  a  later  stage  of 
development, the educated child will consistently select appropriate music through 
the knowledge he has acquired through education. Cicero continues:
69 
 
[T2.iv.8]  As soon as one has gained some understanding, or rather ‘conception’ 
(what the Stoics call ennoia), and sees an order and, as it were, concordance in the 
things which one ought to do, one then values that concordance much more highly 
than  those  first  objects  of  affection.  Hence  through  learning  and  reason  one 
concludes that this is the place to find the supreme human good, that good which is 
to be praised and sought on its own account. This good lies in what the Stoics call 
homologia. Let us use the term consistency, if you approve. 
 
As stated earlier, Diogenes might have been the first Stoic to write in any 
detail  on  music,  and  it  is  not  therefore  known  whether  Chrysippus  would  have 
endorsed his view, but it does not  appear to require any fundamental change to 
traditional Stoic doctrine. 
                                                 
67 De Fin. III.16, see above, T2.iv.6. 
68 Value for the Stoics will only be seen in good, i.e., virtuous goods or actions. 
69 De Fin. III. 21.   35 
Janko’s objection
70 that employing the notion of oikeiōsis would go against 
the  standard  Stoic  theory  of  emotion  rests  partly,  I  would  suggest,  on  his  own 
substitution  in  line  12  (of  T2.iv.1)  of  ἐκστάσεις  for  Delattre’s  αἰσθήσις.  This 
substitution  might  be  a  result  of  another  conjectural  insertion  at  Philodemus’ 
discussion of the passage, which appears at column 77,
71 but again the state of the 
original text has left Philodemus’ own wording open to interpretation. Janko writes 
‘That a Stoic should argue this case at all is very striking; the “enjoyments, emotions 
and  sensations”  which  arise  through  music  would  be  considered  irrational  and 
therefore  hostile  to  virtue  in  orthodox  Stoic  theory.’  The  use  of  the  conjectural 
ἐκστάσεις  would  appear  to  strengthen  Janko’s  argument  for  a  connection  with 
Aristotle’s notion of tragic catharsis  (on which see chapter 5, below). In the context 
of a Stoic discussion, however, Delattre’s αἰσθήσεις, sensations, would appear more 
appropriate, particularly in the context of Diogenes’ own theory. 
Janko states that ‘enjoyments, emotions and sensations which arise… would 
be considered irrational’.  However, music’s effects on our behaviour (by way of the 
assent  or  rejection  of  the  proposition  contained  within  the  music)  would  not 
necessarily be considered irrational simply because the music does not contain a 
proposition  that  is  expressed  verbally.  As  Nussbaum  suggests,
72  ‘Language  is  a 
medium of representation. When we express the content of an emotion in words we 
are in many cases performing a translation of thoughts that did not originally take an 
explicitly verbal form . . . music is another form of symbolic representation . . . so it 
is not obvious why we think that there is a greater problem about expressing an 
emotion’s content musically than about expressing it linguistically.’ Similarly, if I 
hear a song sung in a language I do not understand, but with the words set to music 
in an idiom familiar to me, then whether or not I have ‘understood’ the music in a 
technical sense (see below, pp. 39 ff.), the musical line may well give me more of an 
appreciation  of  the  character  being  expressed  than  the  foreign  words  being 
enunciated.  Perhaps  for  Diogenes,  music ( μέλος)  itself  was  a  kind  of  language, 
                                                 
70 1992b: 123–9, at 126. 
71 In Delattre 2007, previously column 69 in Delattre 1989, Kemke III. 24. 
72 2001: 264.   36 
which  had  to  be  learned  before  its  effects  could  be  properly  understood. 
Nevertheless, this lack of technical ‘understanding’ will not change the fact that 
behaviour will be affected if the listener acts upon the impression received from the 
music. Hence, a mother singing a lullaby to a child will be seen to soothe and relax 
the  infant,  just  as  the  drunken  youths  were  soothed  by  the  flautist  (see  above 
T2.iii.4, T2.iii.5). 
As Tad Brennan points out in his discussion
73 of how a Stoic might defend 
the claim that music can affect behaviour without containing any verbally expressed 
propositional element: 
 
The Stoics have no need to deny . . . that the application of thumbscrews will 
. . . produce in their victim the impression that something bad is occurring, and so 
make it more likely that the average victim will actually believe that something bad 
is happening. So too there is no reason for them to deny that music may have an 
effect  on  our  behavior  –  exactly  because  it  affects  our  beliefs.  True  it  has  no 
propositional content, but then neither do the thumb-screws . . . And yet they are all 
capable  of  having  some  effect  on  our  behavior  if,  and  only if  we  assent  to  the 
impressions and so change our beliefs.
74 
 
(v)   ‘Natural’ perception vs. ‘knowing’ perception 
 
With  regard  to  the  question  as  to  how  one  might  recognise  and  understand  the 
psychological value within the music, at Column 34, lines 2–21, Philodemus reports 
that  Diogenes  believed  that  there  were  two  types  of  perception  –  a  natural 
perception,  which  could  tell  what  was  hot,  what  was  cold  etc.,  and  a  knowing 
perception, which could tell ‘that which is in harmony and that which is not’. The 
passage and its translation are quoted below, together with Philodemus’ refutation 
(Greek and translation): 
 
                                                 
73 1998: 32–3 and nn. 24–5. 
74 Italics mine.   37 
[T2.v.1]            [T2.v.1a] 
Col. 34                                                            Col.115  
 
συ[γκεχωρ]ηκέναι δ᾽ αὐ-      εἴρηται δὲ [. . τὸ τὰ] μου 
τῶι τὰ μὲν [αὐτο]φυοῦς αἰσ-      σ[ικοῦ] καὶ τὰ πο[ι]ητοῦ γ᾽ [ὦ]τα 
θήσεως δε[ῖσ]θαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἐπιστη-    ἀ[π]ὸ δυνάμεως περὶ τὴν 
μονικῆς, τά [τε θ]ερμὰ μὲν      α[ἴσ]θησιν καταλαμβάν[ε- 
καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ τῆ[ς αὐ[τοφυοῦς, τὸ    σθ[α]ι τὰς ποιότητας ὧν ἀν- 
δ᾽ ἡρμοσμέν[ον] καὶ ἀνάρμο-     τιλαμβάνονται καὶ τᾶς ἡ- 
στον τῆς ἐπ[ιστη]μονικῆς· [ἑ-     δονὰς καὶ τας ὀχλήσεις 
τέραν δὲ τὴ[ν  τ]αύτηι συν[ε-     τὰς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, τῆς μὲν αὐτο- 
ζευγμένη[ν, κα]ὶ παρακολου-     φυοῦς, τῆς δὲ ἐπιστημονι- 
θοῦσαν ὡς [ἐπὶ τ]ὸ πολύ, δι᾽ ἧς [ἄλ-    κ[ῆ]ς· ὑπ[ὸ] γὰρ αὐτοφυοῦς καὶ 
λοιοῦμεν τ[ὴν π]αρεπομέ-      ἀλ]όγου κρίνεται μᾶλλον 
νην ἡδον[ὴν ἑκ]άστωι τῶν      τά γ]ε τῆς ἀκοῆς [ἴ]δ[ι]α, [ὑπὸ δ]ὲ 
αἰσθητῶν, [ἡδον]ήν τε [καὶ λύ-    ἐπ]ιστημονικῆς κ[αὶ τ]ὰ τοῦ 
πην οὔσα[ν . . . . την αὐτήν·      γε] νοῦ μᾶλλον, εἴ γ᾽ ἔπεσ[τί] τι 
οὐ γὰρ ἂν [συμ]μειχθεῖεν δύ[ο    τ]οῖς ἐναργέσι παρε[πόμε- 
αἰσθήσεις [εἰ] μὲν τὸ ὑποκεί-     νον προχειροτά[τ]οις· κ[α]τὰ λό- 
μ]ενον συμ[φ]ωνεῖν οἷον θ᾽ ὅτι    γον δὲ καὶ τὸ το[ῦ π]οιη[τοῦ ἴδι- 
π]ικρὸν ἢ λ[ιγ]υρόν, περὶ δὲ τῆν    ον, ὅ φησιν ἐναργὲς εἶνα[ι], ε[ἴ- 
π]αρεπ[ομέ]ν ἡδονὴν  [. . .      ληπται. παραπ[λ]ήσιοι γὰρ 
.ὲ καὶ λύ[πην] διαφωνεῖν [. . .     αἰσθ[ήσ]εις κατὰ τῆν διάθε- 
            σ]ιν οὐχ ὅτι μὲν [π]ικρὸν τὸ 
            ὑποκ[ε]ίμενον ὁμολογοῦ- 
            σ[ι]ν, ε[ἰ δ᾽] ὀχληρῶς ἢ ἐπιτερ- 
            πῶς [ἔ]χει διαφωνοῦσιν, 
            ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ποιοῦν- 
            ται κρίσιν *.        
   
Translation [T2.v.1]   38 
But he [Diogenes] agreed with him that [among the senses] some things need natural 
perception,  the  others  a  knowing  perception;  hot  and  cold  things  [need]  natural 
perception,  that  which  is  in  harmony  and  that  which  is  not  [needs]  knowing 
perception. The one that is linked with this
75 and accompanies it for the most part  is 
different, [and] it is through this that we distinguish the pleasure which accompanies 
each of the senses, [or rather] the pleasure and the pain, which  are <assuredly not> 
the same. For the two senses would not be confused if it were possible for them to 
agree,    on  the  harsh  and  melodious  character  of  the  relevant  matter,  while 
disagreeing regarding the consequent pleasure and pain. . . 
 
Translation [T2.v.1a] 
Moreover, [Diogenes was wrong] to say that [the ears] of a musician and of a poet 
comprehend  the  qualities  of  what  they  hear,  and  the  pleasures  and  discomforts 
which ensue, by a capacity which is in part natural and in part knowing; for what is 
discerned by that which is natural, and from which reason is absent, is rather what is 
proper  to  hearing  [is  the  proper  object  of  hearing],  by  the  knowing  that  which 
belongs to the mind, if anything is added accompanying what is clear and most 
immediate. For it is by a rational process that also what is personal/particular to a 
poet/musician, something which he [Diogenes] affirms is evident, is apprehended by 
him. It is not the case that the senses, very alike by their disposition, on the one hand 
do agree that the object in question is bitter but on the other disagree over whether it 
is disturbing or pleasant, but rather they pass the same judgement. 
 
In  Diogenes’  view,  there  are  two  types  of  sense  perception.  Natural 
perception apprehends, for example, that we might like or dislike the music that is 
heard. Knowing perception would ask, and be capable of learning why we like or 
dislike that music. Philodemus, on the other hand, holds that the ear simply hears the 
                                                 
75 The ‘this’ here might imply a third type of perception, as suggested by a number of scholars, but 
without resolution, e.g., Rispoli 1969, Neubecker 1986 ad loc.; contra Delattre 1993: 71.  However, 
Professor Sharples suggests to me (private conversation) ‘unless “the one that is linked with” 
knowing perception is natural perception again, and “this” in “through this” is not “the one that is 
linked” but the general situation of there being two.’ I am grateful to Professor Sharples for this 
point, which would indeed resolve the problem of a third type of perception.   39 
music – it is an organ of hearing, no more. It is the mind that will decide whether we 
like or dislike the music. 
The phrase ‘that which is in harmony and that which is not [needs] knowing 
perception’ in Diogenes’ statement T2.v.1 is strikingly powerful. It suggests that this 
perception has to be acquired by training, indeed would seem to build upon the 
implications of column 18 (T2.iv.1, above) – that a good education is essential if a 
human is to have the ability to develop to their full potential – in the Stoic view, to 
‘live in accordance with nature’, and as extended by Diogenes himself ‘reasoning 
well in the selection and disselection of things’. 
Although this could be taken to imply that there is no natural perception of 
harmony, this does not need to be the case. The soul is instinctively drawn to the 
virtue inherent in [the correct, harmonious] music, simply by taking pleasure from 
the harmony, albeit not understanding why, or even that, it might be beneficial to 
him, and that will suffice until the child begins his education. Then once the child 
begins his education, the teachers, who have the necessary training will expose him 
to  ‘harmonious’  music,  and  will  begin  that  education  in  the  acquisition  of  the 
knowing perception, i.e., acquiring the knowledge to perceive harmonic qualities. 
Diogenes earlier has said (columns 12–13) that becoming a professional musician is 
not proper for the free born, and so, like Plato and Aristotle before him, he argues 
that  music  should  not  be  pursued  beyond  the  acquisition  of  sufficient 
understanding/skill to help him to lead a virtuous life. 
In his refutation of Diogenes’ claim in column 34 (T2.v.1), at Column 115 
(see [T2.v.1a] above), Philodemus follows his dismissal of the knowing sense by 
affirming that quality within the modes of music is a matter of opinion rather than 
knowledge, and asserts that music does not have the power to alter character. His 
words do not seem to reply to any specific justification of this ‘knowing perception’. 
For the Epicurean, there can be no distinction between types of senses – they 
are one and the same.  The idea that music could by itself affect the mind would 
directly conflict with the Epicurean account of perception, as for the Epicureans the 
senses  are  irrational  and  so  incapable  of  moving  the  mind  directly,  without  a 
judgement being involved. Music would affect only the ear, it would be the rational   40 
judgement of what the senses present that would be capable of moving the soul. 
Sextus Empiricus reports at M. VIII. 9 (=Adv. Log. II.9): 
 
[T2.v.2] And he [Epicurus] says that sense, being perceptive of the objects presented 
to  it  and  neither  subtracting  nor  adding  nor  transposing  aught  through  being 
irrational, constantly reports truly and grasps the existent object as it really is by 
nature.     (Trans. Bury in the Loeb edition) 
 
Sensation is devoid of cognitive significance, and twice in his refutation, 
Philodemus uses the word alogos of music. However, Philodemus does not really 
take issue with Diogenes’ words, he simply states they are incorrect. At other places 
in his refutations he ridicules a theory with biting humour (see below, chapters 3 and 
5), and the absence of this here leads me to think that perhaps Diogenes’ views were 
not so new that they needed to be refuted with any strength.   It is also remarked by 
Barker
76  that  ‘Philodemus  complains  more  than  once  that  Diogenes’  attempts  at 
proof  fall  hopelessly  short  of  genuine  demonstration  and  are  unworthy  of  a 
philosopher.’  There  is  no  such  complaint  here,  which  might  again  suggest  that 
Diogenes is not claiming something that previous musical theorists had not already 
claimed. 
It  is  possible  that  Philodemus  is  either  misreporting  or  misrepresenting 
Diogenes’ argument.  A comparison with Philodemus’ reporting of Crates’ theories 
on poetry with other sources suggested a less than objective form of reporting.
77 As 
stated above this particular part of the text reporting Diogenes’ views (column 34 
and surrounding) is very damaged and the whole of the following column is lost, but 
it does not appear that Diogenes explains, or at least Philodemus does not report 
Diogenes’ explanation, if there was one, as to how this ‘knowing perception’ came 
to  be  –  he  simply  makes  the  assertion,  as  though  assuming  this  not  to  be 
controversial. Or perhaps Philodemus’ brevity, both in this explication of Diogenes’ 
                                                 
76 2001: 361. 
77 Personal conversation with Dr Maria Broggiato; on which see further discussion below chapter 6 
on poetry. See also below, chapter 6 for more on Crates and  poetry.   41 
theory, and his own refutation, is a sign of his lack of understanding rather than his 
lack of interest. 
However, as stated above, column 114 is also severely lacunose, with some 
twenty-four  unreadable  lines.  But  in  the  lines  immediately  before  Philodemus’ 
critique of this part of Diogenes’ psychology, Philodemus compares drunkenness 
and over-eating with musical passions, suggesting they lead one to welcome coarse 
and disgraceful movements, but not the reverse, i.e., calming, an argument repeated 
at column 117 and following. Philodemus seems to be inconsistent here; the context, 
however,  does  nothing  to  suggest  that  any  argument  relevant  to  the  ‘knowing 
perception’  issue  has  been  lost.  The  concept  of  the  ‘knowing  perception’  has 
attracted much discussion, and Delattre suggests that Diogenes might have been 
influenced by Speusippus, linking the reference to ‘him’ (αὐτῶι) in column 34, lines 
1–2 (T2.v.1) to that philosopher. For a short discussion of this suggestion, see the 
Appendix to this chapter, below. 
 
At column 48, 22–7 Diogenes goes beyond any claim made by Plato or Aristotle, 
when  he  states  that  ‘music  is  good  for  the  intelligence  because  it  contains 
definitions, divisions and demonstrations’, thus confirming his view that music is 
not an irrational phenomenon:  
 
[T2.v.3] 
        χρη- 
στὴν δ ᾽ εἶ[ν]αι τῆν μουσικὴν 
καὶ πρὸς σύ[ν]εσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὅ- 
ρους καὶ διαιρέσεις καὶ ἀποδεί- 
ξεις ἐν ἁρμονικῆι πλείους εἶ- 
ναι 
 
This  claim  is  in  itself  quite  remarkable,  and  whether  Diogenes  ever 
elucidated his comments here is now probably impossible to tell, but it is worth 
spending some time on the short passage. It does suggest that he held a similar view   42 
to that of Cleanthes (above, T2.iii.3), and therefore he probably did not need to 
depart from orthodox Stoic psychology to hold this view, as suggested by some 
scholars.
78 Philodemus himself certainly does not enlarge on the claim, and in his 
direct criticism (column 138) he merely states that it is now ‘exposed as ridiculous’. 
However, Diogenes immediately moves on to suggests that the musical theorists 
with their skills resembled the kritikoi of poetry, who were ‘primarily concerned 
with the judgement of the composition of the sounds of poems’.
79 So, is Diogenes 
looking for the trained listener of music to [what we would term today] analyse the 
music by defining the rhythms, mode, intervals, just as we would define the key, 
tempo, dynamics and phrasing? I suggest that is precisely what he is saying. The 
very  construction  of  the  harmonic  line  determines  its  power  to  affect  a  person 
whether or not the listener understands it her- or himself, and this would certainly 
explain why Diogenes placed such importance upon its regulation. Diogenes further 
stated that music contained such qualities as nobility, ugliness, appropriateness or 
inappropriateness, and that it contained ‘likenesses’ of characters, but he stated that 
only  the  person  well  trained  in musical  theory could  recognise  these  qualities.
80 
These ‘likenesses’ are, therefore, not crude imitations, but rather they, in the words 
of Cleanthes, perhaps ‘mostly correspond to the truth of the theories concerning the 
divine’.
81 
The Greek word ὅρος, as well as meaning ‘definition’, however, can also 
mean ‘limit’ or ‘boundary’, and is the word used by Plato in his discussion of  the 
limited  and  the  unlimited  and  the  connection  with  musical  intervals  and  their 
analysis in the Philebus at 17c ff.: 
 
[T2.v.4]  But, my friend, when you have grasped the number and quality of the 
intervals of the voice in respect to low and high pitch, and the limits (ὅρους) of the 
                                                 
78 E.g., Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 357. See also Scade 2007: 216, supporting my contention. 
79 Blank 1994: 55–62, at 55.  
80 For which, see T5.i.9 and discussion. 
81 Above, T2.iii.3.   43 
intervals,
82 and the combinations derived from them, which the men of former times 
discovered and handed down to us, their successors, with the traditional name of 
harmonies, and also the corresponding effects in the movements of the body, which 
they  say  are  measured  by  numbers  and  must  be  called  rhythms  and  measures 
(μέτρα) – and they say that we must also understand that every one and many should 
be considered in this way – when you have thus grasped the facts, you have become 
a musician. . .
83  
 
  Plato, of course, spells out what is necessary before a man could call himself 
a musician, but I would suggest that in essence Plato and Diogenes are looking for 
similar skills. Analysis of the musical line is necessary, and an understanding of how 
this analysis should proceed is necessary for a man to become a reliable ‘judge’ of 
music.  As Plato spells out at Laws II. 670c, a man who does not understand the 
elements of a tune (μέλος) will not be able to say whether or not it is correct: 
 
[T2.v.5]  [ATH.] What then of the man who does not know in the least what the 
tune’s elements are? Will he ever know about any tune, as we said, that it is correct? 
[CLIN]  There is no possible means of his doing so.
84  
 
For Plato, the active principle is definitely the potential musician, As Frede 
points out in her commentary on these lines,
85 ‘The crucial point . . . is that Plato 
proposes a holistic model of knowledge. There cannot be knowledge of any items in 
isolation; to know what one letter is we have to know the whole field of grammata, 
and their interconnections. Similarly with music, it is no good knowing one note – 
knowledge and understanding can only be achieved by knowing all the notes in the 
harmoniai and their relationships to one another.’  
                                                 
82 These limits are spelled out at Rep. IV. 443d–e as neatē, hypatē and mesē (καὶ ξυναρμόσαντα τριά 
ὄντα ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μἐσης). 
83 Trans. Fowler in the Loeb edition. 
84 Trans Bury in the Loeb version. Correct, for Plato, must mean ethically correct; to be ethically 
correct it should also be musicologically correct. 
85 Frede 1993: 10, n. 3.   44 
A similar view is expressed by Plato in the context of rhetoric in the passage 
from the Phaedrus discussed briefly in chapter 3, below and this can usefully be 
quoted here also: 
 
[T2.v.6]  A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he 
speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has 
defined them, he must know how to divide them by classes until further division is 
impossible; and in the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must 
find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his 
discourse  accordingly,  offering  to  the  complex  soul  elaborate  and  harmonious 
discourses, and simple talks to the simple soul. Until he has attained to all of this, he 
will not be capable of pursuing the making of speeches in a scientific way, so far as 




If  ‘music’  replaced  all  instances  of  the  art  in  question  (here  speech, 
discourse), I would suggest, the claims in this passage would sound very similar to 
Diogenes’ own claims in T2.v.3 above. For Diogenes the music also seems to play 
an active part by insinuating itself into the mind by way of oikēiosis, as suggested in 
column 18,
87 and it is the ‘knowing sensation’, i.e., the ‘educated ear’ with which the 
musician interprets the qualities, as discussed in section iv above. 
   It  seems  that  Diogenes  probably  agreed  with  Plato  that  music  was  a 
stochastic art,
88 and within his theory he was trying to ‘pin it down’
89 in order that a 
more complete ‘account’ might be given of it. In a similar way to the practice of 
medicine,  no  matter  how  long  the  practitioner  has  worked  at  his  art,  Diogenes’ 
acknowledgement  that  ‘everyone  is  affected  in  a  different  way’
90  must  be 
                                                 
86 Phaedrus 277b–c, trans Fowler (1995[1914]), as amended. 
87 See text T2.iv.1 above. 
88 For discussion on which, see below chapter 3, pp. 85–7, and chapter 4, T4.17. 
89 See Barker 1987: 108 who states ‘that it is difficult to pin down something in motion’ [in this case, 
the musical notes, which are correctly placed by the well-practised musician] ‘is of course a familiar 
Platonic theme’. 
90 Column 36. See chapter 3, T3.i.26 and discussion.   45 
considered. Despite the skill of the practitioner, therefore, the end result can never 
be guaranteed – try as he might to execute his art in the way deemed to be correct, 
other matters can come into play. For example, a doctor can administer the correct 
drug for a given illness, but one patient might react more slowly than another. It is, 
therefore, difficult to ‘pin down’, as Barker suggests, above. 
 
The word ‘ὅρος’ used in Diogenes’ passage quoted at T2.v.3, whilst representing the 
limit of the interval or scale, could also be analogous with the limits or boundaries 
of good behaviour, particularly for Diogenes, and the harmony of the Greek musical 
scale could therefore be seen as directly analogous to a virtuous character. Just as a 
person could not be considered virtuous if they didn’t possess all the virtues together 
with their subordinates, so too in a harmonic system, it was necessary for ‘any note 
sounding at a given moment to be concordant with all the other notes that are not 
being activated … One single error is enough to wreck the whole harmony’.
91  
Long suggests that the early Stoics drew a ‘comparable analogy between 
musical and ethical harmony’.  Whilst the full extent of the argument is too lengthy 
to discuss here, I feel it is too important to omit altogether. Long writes that: 
 
The Stoic world is a systematic structure in which everything fits together according 
to a divine and rational plan. In proposing ‘harmony’ as a name for this structure and 
‘harmoniously’ as the mode of life appropriate to it, the Stoics… intended to link 
their philosophy to the art which comes first to mind as the repository of consonance 
and concordance – music.
92 
 
For Diogenes of Babylon, and, perhaps, for Plato too, the limit or boundary 
of the interval and, more importantly, the scale, thus identified, or even, defined, the 
character of the music, and thus the character it represented. Plato has, of course, 
linked ethos and harmony in the Republic and the Laws.
93  
                                                 
91 Long 1996[1991]: 218–19.  
92 Long 1996 [1991]: 202–24, at 203.  
93 See below, pp. 102 ff.   46 
Long’s argument would seem to be supported by Chrysippus’ view that the 
Stoic telos of living in harmony with nature was only achieved by living in harmony 
with  oneself.  Diogenes  Laertius  paraphrases  Chrysippus’  writing  in  On  Ends  I, 
saying: 
 
[T2.v.7]  [The telos is living] in accordance with the nature of oneself and that of the 
universe, engaging in no activity which the common law is wont to forbid, which is 
the  right  reason  (orthos  logos)  pervading  everything  and  identical  to  Zeus,  who 
directs the organisation of reality. The virtue of a happy man and his good flow of 
life are this: always doing everything on the basis of the concordance (kata tēn 




The word sumphōnian has strong musical connotations, and the Stoic orthos 
logos, as well as meaning ‘right reason’ may also be read as ‘correct ratio’, and so 
would imply the notion of ‘determinacy, proportionality, exactitude of quantitative 
or numerical order’.




[T2.v.8]  [The Stoics] say that a right action is a proper function which possesses all 
the numbers (πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς) . . . while a wrong action is one that is 
done contrary to right reason/ratio (τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον), or one in which some proper 
function has been omitted by a rational animal.
97 
 
As suggested by Scade,
98 this does indeed support the hypothesis that some 
Stoics  considered  a  ‘musico-mathematical’  approach  to  be  one  valid  way  of 
analysing ethics. The notion of ratios and proportion within music is, of course, 
                                                 
94 Diogenes Laertius VII.88, trans. Long and Sedley 1987: vol. I, 63C. 
95 Long 1996[1991]: 207. 
96 Fifth century AD. 
97 Stobaeus II.93, 14–18. 
98 Scade 2007: 209.   47 
fundamental to Pythagorean musical theory, and is endorsed by Plato in the Timaeus 
and  the  Republic,  and  whilst  I  can  see  almost  no  trace  of  any  reference  to 
Pythagoreanism  within  Diogenes’  theory,
99  one  very  lacunose  fragment
100  might 
indeed indicate at least some reference to Pythagoras within Diogenes’ thought. This 
is  not  to  suggest,  however,  that  there  is  no  link  with  mathematical  theory  in 
Diogenes’ science of harmonics. Further, the notion of linked bodily and musical 
harmonia and sumphōnia are certainly very apparent. At column 80, Philodemus 
claims  that  music  is  not  able  to  harmonise  or  discipline  the  soul,  and  although 
Diogenes’ parallel claim that it does so is no longer extant, he must have made such 
a claim for Philodemus to write his refutation. The words Philodemus uses are τὴν 
ψυχὴν.  .  .  καὶ  σύμφωνον.  If  Zeno’s  musical  philosophy  was  Pythagorean,  as 
tentatively suggested on the basis of the Plutarchan anecdote mentioned earlier,
101 
then it may be that Diogenes developed the theory further, just as he developed or 
reformulated other Stoic theory – a common belief in the relationship between ethics 
and music is certainly implied. 
Returning to the three qualities ‘definitions, divisions and demonstrations’ 
(T2.v.3  above),  these  are  also  to  be  found  in  the  Stoic  theory  of  logic.  Both 
Antipater of Tarsus and Chrysippus wrote works entitled On Definitions, as testified 
at Diogenes Laertius VII.60; and ‘divisions’ were used by the Stoics to distinguish 
between neighbouring species. D.L. VII.61 reports the Stoic view that ‘Divisions of 
a  genus  means  dissection  of  it  into  its  proximate  species.’  Demonstrations  are 
explained at D. L. VII.45 as ‘an argument inferring by means of what is better 
apprehended something less clearly apprehended’. I do not think it implausible to 
suggest that this language could  also be used in musical contexts. The different 
‘scales’, e.g., the Dorian or Phrygian, might be the ‘neighbouring species’; and the 
‘likenesses’ of  character or ēthos communicated by the music, and the resulting 
effect on the listener, such as the changed behaviour of the drunken youths, above, 
                                                 
99 Barker states ‘it [Pythagorean mathematical argumentation] is simply not there’, Barker 2001:356. 
100 Column 42, 36–45, on which, see chapter 3 below, T3.i.21. 
101 Above, section 2, T2.ii.1.   48 
T2.iii.4, the demonstrations, or ‘proofs’ for example, although there is of course the 
problem that these ‘proofs’ are external to the music rather than within it.  
On  the  other  hand,  however,  the  words  ‘definitions,  divisions  and 
demonstrations’ were also technical terms in Aristoxenus of Tarentum’s harmonic 
theory, and so it is just possible that Diogenes might be referring to him here,
102 
although again he does not mention him by name, and there is nothing elsewhere in 
the work to suggest that Diogenes relied upon, or even knew, Aristoxenian musical 
theory.
103 Diogenes’ language here is certainly reminiscent of Aristoxenus’ technical 
approach, but Aristoxenus does not refer to these terms in the context of educational 
tools, and I do not believe that he would have agreed with Diogenes’ claim here, as 
his writings make clear how dubious he was about just how great an effect music 
could have on the character.
104 
As  mentioned  above,  Diogenes  further  stated  that  music  contained  such 
qualities  as  nobility,  ugliness,  appropriateness  or  inappropriateness,  and  that  it 
contained ‘likenesses’ of characters, but that only the person well trained in musical 
theory  could  recognise  these  qualities.  Plato  stressed  the  problems  of  music’s 
mimetic character,
105 although in another view, he makes Timaeus allow that by 
imitating the divine and ideal order, music was ‘capable of leading man to virtue and 
knowledge’.
106 Plato’s choice of wording here is reminiscent of the claim attributed 
to Cleanthes, discussed above, T2.ii.1, which again suggests that either Cleanthes or 
Diogenes (if Diogenes was putting the words into Cleanthes’ mouth) possibly had 
                                                 
102  See  also  Delattre’s  discussion  at  2007:  vol.  I,  77  n.  5.  Philodemus  himself  does  refer  to 
Aristoxenus, but not in this context. 
103 For more on why it is unlikely that Diogenes is following Aristoxenus’ theory here, see Barker 
201: 354–61. 
104 See, e.g., El. harm. II. 31.16–32.8, where he states ‘What we are trying to do is to show for each 
kind  of  melodic  composition  and  for  music  in  general  that  such  and  such  a  type  damages  the 
character while such and such another improves it… in so far as music is capable of yielding such 
benefits… The science is not to be despised by anyone of intelligence . . . nor is it so important as to 
be sufficient on its own for everything,’ Trans. Barker 1989: 148–9, my emphasis.  
105 Rep. III. 394–5; Laws II. 668a, 669b–c. 
106 Timaeus 80a–b.   49 
Plato’s writing in mind.
107 Aristotle, too, points out that mousikē was by its very 
nature mimetic ‘of character, emotions and actions’.
108  
As I will discuss in chapter 4, in the Republic, Plato’s Socrates states that 
‘rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold on it, 
bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the 
contrary’,
109 a view which Diogenes echoes himself, above, and a view again echoed 
in the Timaeus, emphasising the importance of harmony and rhythm to the rational 
soul (Tim. 47d–e): 
 
[T2.v.9]  Music  too.  .  .  was  bestowed  for  the  sake  of  harmony ( ἁρμονία).  And 
harmony, which has motions akin to the revolutions of the soul within us, was given 
by the Muses to him who makes intelligent use of the  Muses, not as an aid to 
irrational pleasure, as is now supposed, but as an auxiliary to the inner revolution of 
the soul when it has lost its harmony to assist in restoring it to order and concord 
with itself. And because of the unmodulated condition, deficient in grace, which 
exists in most of us, rhythm was also bestowed upon us to be our helper by the same 
deities and for the same ends. 
         
. . . . . 
 
Nothing in the above discussion suggests, I would argue, that Diogenes departed 
from orthodox Stoic psychology in his theory of music. True, it would appear that 
he developed it further than earlier Stoics, insofar as he found a place for music 
within that psychology, but in this respect, as I will discuss further in chapters 4 and 
5,  he  was  heavily  influenced  by  earlier  philosophers,  notably  Plato,  and  most 
probably Aristotle and the Peripatetic school. 
                                                 
107  Cf.  also  Republic  VI.  486e  where  Plato’s  Socrates  asserts  that  ‘truth  is  akin  to  metre  and 
proportion, ἐμμετρία. 
108 Poetics 1447a. (There is nothing to suggest that Diogenes, or Plato for that matter, explicitly 
claimed  to  have  such  musical  expertise.  This  would  account  for  both  philosophers’  concern, 
expressed in parallel passages (see chapter 4, T4.13, 4.14), that great care should be taken to ensure 
the use only of the correct type of music, and for the appointment of appropriately trained judges. 
109 Republic III. 401d5–e1, my emphasis. For further reference to these lines, see chapter 4, note 4.   50 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2  
 
Speusippus and his influence on Diogenes’ theory at column 34 (T2.v.1) 
 
Delattre suggests that in column 34, Diogenes is influenced by Speusippus in his 
claim that there are two types of perception, linking the reference to ‘him’ at lines 1–2 
of the column (T2.v.1) with that philosopher.
1 Sextus Empiricus outlines Speusippus’ 
own view at M. VII. 144–7 states: 
 
[T2.App.1] Σπεύσιππος  δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν 
μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν 
ἐπιστημονκιὴν  αἴσθησιν.  ἐπιστημονικὴν  δὲ  αἴσθησιν  ὕπείληφε  καθεστάναι  τὴν 
μεταλαμβάνουσαν  τῆς  κατὰ  τὸν  λόγον  ἀληθείας.  ὥσπερ  γὰρ  οἱ  τοῦ  αὐλητοῦ  ἢ 
ψάλτου δάκτυλοι τεχνικὴν μὲν εἶχον ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ προηγουμένοως 
τελειουμένην, ἀλλ᾽  ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν συνασκήσεως ἀπαρτιζομένην, καὶ ὡς 
ἡ τοῦ μουσικοῦ αἴσθησις ἐνέργειαν μὲν εἶχεν ἀντιληπτικὴν τοῦ τε ἡρμοσμένου καὶ 
τοῦ ἀναρμόστου, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ αὐτοφυῆ. ἀλλ᾽  ἐκ λογισμοῦ περιγεγονυῖαν, οὕτω 
καὶ  ἡ  ἐπιστημονικὴ  αἴσθησις  φυσικῶς  παρὰ  τοῦ  λόγου  τῆς  ἐπιστημονικῆς 
μεταλαμβάνει τριβῆς πρὸς ἀπλανῆ τῶν ὑποκεικένων διάγνωσιν.  
 
But Speusippus declared that, since some things are sensible, others intelligible, the 
cognitive reason is the criterion of things intelligible and the cognitive sense of things 
sensible. And cognitive sense he conceived as being that which shares in rational 
truth. For just as the fingers of a pipe-player or harper possess an artistic activity, 
which, however, is not primarily brought to perfection by the fingers themselves but 
is fully developed as a result of joint practice under the guidance of reasoning, – and 
just  as  the  sense  of  the  musician  possesses  an  activity  capable  of  grasping  the 
harmonious and the non-harmonious, this activity, however, not being self-produced 
but an acquisition due to reasoning, – so also the cognitive sense naturally derives 
from  the  reason  the  cognitive  experience  in  which  it  shares,  and  which  leads  to 
unerring discrimination of subsisting objects. (Trans. Bury in Loeb edn.) 
 
                                                 
1 Delattre 1993; 2007: vol. II, 346, esp. n. 2.   51 
 
Speusippus’  name  does  not  occur  at  all  in  the  surviving  columns  of 
Philodemus’  treatise,  although  as  remarked  earlier,  the  text  around  the  columns 
relating to the two types of perception is very damaged and quite lacunose. It has been 
suggested,
2 and will become clear from chapters 3, 4, and 5 below, that Diogenes 
knew of and recognised earlier ‘rivals’ as ‘important philosophical authorities’, and 
did not hesitate to draw upon them. In drawing upon these authorities, however, it has 
to be said that Diogenes does not always acknowledge the philosopher whose views 
he is utilising. So the fact that Speusippus’ name does not appear need not mean that 
Diogenes  was  not  drawing  upon  his  theory.  However,  I  believe  that  whoever 
Diogenes was agreeing with in the column, it was not Speusippus, as will be outlined 
below. 
In  his  collection  of  fragments  of  Speusippus,  and  commentary  thereon, 
Leonardo  Tarán
3  asserts  that  Sextus  had  derived  his  knowledge  of  Speusippus’ 
doctrine from an intermediate source rather than directly, and agreed with the claim 
that ‘his report is contaminated by Stoic terminology’.
4  It seems that when Sextus has 
‘direct or indirect access to a statement by an ancient philosopher, he likes to quote at 
least part of the original’.
5 Certainly, all references to Speusippus’ theory in Sextus’ 
extract  seem  to  be  reported  in  the  third  person  –  ‘Speusippus  declared’;  ‘he 
conceived’ – and it therefore appears that no part of Speusippus’ own writing is being 
quoted directly.
6 
Tarán  denies  that  Speusippus  is  Diogenes’  main  influence  in  this  passage, 
arguing that whilst Diogenes clearly differentiates between two kinds of perception 
(Diogenes refers to αἴσθησις αὐτοφύης and αἴσθησις ἐπιστημονική) Speusippus does 
not.
7 Speusippus rather differentiates between the two kinds of objects of cognition – 
τὰ νοητά, and τὰ αἰσθητά – the sensibles and the intelligibles, as Plato did before him. 
Speusippus, however, might have been making a rather more subtle distinction than 
                                                 
2 Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 357–8. 
3 1981: 432–3. 
4 This ‘contamination’ had led Tarrant (1985 : 96–103) to believe that the terminology derived from 
Antiochus of Ascalon, who originally belonged to the sceptical Academy, and who in attacking the 
Stoics used much of their philosophical language (see Cicero Lucullus, and OCD s.v. Antiochus). 
5 Tarán 1981: 432n. 253. 
6 Although this cannot be said to be conclusive, pace Tarán in n. 5 above. 
7 1981: 433.   52 
Plato, distinguishing between ἐπιστημονικός λόγος and ἐπιστημονική αἴσθησις,
8 or, 
rather, probably simply αἴσθησις according to Tarán (see below).  
For Speusippus, ‘the musician’s faculty of perception possesses an activity 
which  can  apprehend  what  is  harmonious  and  which  is  not;  this  activity  is  not 
spontaneous  or  innate,  but  acquired  by  the  use  of  ratiocination’.
9  Also  the  pipe-
player’s fingers are brought to play well by practice, but reason plays a part in the 
development  of  both  skills.  For  Speusippus,  ‘Sensation  can  share  in  the  truth  of 
reason.’
10 The issue is that both the fingers and reasoning are required at the outset, 
together, one skill does not precede the other. Speusippus is not discussing sensation 
without  reason.
11    This  sounds  quite  close  to  Aristotle,  who  seemed  to  identify 
sensation  with  nous,  the  faculty  which  has  an  intuitive  grasp  of  truth.
12  Intuition 
seems  for  Aristotle  to  be  involved  both  before  knowledge  is  acquired,  but  also 
afterwards, to ‘make the leap to the ultimate archai’.
13 
 Regarding  sense-perception,  Speusippus  suggested  that  ‘perception 
(αἴσθησις) participates in the cognitive power of reason (λόγος) and is a faculty with 
innate and unerring powers to discriminate’.
14 Tarán adds, Speusippus postulates that 
‘In [sense] perception there is a comparison, analysis and classification of the data 
provided  by  the  senses,’
15  but  that  the  ‘knowledge  of  the  separately  existing 
magnitudes is not direct, but derivative’.
16  Tarán plausibly remarks, therefore, that in 
his view it is unlikely that ἐπιστημονική αἴσθησις would have been Speusippus’ own 
words, being, rather, Stoic terminology, and suggests that he would have used simply 
αἴσθησις. 
 Sextus’  account  is  clarified  and  supplemented  by  Proclus  Eucl.,  p.  179 
Friedlein, which quotes Speusippus’ account of intuition and discursive reason:
17  
                                                 
8 Dillon 1993: 63. 
9 Tarán 1981: 433. Diogenes refers to αἴσθησις αὐτοφύης, which is natural, a part of one’s nature, 
something  specifically  denied  by  Speusippus  in  Sextus’  fragment,  where  he  states  ‘this  activity, 
however, not being self-produced, but an acquisition due to reasoning’. 
10 1981: 427. 
11 This sounds similar to the ‘dual criterion’ of sensation and reason, associated with the Peripatetic 
school, and, in musical contexts, with Aristoxenus, on which see chapter 5, T5.v.11 ff., below. 
12 See Guthrie 1978: 467, for Aristotle’s views in the context of Sextus’ passage on Speusippus. 
13 Ibid., and Aristotle, EN VI.10–11, 1143a12–b14. 
14 1981: 54. 
15 1981: 57. 
16 1981: 425, my emphasis. 
17 Tarán 1981: F73 and commentary 422–31.   53 
 
[T2.App.2]  καθόλου γάρ, φησὶν ὁ Σπεύσιππος, ὧν ἡ διάνοια τὴν θήραν ποιεῖται 
τὰ μὲν οὐδεμίαν ποικίλην ποιησαμένη διέξοδον προβάλλει καὶ προευτρεπίζει πρὸς 
τὴν  μέλλουσαν  ζήτησιν  καὶ  ἔχει  τούτων  ἐναργεστέραν  ἐπαφὴν  μᾶλλον  ἢ  τῶν 
ὁρατῶν ἡ ὄψσις, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέως αἱρεῖν ἀδυνατοῦσα κατὰ μεταβάσιν ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα 
διαβαίνουσα κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτῶν ἐπιχειρεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν θήραν. 
 
‘In general’, Guthrie translates, ‘says Speusippus, there are some things which 
the intellect in its researches simply puts forward without any elaborate process of 
thought,  as  preparation  for  the  coming  enquiry,  and  of  these  it  has  a  clearer 
apprehension  than  has  sight  of  what  is  visible.  Others  it  cannot  seize  upon 
immediately, but progresses towards them by inference, and endeavours to track them 
down by way of their consequences.’
18  
Plato  also  divided  ‘objects  of  cognition  into  intelligible  and  sensible’,  as 
discussed by Socrates and Theaetetus at Theaetetus 186 b–e where Socrates insists: 
 
[T2.App.3]  Is it not true, then, that whereas all impressions which penetrate to the 
mind  through  the  body  are  things  which  men  and  animals  alike  are  naturally 
constituted to perceive from the moment of birth, reflections about them with respect 
to their existence and usefulness only come about, if they come at all, with difficulty 
through a long and troublesome process of education? . . . If this is so, knowledge 
does not reside in the impressions, but in our reflection of them. It is there, seemingly 
and not in the impressions, that it is possible to grasp existence and truth.   
                  (Trans. Cornford) 
 
For Plato, therefore, reason is involved as soon as one gets beyond the raw 
sense  data.  However,  like  Diogenes,  but  unlike  Speusippus,  ‘raw’  sensation  is 
recognised  here,  but  neither  Plato  nor  Speusippus  in  the  texts  quoted  distinguish 
between two sorts of sensation.  
To return to Diogenes’ statement in T2.v.1, ‘[among the senses] the first are 
called natural perception, the others a knowing perception’, lines 1–4. Diogenes goes 
                                                 
18 Guthrie 1978: 466–7. Again, it is the objects perceived that are differentiated, rather than the means 
of perception.   54 
on to accept that they are ‘inseparably connected’, and explains the detail of what they 
will perceive rather than the detail of the different perceptions themselves. He later 
explains that the ability to recognise harmony or otherwise has to be acquired through 
education,  and  that  only  after  this  education  is  someone  ‘adequately  qualified  to 
prescribe the proper use of music in education and care for the soul’.
19 This would 
seem to be similar to Aristotle’s remarks at EN VI.11, 1143b11–15, where he states 
that those in need of moral educations should listen to the ‘undemonstrated assertions 
and opinions of those experienced and older or practically wise. . . for on account of 
their having an eye from experience they see correctly’.
20 Diogenes’ theory is only 
briefly outlined, but his emphasis on the role of the teacher, as will be seen in chapters 
4 and 5 would seem to endorse Aristotle’s view; perhaps Philodemus did not go into 
further  detail  because  general  familiarity  with  Platonic  and  Aristotelian 
epistemological theories would have made the point clear enough, and to go into 
detail would be to digress.  
As Guthrie remarks, the thoughts of Plato, Speusippus and Aristotle, although 
not coinciding, were at least ‘converging’.
21 Diogenes’ views of perception were, it 
would seem, a little different. And, as Tarán remarks, it is the confusion between ‘the 
examples given in comparison with the thing which is being compared to them’
22that  
has led to scholars thinking that Speusippus has influenced Diogenes of Babylon.
23 




                                                 
19 Barker 2001: 353. 
20 DeMoss 1990: 75. 
21 Guthrie 1978: 467. 
22 1981: 434. 
23 Ibid. n. 259.   55 
Chapter 3 
 




What  exactly  did  Diogenes  say  about  the  use  of  music  generally,  and  did  his 
opinions  differ  from  others  who  wrote  before  him?  In  his  introduction  to 
Philodemus’  critique  of  Diogenes’  musical  philosophy,  Delattre  remarks  that 
Diogenes ‘gave away’ various opportunities to Philodemus, and not least his ‘naïve 
and unmethodical’ views.
1 However, given Diogenes’ reputation within the Stoic 
tradition, I cannot believe that his writings would have been as unmethodical as they 
appear in this work; perhaps they only appear unmethodical because of the lacunae. 
Had the work not been so damaged, it may be that his method of categorisation 
would have been more apparent.
2 Perhaps indeed it is Philodemus’ way of reporting 
that makes Diogenes’ views appear so unmethodical, and perhaps also so naïve; 
after all, as a member of the opposing school, Philodemus would have presented his 
own views as being more carefully thought out – certainly some of his criticism is 
difficult to fault. But rather than Diogenes being naïve, perhaps Philodemus does not 
fully understand, or chooses not to understand, the essence of Diogenes’ argument. 
From  the  tone  of  Philodemus’  critique,  the  latter  would  seem  more  probable, 
although this will in all likelihood never be known, but given that this debate about 
the ethical qualities within music continues still today, it would be wrong to dismiss 
Diogenes purely because of Philodemus’ method of reporting.  
Unlike any of the earlier writers on music who could have been, and indeed 
in some cases were likely sources or influences on Diogenes’ own theory, Diogenes 
only once discusses the modes by name – in the whole of Philodemus’ text there is 
only one reference to the Dorian and Phrygian modes, discussed in more detail by 
                                                 
1 Delattre 2007: Introduction to Part II of the De Musica (columns 56–140, 14), at vol. II, pp. 110–11. 
2  Indeed,  Andrew  Barker  suggests  that  Philodemus’  very  presentation  of  Diogenes’  arguments, 
starting with column 119 suggests that ‘the facts had been carefully sifted and organized, through a 
deliberate  exercise  in  sociological  classification  that  goes  well  beyond  the  commonplace’  (2001: 
360).    56 
Plato, Aristotle and their commentators.
3 This would seem to make Diogenes almost 
unique in the extant musical writers. Rather, Diogenes uses the terms ‘enharmonic’ 
and ‘chromatic’, terms that are found in one other source that is probably earlier 
than Diogenes himself, but a text that holds the opposite view of music: that is the 
fourth-century BC document known as the Hibeh Papyrus.
4 It states:  
  
[T3.1] 
λέγουσι δὲ ὡς τῶν μελῶν τ[ὰ] μὲν ἐγκρατεῖς τὰ δὲ φρονίμους, τὰ δὲ δικαίους τὰ δὲ 
ἀνδρείους τὰ δὲ δειλοὺς ποιεῖ· κακῶς εἰδότες ὅτι οὔτε χρῶμα δειλοὺς· οὔτε ἁρμονία 




 They [the harmonicists] also say that some melodies make people self-disciplined, 
others prudent, others just, others brave, and others cowardly, not understanding that 
the chromatic cannot make cowards nor the enharmonic make brave men of those 
who  employ  it  .  .  .  The  chromatic  does  not  make  people  cowardly,  nor  the 
enharmonic brave.       (Trans. Grenfell and Hunt, with amendments) 
 
Diogenes of Babylon was convinced that music was useful to every part of 
life,  and  I  will  discuss  Philodemus’  presentation  of  these  views,  in  two  broad 
sections in this chapter. In the first section, I will deal with his writing on music 
generally; in the second I will discuss the use of music for religious purposes. I will 
also discuss Philodemus’ criticisms, often voiced at length, if not necessarily in any 
more detail, in parallel. Diogenes’ views on the use of music in education will be 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5, in parallel with discussion of the views of Plato and 
Aristotle. 
 
                                                 
3 On which, see chapters 4 and 5 below. 
4 This papyrus was found by Grenfell and Hunt in 1902 in the Fayum region of Egypt, and was so 
named, presumably, after the town in which it was found. P.Hib. I.13; extract from cols. 1.15–2.6. 
5 Accents inserted.   57 
(i) Diogenes’ views on the use of music generally  
 
Diogenes asserted that music is ‘a universal activity, since everyone, Greeks and 
barbarians  practise  it’,  τῶν  δὲ  κοινῶν  εἶναί  τι  καὶ  τὴν  μουσικήν·  πάντας  γάρ, 
Ἕλληνάς τε καὶ βαρβάρους αὐτῆι χρῆσθαι,
6 and he lists a number of pursuits in 
which music plays an important part, which I will discuss below. 




. . . . . . . . . ]ν οὔτ ᾽ εἶ- 
ναι μόνον αὐτ]ὴν χρήσι- 
μωτάτην πρὸ]ς διαγωγήν, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ προσ]ήκειν ποεῖ- 
σθαι [μουσικ]ὴν ὡς ἔτυ- 
χεν, οὐχ ὅπως [εἰς] φυσικὴν 
ἡδονὴν μόνον], μὰ Διὰ, ταῖς 
χορδαῖς προσᾴδωμεν· 
 
not only is music very useful for a life of leisure, but also it befits us to practise it as 
and how it chances, not by Zeus in order to sing in accompaniment to stringed 
instruments for natural pleasure alone. 
 
Rhythms and tunes are, according to Diogenes, agreeable to everyone, and 





      εὐθέ- 
ως δὲ καὶ πᾶσιν ἡ]δέα ταῦτ ᾽ εἶ- 
                                                 
6 Column 25.6–9. 
7 Column 12.1–8. 
8 Column 17.8–13.   58 
ναι καὶ πάν]τας ἐπιζητεῖν 
φυσικῶς, ἐξ οὐ]δεμιᾶς διδα- 
χῆς [ἢ] ἐξ ἔθους προαχθέντας, 
ἀλλ ᾽ ὥσπερ αὐτομάτους συν 
. . . .  
 
  Just  as  the  beauty  and  utility  of  movement  and  rest  is  demonstrated  by 
gymnastics, so painting for its part teaches the eye about beautiful objects. As for 
music, even if it seems less necessary than these other two [arts], in fact its beauty is 
pre-eminent if it is grasped by hearing (τῆς δὲ μουσικῆς τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ἧττον 
τούτων ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν μάλιστ᾽ ἐάν τις ἐπιβολῆι ἀκουστῆι χρῇται).
9 In a column 
that might be a direct parallel to this claim, Philodemus writes: 
 
[T3.i.3]  
Ἀρισ]τόξενος [δὲ] τὴν ὅρ[ασιν 
καὶ τ]ὴν ἀκο[ὴν λ]έγων [καὶ 
γεγεν]ῆσθαι τὸ κύριον τῆ[ς δι- 
ανοί]ας καὶ θειοτέρας τ[ῶν 
ἄλλω]ν αἰσθήσεων, οὐ μ[ό- 
νον δι]ὰ τὸ τετυφῶσθαι δ[ι- 
έπιπ]τεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ [λέ- 
γειν] προάγειν καὶ παῖ[δα, 
ὄντα] παντελῶς ἀναν[δρον, 
εἰς ἀνδ]ρείας παρασκευά- 
ζουσαν] 
[Moreover]  when  Aristoxenus  said  that  sight  and  hearing  [make  up]  the  most 
important part of the intellect and are more divine than the other senses he was 
wrong not only because he was indulging in pretentious stupidity, but also because 
                                                 
9 Column 27. That is, the beauty of the music is less-immediately apparent and so you have to listen 
carefully to appreciate the full meaning.   59 
[he  said]  that  it  [music]  could  incite  even  a  child,  a  being  totally  lacking  in 
[courage], preparing [him for] acts of courage. . .
 10 
 
If this is indeed a direct response to the claim  made in column 27 cited 
above, then it strongly suggests that Diogenes might have quoted Aristoxenus by 
name as an authority here. Certainly there is a lacuna of some twenty-four lines at 
the end of column 25, and the whole of column 26 is missing. There are, however, 
no references to Aristoxenus in any of the extant columns within Diogenes’ section 
of the work. He is mentioned just twice in the text as we have it today – once at 
column 109 as above, and once again at column 143, within Philodemus’ general 
conclusion  to  the  whole  work.  It  would  be  a  little  surprising  if  Diogenes  uses 
Aristoxenus  as  an  authority  here  given  that  if  my  understanding  of  Diogenes’ 
musical philosophy is correct, the two would not have shared many views. It may 
be, however, that Diogenes used his name here to indicate that he had read his work 
– as mentioned in chapter 1, Aristoxenus was, after all, probably one of the most 
important musicologists before him – and sought a point on which they would have 
agreed to show that he was ranging across many sources.
11 Philodemus does suggest 
that Diogenes is  writing more as a historian than a philosopher, and so perhaps 
indeed his work was as much a musico-history as musical philosophy. 
 





κοι]νῆι μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰς πο- 
                                                 
10 Column. 109.28–38; see Delattre 2007: vol. I, 40 and vol. II, 203. 
11 For further discussion on Aristoxenus and the likelihood of his being one of Diogenes’ sources, see 
chapter 5, section 5.v, below. 
12 Column 39.35–44. A similar report on the use of music within sport is made by [Plutarch] at De 
Musica 1140D, ‘Nay even now it is the rule to conduct the pentathletic contests to the sound of the 
aulos. The music, to be sure, is in this case nothing distinguished or in the classic style, nor like the 
pieces that were the rule among the men of old, such as Hierax’s composition for this contest which 
was called Endromê; yet feeble and undistinguished though the music is, the aulos is nevertheless 
played’ (Loeb translation).    60 
λεμι]κὰς τοῖς ἐν τῆι σάλπι[γ 
γι] καὶ νῦν τὸ πολὺ πλῆθος 
τῶν Ἑ]λλήνων χρῆσθαι, τι- 
σὶ] δὲ καὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ τῶν αὐ- 
τῶν *. πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἀθλήσεις 
καὶ] τῆι σάλπιγγι σημαί[νε 
σθαι τ]ὸν πολεμικὸν νόμ[ον, 
ὅτα]ν [τρ]έχωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ τ[έ- 
λος]· τοῖς δὲ πεντάθλοις 
τ]ὴν ἄλσιν καὶ τὸν δί[αυ- 




In fact, to accompany wartime activities in public, most Greeks today play nomes on 
the trumpet, and some of the same nomes are played in private. And to accompany 
athletic activities, it is on the trumpet also that they sound the war-like nome when 
the runners are running towards the finishing line. In the pentathlon on the other 




There  would  seem  nothing  new  here  and  most  ancient  writers  on  music 
would have discussed such uses.
13 There are also many images of athletes or pipe-
players marching with hoplites into battle. For example, the Chigi vase, a small 
oinochoe dated to the third quarter of the seventh century BC,
14 depicts a hoplite 
phalanx marching into battle to the sound of a pipe-player; Thucydides wrote that 
                                                 
13 E.g. Pausanias V.7.10 on the introduction of the flute to accompany jumping in the pentathlon, and 
V.17.10 for the description of a wooden chest depicting, amongst other things, athletes competing in 
various contests, and an aulete with pipes standing by; Philostratus, De gumnastica 55. 
14 Painted in Corinth, this vase was found at Veii in Etruria and now stands in the Villa Giulia in 
Rome.   61 
the Spartans used the piper to keep the phalanx in step so as not to break ranks.
15 
Diogenes’ discussion doesn’t suggest that music was used in any different way, and 
adds  that  the  piper  sounds  the  signal  to  order  the  attack.  Philodemus  claims, 
however, that rather than the sound of the music, it is the warriors themselves, and 
their war cries that encourage their own soldiers, and strike fear into the hearts of the 
enemy.
16 
  Diogenes moves on to discuss the music of the theatre: 
 
[T3.i.5] 
. . . . . . .     [καὶ 
μὴν πρ]ὸς τὴ[ν] χειρονομίαν 
μὲν αὐλεῖσθαι] τὸ ὁμώνυμον 
μέλος]. Ἀ[ργείο]υς δὲ καὶ πρὸς 
τῆν π]άλην [ἐπαγ]αγεῖν τὸν αὐ- 
λό]ν. προσῆχθα[ι] δὲ τὴν μου- 
σικὴν καὶ πρ[ὸς τ]ὰς χορικὰς 
κιν]ήσεις τῶν τε γυμνοπαι- 
δικ]ῶν καὶ τῶν ἐνόπλων 
καὶ τῶν δραματικῶν, τρα- 
γικῆς καὶ σατυρικῆς καὶ κω- 
μικης· τὴν μὲν οὖν καλλί- 
στην] τούτων, τὴν τραγικήν, 
. . .]ον[. . . . .] πατέρων κα[ὶ 
γερόντων, . . . 
and to accompany pantomime gestures, they play an air bearing the same name on 
the aulos. And the Argives too, for their wrestling, bring on the aulos. Furthermore, 
music  was  also  used  to  accompany  the  movements  of  the  chorus,  the 
                                                 
15 History of the Peloponnesian Wars, V.70. 
16 Delattre remarks in his notes to this column that Philodemus is seeking here, as elsewhere in De 
Musica, to persuade his reader that it is the words that are sung or spoken, and not the sounds of the 
music, certainly not bare sounds without words, that will have any effect on the minds or souls of the 
hearers.    62 
gumnopaidiai,
17  dances  in  arms  and  the  theatrical  dances  –  tragedy,  satyr  and 
comedy. Amongst these latter, the most beautiful was the tragic dance . . . of fathers 
and old men
18. . . 
 
 Again,  there  is  nothing  really  new  here  –  music  was  traditionally  a 
significant part of everyday life in ancient Greece and its uses are attested by many 
writers.
19  
Diogenes moves on to claim that music could feed amorous desire, but also 
could console the chagrins of love, and this ability to seduce or comfort was of 
particular use to the lyric poets of old.
20  He remarks that Chamaeleon
21 was not 
incorrect when he said that the comic authors also used a similar genre, but they 
wrote in their enigmatic form in their nomes about food and drink and gave them 
their own characters. 
 
[T3.i.6] 
    πρὸς ψυχα- 
γωγίαν ἰδίαι περιειλῆφαθα[ι 
παρά [γ]ε τοῖς μελοποιοῖς ὅσοι 
χρ]ησίμως πεφιλομουσή- 
κ]ασιν: μὴ γὰρ κακῶς ἐπιση- 
μ]αίνεσθαι Χαμαιλέοντα τὸ 
τοιοῦτον τι τοὺς κωμικοὺς 
α[ἰ]νίττεσθαι περὶ τῶν ποη- 
τῶν προσηγορίαις μὲν χρω- 
                                                 
17 Gumnopaidiai are discussed by Athenaeus at Deipnosophistae XIV: 631b, as being similar to the 
anapalē of the ancients, and the Spartan festival of Gumnopaidiai is also mentioned by [Plutarch] at 
De Musica 1134C. The gumnopaidiai are reputed to have been founded by one Thaletas of Gortyn, 
mentioned by Diogenes later at column 47.23–30, and by Philodemus at 132.37–133.3. See, below, 
pages 66–9 for discussion of Thaletas. 
18 Column 39.46-40.14.  
19 E.g. Homer, of course, Plato, Aristophanes, Athenaeus, Plutarch and Pausanias. 
20 Columns 43 and 47. 
21 Col. 47.5. The Peripatetic writer from Heraclea Pontica, dating to around 350–281 BC; see fr. 1 
Wehrli, and fr. 176 Wehrli (= D.L. V.92), a contemporary of Heraclides of Pontus; OCD 3rd edn 
s.vv. This might indeed be an indication, as will be suggested below, that Diogenes’ principal sources 
might have been the Peripatetics.   63 
μ]ένους ταῖς τῶν βρωτῶν 
καὶ ποτῶν, πα|ριστάντας δὲ 
τὴν ἰδιότητα | [τ]ούτων *. 
  
In his critique, Philodemus once again accuses his opponent of confusing the 
poet with the musician.
22  
 
 ‘As far back as you can go towards our origins’, writes Diogenes, ‘melody has by 
its nature had the [power] to incite motion and to arouse actions’.  
 
[T3.i.7]      Ἄνωθεν 
  δ᾽ ] ἔχειν φύσει τὸ μέλος κινη- 
  τικόν τι, παραστατι- 
  κὸν [κ]αὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις . . .
 23 
 
And Diogenes cites the examples, first of Orpheus charming the stones [with 
the power of his voice] (τῶι μεμυθεῦσθαι τε Ὀρφέα θέλξαι τὰς πέτρας καμπαὶς), 
contrasting this anecdote with the case of Amphion, who made his workers submit 
to his will (ἀλλὰ Ἀμφίονα πονοῦντας παριστάσθαι).
24 He then immediately moves 
on, without any further comment, to talk of Ptolemy’s rowers, who were unable to 
move their boat effectively until Ptolemy instructed the famous aulete, Ismenias, to 
accompany their actions.
25  
                                                 
22 Column 131.17–34. 
23 Column 41.17 ff. Note here that Diogenes uses melos rather than mousikē.  
24 Column 41.21–5. The OCD s.v. Amphion actually credits Amphion with ‘walking around the site 
of Thebes playing his lyre and charming the stones into a wall’, very similar to Diogenes’ claim. 
Apollodorus’ Library III.v.5, writes ‘And having succeeded to the sovereignty they [Amphion and 
his brother Zethus] fortified the city, the stones following Amphion’s lyre’(Loeb translation). Frazer, 
the translator, refers to the incident as ‘the miracle of the music’ p. 339. 
25 Delattre (2007) suggests that the Ptolemy here referred to was in all likelihood Ptolemy I Soter. 
The aulete Ismenias was known before 339 BC, and it seems that he was accorded much respect by 
Zeno of Citium. He is cited by Diogenes Laertius at VII. 125 as ‘[playing] all airs on the flute well’, 
and mentioned by Plutarch at Non Posse 1095F, ‘Do the Epicureans not make the Scyth Ateas look as 
if he had more music in his soul – who swore, when the flute-player Ismenias was a prisoner and 
performed  at  a  banquet,  that  he  found  greater  pleasure  in  the  whinnying  of  a  horse!’  (Loeb 
translation). I have been unable to find any earlier reference to Ismenias than this, although he is 
again mentioned by Diogenes Laertius at IV.22 in his chapter on Crates, the Head of the Academy in   64 
  In his parallel critique, Philodemus makes no mention of the name of the 
aulete.  He  mocks  Diogenes’  claims  that  music  incites  movement  with  ‘if  as  he 
affirms, it is Providence that introduced it [music] for this end, then we will not 
waste time examining it!’
26 And he moves on to suggest that:  
 
[T3.i.8] 
καὶ γὰρ διορίσας τὸ μέλος ἔ-          2 
φη κινητικὸν εἶναι φύσει· 
πρὸς δ ᾽ οὖν τὴν ὑπόνοιαν 
τῆν οὕτω κωφὴν ἔοικεν ἐ-          5 
πεσπάσθαι τὸ τοῖς ἐλα[ύ]νουσιν 
ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν καὶ τοὶς θερί- 
ζουσιν πάλαι καὶ τὸν οἶνον 
ἐργαζομένοις καὶ πολλοῖς 
ἄλλοις τῶν ἐπίπονα συντ[ε-          10 
λούντων ἔργα τῶν ὀργά- 
νων τινὰ παραπο[ζε]υγνύ- 
ειν· ὃ καὶ Πτολεμαῖον οὗτος 
γράφει πεποιηκέναι τοῖς κα- 
                                                                                                                                        
the third century BC. Diogenes (Laertius) states that Crates and Polemo ‘did not side with the popular 
party, but were such as Dionysodorus the flute-player is said to have claimed to be, when he boasted 
that no one ever heard his melodies, as those of Ismenias were heard, either on shipboard or at the 
fountain’. I take this to imply that Ismenias was a well-known aulete, who would have played at 
many  public  events,  whilst  Dionysodorus  might  have  been  more  choosy  about  where  his 
performances were held. If Zeno thought highly of Ismenias, however, Diogenes of Babylon would 
surely have heard of him via the Stoic tradition.  A search of the  internet under ‘Ismenias’ has 
brought  up  an  introduction  to  The  Praise  of  Music:  Wherein  besides  the  antiquitie,  dignitie 
delectation and use thereof in civill matters, is also declared the sober and lawfull use of the same in 
the congregation and Church of God, written by the Oxford Aristotelian John Case in 1586 (although 
authorship is now a subject of some debate). An excerpt from chapter 4 of Praise states ‘By the help 
of  musicke  Ismenias  a  Theban  musician,  restored  men  sicke  of  an  ague,  to  their  former  health. 
[http://www.philological.bham.ac.uk/music2/intro.html]. Two earlier musicians credited with similar 
feats are mentioned by Diogenes at column 47, on which see below, pp. 66–9. Another example also 
used by Diogenes is found in the same chapter of the Praise.  
26 Presumably Divine Providence, for which Philodemus, as an Epicurean, would have no time. The 
Epicurean school did not believe in Divine Providence, nor did they believe that the gods would 
intervene in men’s lives on earth. Any argument based upon gifts from the gods would have been 
ridiculed by orthodox Epicureans, as indeed they are by Philodemus in this treatise. Delattre remarks 
that here Philodemus refuses to enter into any theological argument (2007: vol. II, 225), but simply 
once again resorts to ridiculing his opponent (col. 121.22–30).   65 
θέλκουσιν. Ἀλλ ᾽ οὐχ ὅτι κι-        15 
νεῖ καὶ παρίσταται τὰ μέ- 
λη πρὸς τὰς πράξεις οὔτ ᾽ [ἐ]φι- 
στάνουσιν οἱ παρέχοντες 
τὴν μουσικὴν οὔτε τ[ό]τε συν- 
τελοῦσιν οἱ πράττοντες, ἄ-          20 
νευ δὲ μουσικῆς ἧττον δύ- 
νανται, τῶι δ ᾽ ἀνεπ[ι]βλῄτους 
ἐπὶ τὸν πόνον γίνεσθαι καὶ 
κουφότερον ποεῖν τῇ πα- 
ραμείξει τῆς ἡδονῆς  *.          25 
 
And by definition, he says, melody is by nature kinetic. Whatever it was that led him 
to such a stupid idea – it’s probably the fact that those who row on boats, and those 
in former times who brought in the harvest and produced wine, and many other 
manual workers were seen to be closely associated with certain musical instruments. 
It is exactly this that Ptolemy did for his rowers as my adversary wrote. However, it 
isn’t because tunes set into motion and carry one towards actions that those who 
supply the music [set themselves to it, attend to it], nor that these latter see their task 
through, whereas without music they have a lesser capacity, but the reason for this is 
that they do not pay attention to their work, and because of the fact that pleasure is 
mixed with it, they execute [their work] with a lighter heart.
27 
 
Philodemus’  argument  seems  difficult  to  fault  here,  and  he  moves  on  to 
assert, in the context of Diogenes’ claims for Orpheus, that Diogenes was ‘raving’ 
when  he  claimed  that  music  itself  could  set  souls  and  bodies  into  motion.  He 
remarks that the myth of Orpheus was today usually called hyperbole (καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς 
                                                 
27 Columns 122.2–25. In a note to Aristides Quintilianus De Musica II, 3, where Aristides remarks 
upon music’s ability to ‘take away the hardship from sailing and rowing and from the hardest kinds 
of manual labour, easing their toil’, Barker suggests (1989: 462) that there was probably in existence 
‘a  more  or  less  standard  compendium  of  [such]  instances’.  Certainly  Aristides’  comments 
immediately recall the Philodemian passage.   66 
γ ᾽ εἰώθαμεν ὑπερβολικῶς λέγειν).
28 But, he does concede that if one does want to 
use the example of Orpheus, the fabled musician should be seen as analogous to an 
aulete playing from the bow of the trireme at the head of a team of rowers rather 
than the ‘delirious images of my adversary!’ (διὰ τὰ τούτου ληρήματα). However, 
one does wonder whether Philodemus deliberately reports Diogenes’ beliefs in such 
a way to make them sound all the more unbelievable, thus making his own critique 
sound all the more reasonable. It is interesting that in introducing the anecdotes of 
Orpheus and Amphion, Diogenes states ‘according to legend’ (τῶι μεμυθεῦσθαι). 
This  appears  to  be  the  only  case  where  he  distinguishes  ‘legend’  or  myth  from 
history, and I would suggest that this must be deliberate. For a Stoic to argue that 
music  itself  contains  ēthos,  as  I  argued  in  chapter  2,  then  there  must  be  some 
cognitive value to it. But to suggest that music could have an effect on inanimate 
objects as well, surely reduces it so some sort of magical effect; indeed the verb 
Diogenes uses with respect to Orpheus moving  stones is θέλξαι, which in itself 
suggest magic, and thereby opening up the way for Philodemus’ stinging rebuke.   
  However,  there  is  a  discussion  in  Aristides  Quintilianus’ De  Musica  II,
29 
where  Aristides  states  that  although  some  people  might  initially  seem  to  be 
unmoved by the music, everyone will in the end be affected by it. Perhaps, therefore, 
Diogenes’ reference to the effect of Orpheus’ music on the stones is a deliberate 
metaphor for such situations. 
Diogenes  doesn’t  only  use  mythical  characters  to  illustrate  his  points, 
however;  he  also  uses  apparently  genuine  historical  characters.  One  ancient 
musician Diogenes used as  an example of music’s power is the seventh-century 
Thaletas of Gortyn, in Crete. Although the name of Thaletas is not preserved within 
Diogenes’ own text, Philodemus’ parallel detailed criticism makes it clear that he 
(Diogenes) claimed that Thaletas had visited the Spartans, at their request, following 
a Pythian oracle ordering them to invite him to Lacedaemonia. Apparently he put an 
                                                 
28 Column 122.25–32. 
29 Book II, chapter 4; for more on this, see below, T3.i.27 and discussion.   67 
end to a plague (but see further below) through the playing of his music. According 





  Λακεδαιμονίους          132.33 
δὲ τοῖς ἀδιανοήτοις οὐ 
προσιέμεθα μαρτυροῦν-      35 
τας, ὅτι καὶ πυθόχρηστον 
ἔσχον μεταπ[έ]μψασθαι Θα- 
λήταν καί, π[α]ρα[γ]ενομέ- 
νου, τῆς διχον[οί]ας ἔλ[η]ξαν, 
εἰ δὴ μαρτ[υρο]ῦσιν · ἀλλ ᾽ οὐ     40 
μόνον ὅ τι παρὰ τοῖς πεπλα- 
κόσιν ἄριστά γ[ε] καὶ μουσι- 
κοῖς ἄλλοι[ς καὶ] ἄντιλέγου- 
σ]ιν, ο[ὐ]δὲ [. . . . ]σιν α[. . ]ι- 
γ[. . . . . ]λ[. . . . . . ]ον ἀλα-      45 
ζονευόμενον δι ᾽ ἀναθέμα- 
τος, εἴπερ ἀνέθηκεν οὕτως ἐ- 
πιγράψας ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσιν.             133.3 
 
This story appears in few other sources today, none of them earlier than 
Diogenes, although Thaletas is known through Ephorus,
31 a fifth-century writer, who 
records that Thaletas introduced the paeonic and cretic rhythms.
32 Although he was 
                                                 
30 Diogenes’ very lacunose text at column 47.23–30; Philodemus’ rather more complete criticism at 
132.33–133.3.  
31 Strabo I.1.1 suggests that Ephorus was a contemporary of Democritus, Eudoxus and Dicaearchus, 
and names Eratosthenes, Polybius and Posidonius as their successors. The OCD dates Ephorus to c. 
405–330 BC. 
32 Strabo X.4.16–17. FGrH 70 F 149, and [Plutarch] De Musica 1134E. More on this below.   68 
known as Thaletas, Pausanias I.14.4 writes of a Thales,
33 who ‘stopped the plague at 
Sparta’;
34 [Plutarch] writes at De Musica 1146C: 
 
[T3.i.10]  the Cretan Thaletas who is said in accordance with a Delphic oracle to 
have  visited  Lacedaemon  and  by  means  of  music  to  have  brought  health  to  the 
people, delivering Sparta, as Pratinas




Plutarch also records the event in his Life of Lycurgus 4,
37 in rather more 
detail, and from this it would appear that the ‘plague’ was indeed civil unrest rather 
than  a  disease.  This  would  seem  further  confirmed  by  Philodemus’  unequivocal 
statement, at T3.i.9, line 39, that it was civil unrest (τῆς διχονοίας), and so Barker’s 
doubts about the exact meaning in [Plutarch] (see n. 36) are now unnecessary. 
Barker  notes  that  it  is  probable  that  Thaletas  wrote  music  for  stringed 
instruments rather than the aulos, although he probably ‘composed new rhythms 
drawn  from  the  repertoire  of  the  aulos’.  Cretan  music  was  based  primarily  on 
stringed instruments.
38 Plutarch confirms in his own De Musica that:  
 
[T3.i.11]    while  Polymnestus,  after  the  introduction  of  the  Terpandrian  style, 
employed a new one, although he too remained faithful to the lofty manner; so too 
                                                 
33 Strabo X.4.19 associates Thales with Lycurgus. This Thales and Thaletas are probably one and the 
same person; see OCD s.v. 
34 Pausanias Guide to Greece vol. I, trans Peter Levi. Penguin: 1971. Levi suggests at p. 43, n. 81 that 
Thales and the other men being discussed at the time ‘seem to have been real shamans, who were 
soon lost among legendary achievements and falsely attributed writings’.  
35 Possibly Pratinas of Phlius, who according to the Suda, competed in the 70th Olympiad in 499–496 
BC, but it is not certain that this is the same man. 
36 Andrew Barker, in his note to 1134B (where Thaletas is first mentioned) of his own translation 
remarks, that although Thaletas was reputed to have put an end to a plague by means of music, 
‘whether it was a real epidemic or a metaphor for unhealthy political unrest is not clear’.  
37 Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus 4, 2–3. Plutarch writes, ‘Now Thales passed as a lyric poet and screened 
himself behind this art, but in reality he did the work of one of the mightiest lawgivers. For his odes 
were so many exhortations to obedience and harmony, and their measured rhythms were permeated 
with  ordered  tranquillity,  so  that  those  who  listened  to  them  were  insensibly  softened  in  their 
dispositions, insomuch that they renounced their mutual hatreds which were so rife at that time, and 
dwelt together in a common pursuit of what was high and noble.’ 
38  Athenaeus  627d;  [Plutarch]  De  Musica  1140c,  ‘Others  march  into  battle  to  the  music  of  the 
lyre.The Cretans are on record as having long maintained this practice’; Barker 1984: 215, n. 75.   69 
did  Thaletas  and  Sacadas,  these  also,  at  least  in  the  conduct  of  rhythm,  being 
innovators, but nevertheless not departing from the lofty manner.
39 
 
This might suggest that Diogenes is displaying a dislike, as evidenced in 
Plato  and  Aristotle  before  him,  of  ‘New  Music’.
40 [ Plutarch’s]  comment  that 
Thaletas had retained ‘the lofty manner’ suggests that in using him as evidence, 
rather than a later musician, Diogenes is ensuring that the story displays the use of 
appropriate, higher, music, rather than the [suggested] frivolous and even dangerous 
style of the ‘New Musicians’.
41  
  Delattre remarks in his note on the event that only Philodemus’ De Musica 
mentions the ex-voto,
42 and indeed I can find no other reference to it. Diogenes 
would  seem  therefore  to  be  using  a  source  that  once  again  is  no  longer  extant. 
Rispoli  has  suggested  that  his  source  may  have  been  Heraclides  of  Pontus.
43 
However, as Heraclides’ works are also known only in fragmentary form, it is again 
unlikely that this can be known for sure. 
A second historical rather than mythical figure referred to as evidence of 
music’s power to heal or calm is Terpander, a seventh-century musician of some 
importance.
44 This reputation seems to be borne out by the number of writers who 
have referred to him.
45 Diogenes refers to him only briefly, and without introduction, 
immediately after his claim for Thaletas.




[T3.i.12]  Οὐ πειθόμεθα  δ ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶι Τέρ- 
                                                 
39 De Musica 1135C.  
40 For more discussion of ‘New Music’, see chapter 4, pp. 118 ff. 
41 I will discuss this possibility below, pp. 118 ff. 
42 Delattre 2007: vol. II, 368, n.8. 
43 Rispoli 1969: 225, see also Delattre 2007: vol. II, 367, n. 4. 
44 Barker (1984: 208, n. 18) states that Terpander was treated as the greatest of all musicians after his 
time in Sparta. Athenaeus (635e) writes that he instituted and won the kitharodic competition at the 
Carnea. He had four victories  at  the Pythian Games, and  is thought to have invented the seven-
stringed kithara. 
45 A search of the TLG shows some thirteen ancient authors to have mentioned Terpander, the oldest 
source, apart from Diogenes being Diodorus Siculus, who probably was using Ephorus as his source. 
46 Column 47.31. 
47 Column 133.4 ff.   70 
πανδρον κ[α]τὰ μαντείαν  
κεκλῆσθαι πρὸς κατάπαυσιν 
ἐμφυλίου στάσεως, ἂν καὶ πά- 
νυ πολλοὶ συμφωνῶσι περὶ 
τούτου τῶν μουσολήπτων, 
οὗτος δέ, σχεδὸν μόνος, [ἐ]ν 
τοῖς φιλ[ε]ιτείοις αὐτὸν ἄι- 
δοντα ποιῇ *· 
 
And we are no more persuaded, on the other hand, by the story of Terpander who by 
prediction of the oracle was invited to put an end to the civil unrest even if, indeed, 
many enthusiasts of music agree about the event, and if my adversary (he is almost 
alone in this case) makes him sing in the common meals. 
 
Once again, [Plutarch] recounts what seems to be the same event: 
 
[T3.i.13]    That  furthermore  the  best-regulated  states  have  taken  care  to  concern 
themselves with music of the grand style we could show by citing many examples, 




It  seems  that  Philodemus  was  correct  when  he  confirmed  that  ‘many 
enthusiasts of music agree about the event’; unfortunately most of the authors who 
record it whose writings remain extant, were even later than Philodemus.    
Diogenes then moves to discuss the example of another seventh-century lyric 
poet, Archilochus, who was supposed to have said that ‘mortal men are charmed by 
song’ (κηλέεται δ ᾽ ὅτις βροτῶν ἀοιδαῖς), and gives the example of the Carians, 
when, on the occasion of an eclipse or an assembly, a tumult erupted, but were 
                                                 
48 [Plut.] De Musica 1146B–C.   71 
quietened  by  the  playing  of  the  most  calming music,  becoming  milder  until  the 




  παρ[ὰ] δὲ Κα[ρ- 
σίν, ἐ]πειδὰν ἐν ταῖς εκασ[. –       40 
. . . .  θ]όρυβος γένηται, τῶν 
γλυκ]υτάτων τινὰς ᾠδ[ῶν 
κατάρ]χειν, εἶτ ᾽ εἰς τουσ[. . 
. . . . ]νεσθαι καὶ πέρας πα- 
ρανοί]ας· οὕτω δὲ κατα[π]αύ[ει      45 
. . . . . ] τὸ προκείμενον. 
 
 The  question  of  whether  the  original  text  discussed  an  eclipse  or  an 
assembly  is  probably  rather  academic.  I  can  find  no  other  reference  to  such  an 
incident,  and  the  example  merely  presents  another  occasion  when  the  soothing 
music was able to restore calm and order to the gathering. Delattre remarks, ‘Un 
phénomène  comme  celui  des  éclipses  de  soleil  faisait  peur,  et  il  n’est  pas 
invraisamblable que, une sorte de panique prenant la population en cette occasion, 
les  Carians,  réputés  pour  leurs  auloi  aux  sonorités  très  aiguës  utilisés  lors  des 
funérailles, aient eu l’idée de calmer le tumulte au son de l’aulos, jusqu’à la fin de 
l’éclipse. On comprend habituellement: <au cours des [assemblées]>. . .’
50  Here, 
Philodemus  chooses  not  to  comment  upon  his  adversary’s  discussion  –  whether 
because  he  didn’t  consider  it  worthy  of  argument  or  because  he  couldn’t  argue 
against something that actually happened is impossible to tell. I do, however, find it 
a  little  surprising,  given  Philodemus’  habit  of  mocking  Diogenes’  examples 
whenever he can, that no mention is made at all within his critique. He merely 
interpolates ‘It is in this way that my adversary comes to the end of this question.’  
                                                 
49 Column 49, lines 39–46. The word ἐκλείψεσι in line 40, inserted by Gomperz (1885) is doubted by 
Delattre, but indicates both α and σ as doubtful. ἐκκλησίαις was suggested by Rispoli.   
50 Delattre 2007: vol. I, 81.   72 
Immediately after Diogenes’ words, there is a lacuna of some twenty-six 
lines. It appears from the parallel columns in Philodemus’ criticism that Diogenes 
moves on to discuss music’s link to justice, and it is quite possible that Diogenes 
quotes Plato as an authority, as Philodemus remarks that ‘if Plato wanted to say the 
music aided towards justice we would have expected some demonstration on his 
part’.
51 Furthermore, when Diogenes’ text becomes legible again, a discussion of the 
lawgivers and their involvement in choosing suitable music for education follows. I 
will return to that discussion later.
52  
It is interesting that Diogenes cites historical figures alongside mythological 
figures, apparently without differentiating between their status. Is the presence of the 
historical  figures  intended  to  make  the  fictional  characters  more  realistic?  It  is 
interesting also that it is the seventh-century figures that are given prominence, and 
perhaps indeed it is the fact that they were the writers of music in the ‘grand style’, 
that  makes  them  worthy  examples  in  Diogenes’  eyes.  Certainly  the  ‘musical 
innovators’ of the fifth century must have been in his mind. At column 31 Diogenes 
refers  to  earlier  times,  when  innovations  in  music  were  prohibited,  in  a  manner 
reminiscent of Plato: 
 
[T3.i.15] . . . 
  πᾶσι πρότεραν νόμων θέσιν 
παρ[εῖ]σαν αὐτῆι χρῆσ[θ]αι καὶ 
μη[δὲν]α κ[αι]νοτομεῖν· τὴν 
δὲ ν[ῦν] ἀ[κμά]ζουσαν διάθε- 
σιν ἀπ[. . . . . ]ν ἀφεστηκέ- 
ναι *.  Κ[αὶ τοὺς] δειθυραμβι- 
κοὺς δὲ τρόπ[ο]υς εἴ τις συγ- 
κρίναι, τόν τε κατὰ Πίνδα- 
ρον καὶ τὸν κατὰ Φιλοξε- 
νον, μεγάλην εὑρεθήσθαι 
                                                 
51 Column 138.22 ff., and accompanying notes, vol. II, 269–70; 437–8. 
52 Below, chapter 4, T4.15 and discussion.   73 
τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἐπιφαι- 
νομένων ἠθῶν, τὸν αὐ- 
τὸν δ᾽ εἶναι τρόπον · 
 
. . . an early institution of the law which allowed everyone to practise music whilst 
forbidding the introduction of innovations. But the disposition that flourishes today 
is very different. And regarding the styles of dithyramb, if you compare that of 
Pindar and Philoxenus you will see a great difference in the characters they present 
although the style is the same. 
 
Philoxenus,  who  lived  c.  435–380  BC  was  a  famous  dithyrambic  poet. 
Pherecrates,  an  Athenian  comic  poet,  who  won  his  first  victories  at  the  City 
Dionysia  and  the  Lenaea  between  440  and  430  BC,
53  and  a  fragment  of  whose 
writing  is  preserved  in  [Plutarch]’s  De  Musica,
54  introduces  him  as  a  ‘musical 
innovator and corruptor of traditional music’.
55 Aristotle confirms that Philoxenus 
tried to compose his dithyramb entitled The Mysians in the Dorian mode, but was 
unable to and had to revert to the traditional mode, the Phrygian: 
 
[T3.i.16]  Composition itself makes it clear how the dithyramb is by common 
consent  a  Phrygian  form.  People  who  work  in  this  field  of  study  bring  many 
examples  to  prove  it,  including  Philoxenus,  who  when  he  tried  to  compose  his 
Mysians in the Dorian mode, was unable to, but fell back again into the appropriate 
harmonia, Phrygian, compelled by nature itself.
56 
 
An anonymous papyrus fragment found in Egypt in 1891
57 would seem to 
confirm Diogenes’ affirmation that ‘laws’ were in place in earlier times regarding 
                                                 
53 Diodorus Siculus XV.5 places Philoxenus in Sicily with Dionysius of Syracuse in 386 BC. For 
more on Philoxenus, see the Appendix to this chapter. 
54 De Musica 1141D–1142A. 
55 For Pherecrates at the Lenaea, see Plato Prt. 327d. 
56 Aristotle, Politics VIII. 1342b. 
57 P.Graec. Vindob. 1996a and b (MPER n.s. I.22). This papyrus could be the remnants of a treatise 
on the dithyramb, and some scholars suggest that it might have been written by Melanippides himself  
(even though in that case he would be referring to himself in the third person) in the second half of   74 
the correct ‘modes’ to be used for different types of music. This fragment confirms 
that the ‘Dorian harmony was inappropriate to Dionysus’ (i.e., the dithydamb): 
 
[T3.i.17] 
]. . . [  τὸ 
μὲν ] πάθος οὐκ ἀγνο- 
ῶν], ὅτι θρηνόν  τινα 
ἀπα[ι]τεῖν δόξειν ἄν, 
τὸν δὲ διθύραμβον  
εἰδως, ὅτι πάντα μᾶλ- 
[λον ἢ θρῆνον δέχεται] 
-νησε.[. . ].ω . ος ἀ[λ]λό- 
τριον ἡ[γ]ούμενος εἶ- 
ναι τῶι πάθει, τὸ δὲ 
τῆς Δωρι[σ]τὶ τῶι Διονύ- 
σωι.  τὸ μέσον ἀμφο- 
[τέρων ἑλόμενος] 
    [εκεῖ] 
.νο μέλος μαλα[κὸν ἡ- 
γεῖτο πολ[λ]αχοῦ μὲν 
ἀποφαίνε[σ]θαι, μά- 
λιστα δ ᾽  ἐν τῶι ·  τίς ἄ- 
ρα λύσσα νῶι τίν᾽ ὑφαι- 
. . . ] . Μελανιππί- 
δη]ν καὶ κατατάτ- 
τ]ειν ἑκάστην ἐπὶ 
τ]ὸ πρέπον αὐτῶν.  
δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα Τε[λέστης] 
δε . [. . . .]κ 
                                                                                                                                        
the fifth-century BC. (Paper given by Luigi Battezzato at the Institute of Classical Studies, London 
entitled ‘Dithyrambs and Greek Tragedy’, on 2 March 2009).    75 
ἐγείρομεν ιω[ὰν] ν[εοχ- 
μόν · ἐξέγειρε δὲ Λακε- 
δαιμονῖων πόδα.  
.  .  .  since  he  was  not  unaware  that  one  could  think  that  the  suffering  (pathos) 
required some sort of lamentation (thrēnos), and since he knew that the dithyramb 
[encompasses anything] sooner than [lamentation]. . . and since he thought that it 
[the dithyramb genre] was inappropriate (allotrios) to the suffering (pathos), and the 
presence  of  the  Dorian  harmony  was  inappropriate  to  Dionysus.  [Choosing]  the 
intermediate of the two [options/harmonies?]. . . he thought the tune was a delicate 
one [i.e. too delicate] for widespread appearance, and especially in the passage that 
goes: ‘what sort of frenzy (lussa) to the mind (nōi), what’. . . and Melanippides 
arranged  each  [harmony]  according  to  what  was  appropriate  to  them.  This  is 
demonstrated by Telestes. ‘We stir up a newfangled song. Stir up the foot of the 
Spartans.’
58   
 
[Plutarch] confirms that Melanippides, Philoxenus and Timotheus did not 
keep to the traditional music,
59 and provides more information regarding the contrast 
between  the  styles  of  Pindar  and  Philoxenus,  mentioned  by  Diogenes,  during  a 
discussion upon the importance of correct training and instruction in music: 
 
[T3.i.18]  Yet, when [Telesias of Thebes] set out to compose music and tried his 
hand at both manners of composition, Pindar’s and Philoxenus’, he found himself 
unable to achieve success in the latter; and the reason was his excellent training from 
boyhood.
60 
                                                 
58 Translation Battezzato, with amendments. Another part of the papyrus mentions Philoxenus as 
well, although the context is too lacunose to make any real sense. This would seem to be worthy of 
investigation at a later date as the discussion would seem to bear a real resemblance to that of both 
Diogenes and [Plutarch].  
59 [Plutarch] De Musica 1141C–F. 
60 [Plutarch] De Musica 1142C. In his commentary on this passage, Lasserre (1954: 174) writes: ‘Le 
choix de Pindare d’une part et de Philoxène de l’autre pour répresenter, sous le rapport de la morale, 
les deux tendances contraires de la musique et particulièrement de la musique dithyrambique paraît 
avoir été traditionnel car ils les polarisent également chez Philodème, De mus. [31] van Krevelin.’ 
[Plutarch] claims to be reporting what Aristoxenus wrote, but this exists only in fragmentary form 
now (fr. 76 Wehrli). Telesias seems otherwise ‘unknown’ (Loeb translator note, p. 425, n. h).   76 
 
Clearly Philoxenus’ music was not approved of, and considered inferior to 
that of Pindar, although Pindar too justified some use of innovation, stating that the 
old style was ‘drawn out like a rope’.
61 However, Pindar is obviously held in some 
regard  by  Diogenes,  certainly  in  comparison  with  Philoxenus.  Dionysius  of 
Halicarnassus, in his De compositione verborum links Philoxenus with Timotheus, a 
famous innovator, and a musician who claimed to be the ‘successor’ of Terpander, 
discussed above, pages 69–70.  
  Dionysius writes: 
 
[T3.i.19]  The dithyramb composers used to change their modes too, making them 
Dorian, Phrygian, and Lydian in the same song . . . I mean the composers of the age 
of Philoxenus, Timotheus and Telestes, because with the ancients the dithyramb was 
just as regulated as everything else.
62 
 
  Philoxenus  was  clearly  renowned  amongst  ancient  writers  on  music  as  a 
musical  innovator,  his  work  entitled  The  Cyclops  also  being  parodied  by 
Aristophanes in Plutus, and so the mention of him by [Plutarch] is not that unusual. 
But the comparison of Pindar and Philoxenus in the same context, pace the remarks 
of Lasserre,
63 could suggest that the writer had read either Philodemus’ work, or at 
least a work that referred to it. I have seen no other use in other musical writers of 
both Pindar and Philoxenus as examples of the different styles of dithyramb, even 
though  both  Plato  and  Aristotle,  to  name  but  two,  were  eloquent  in  their 
condemnation of the misuse of musical genera. 
In a fragment of his Persae,
64 Timotheus writes: 
 
                                                 
61 Fragment 70b; West 1992: 344. 
62 De comp. verb. 131. 
63 Above, n. 60. 
64 Timotheus fr. 15, PMG 791. Translation from Barker 1984: 96.   77 
[T3.i.20] . . . Terpander yoked music to the ten songs – and it was Aeolian Lesbos 
that bore this famous man. . .And now Timotheus with his eleven-struck metres and 
rhythms makes kitharis spring up anew. . .
65 
 
  Timotheus appears to be discussed briefly by Diogenes at column 43.23, 
although the restoration is not definite. Only the letters ιμό can be read today, but the 
name does fit into the context of a discussion of the fifth-century poets Agathon, 
Democritus  and  Nicander,  all  of  whom  seem  to  be  accused  of  ‘effeminate 
comportment’.  All  three  were  contemporaries  of  Timotheus,  and  it  may  be  that 
Diogenes was presenting examples of the types of music that were not considered 
suitable. 
        . . . . .  
 
The musicians discussed in this section so far, mythological figures apart, are all 
musical figures that appear elsewhere within other musico-historical accounts. At 
column 38, Philodemus remarks that his opponent discusses his views on music as a 
historian  rather  than  as  a  philosopher,  and  to  an  extant  this  would  seem  a  fair 
comment. There is nothing particularly Stoic about the theory presented in this way 
– Plato and members of the Peripatetic school would have all been familiar with the 
musicians Diogenes discusses, and it is clear in some instances that Diogenes has 
used  the  Peripatetics  as  a  main  source.  Only  the  use  of  mythological  characters 
would seem to indicate that this is a Stoic writing. Indeed it has been suggested that 
[Plutarch]  used  Diogenes  as  one  of  his  main  sources  for  his  own De  Musica;
66 
certainly many of the characters discussed by Diogenes appear in the later work, 
often, however, with much more detail added. 
 
                                                 
65  The  ‘eleven-struck’  refers  to  the  eleven  strings  with  which  tradition  links  him  as  opposed  to 
Terpander’s seven strings. See West 1992: 362. 
66 Conversation with Professor Dirk Obbink in Herculaneum in June 2006; also D. Babut, Plutarque 
et le Stoïcisme, Presses Universitaires de France, 1969.   78 
It is clear that it is not only music with words that Diogenes considered useful for 
life. It appears that he also considers instrumental music
67 to have some power over 
the  soul,  as  argued  elsewhere  in  this  thesis,
68  and  as  evidenced  by  an  anecdote 
related  in  various  forms  by  a  number  of  philosophers,  but  as  far  as  I  can  tell, 
Diogenes is the earliest philosopher to discuss it. It appears in column 42, lines 36–
45 of Delattre’s reconstructed text: 
 
[T3.i.21]  καὶ καταστολ[. . . . .  . . . . - 
ξιν ἐπιτ[. . . ]αμε[. . . . .  . . . . 
τόνον τινὰ κα[. . . . .  . . . .  
Πυθαγόραν δὲ [. . . . .  . . . .  
. . .]αγωγότερον [. . . . .  . .  
μεθυ]όντων καλε[. . . . .  . . . 
. . αὐλ]ητρίδα  ν[. . . . .  . . . 
. . . . ]ναν[. . .]πα[. . . . .  . . .  
. . . . . ]ους τὸ σπ[ονδεῖον . 
. . . . ] καὶ τοῦτον [. . . . .  . .  
     
 
It must be said that the text is too fragmentary to make any real sense, but it 
bears so similar a resemblance to the anecdote related in Sextus Empiricus that I 
would suggest it must be relating the same tale:
69 
 
[T3.i.22]  ὁ γοῦν Πυθαγόρας μειράκια ὑπὸ μέθης ἐκβεβακχευμένα ποτὲ θεασάμενος 
ὡς  μηδὲν  τῶν  μεμηνότοων  διαφέρειν,  παρῄνεσε  τῷ  συνεπικωμάζοντι  τούτοις 
αὐλητῇ τὸ σπονδεῖον αὐτοῖς ἐπαυλῆσαι μέλος· τοῦ δὲ τὸ προσταχθὲν ποιήσαντος 
οὕτως αἰφνίδιον μεταβαλεῖν σωφρονισθέντας ὡς εὶ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔνηφον. 
 
                                                 
67 That is, music written to be played without the accompaniment of, or indeed to accompany, words. 
68 See, in particular, the comparison between Diogenes’ column 51 and Plato’s Laws II. 669b–e in 
chapter 4 below, T4.13 and 14 and discussion. 
69 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Musicians VI.8.   79 
Thus, Pythagoras, having noticed on one occasion that some youths who were in a 
state of bacchic frenzy from drunkenness differed not at all from madmen, advised 
the flute-player who was with them in their revels to play them the ‘spondean’ tune; 
and when he had done as instructed, were chastened and changed as suddenly as if 
they had been sober from the beginning.
70  
 
The same anecdote is repeated in Galen, de Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, 
V. 6.21–2, which is, in fact a discussion of Posidonius’ writings,
71 although the 
name of Damon replaces that of Pythagoras.
72 The incident is related by Galen as 
part of his argument that Posidonius followed Plato rather than the orthodox Stoic 
view in the composition of the soul;
73 nonetheless it does indicate that the story was 
well  known.  The  fact  that  Diogenes  cites  Pythagoras  as  the  protagonist  is 
interesting, and may indicate a Pythagorean influence in his musical philosophy, or 
at very least suggest a Pythagorean source.  
  Diogenes does mention Damon in other contexts (and as far as I can see, he 
does not mention Pythagoras again), and as a person worthy of respect, and so the 
anecdote could have been used by him as evidence of Damon’s knowledge of the 
use of music had he chosen to do so. The fact that Posidonius relates the tale using 
the name of Damon, rather than keeping to the story as related by Diogenes might 
suggest that an earlier Stoic had also have written about the event; nonetheless, it 
surely suggests a different source.
74   
  It is interesting also that Posidonius argues against the rational mind/soul 
being affected by ‘irrational’ music, which would mean, presumably, that he would 
not have agreed with his Stoic predecessor: 
                                                 
70 Trans. R. G. Bury, Loeb edition, with amendments. 
71 Posidonius fragment 168, Edelstein–Kidd. 
72  Iamblichus  VP,  112,  and  Quintilian  Inst.  Or.  I.10.32  also  relate  the  story,  with  the  name  of 
Pythagoras. 
73 See chapter 2, T2.iii.5 and discussion. 
74 Carnes Lord (1982: 206–7) suggests that the sources who relate the incident with Pythagoras rather 
than Damon are more frequent and have ‘better authority’, although his discussion is in the context of 
Damon’s musical teaching, into which this incident would not sit happily. It would seem to stand in 
the way of Lord’s understanding of Damon’s thought as regards the question of at what age men can 
benefit from musical education. Lord’s idiosyncratic understanding was that Damon limited music’s 
effects to the very young or the very old. Other modern scholars do not seem to follow this view, 
however.    80 
 
[T3.i.23]  …For  obviously  opinions  held  by  their  [the  drunken  young  men] 
rational faculty were hardly changed through instruction from a musical instrument; 
but  since  the  emotional  soul  is  irrational,  they are  aroused,  and  calmed  through 
irrational  movements.  You  see,  the  irrational  is  helped  and  harmed  by  what  is 
irrational, the rational by knowledge and ignorance.
75 
 
  The similarity between all four versions of the anecdote strongly suggests  
they are referring to just one event, perhaps mythical, perhaps not. Perhaps the name 
of the protagonist was changed through mis-reporting, or perhaps it was changed to 
suit the story-teller’s ends. But either Pythagoras or Damon
76 could have subscribed 
to the view that music could indeed have this effect. 
  However, the purpose here is not to question the accuracy of reporting, but 
simply to note the principle involved. If the aulos-player was the sole musician, 
which very much seems the case in the complete anecdotes, then the music said to 
have both induced frenzy and then soothed it must have been purely instrumental, 
for the player could not have played the instrument and sung at the same time. As 
stated  earlier,  it  was  acknowledged,  certainly  as  early  as  Aristotle,  but  probably 
before,  that  music,  even  without  words,  could  indeed  have  an  effect  on  human 
behaviour. Whether or not Diogenes subscribed to that view, the anecdote is at least 
evidence for the fact that he did discuss music separately from words on occasions.
77 
In his critique, Philodemus either chooses not to comment, or the columns 
bearing his criticism have been lost. He frequently makes the point that if music 
does have any effect it can only be music with words, and that it is the words that 
lead one to do anything. Sextus Empiricus, on the other hand, as is his style, does 
criticise Pythagoras’ actions, but not in the way, surely, that Philodemus might have 
done: 
 
                                                 
75 Trans Kidd 1999. 
76 Pace Lord 1982: 207, see above n. 74. 
77 See also chapter 4, pp. 118 ff., for other discussions of music without words, and chapter 2, pp. 35–
6.   81 
[T3.i.24]  And, as to Pythagoras, in the first place he was foolish in desiring to 
render  drunkards  sober  at  the  wrong  moment,  instead  of  quitting  the  place;  and 
secondly, by trying to reform them in this way he confesses that flute-players have 
more influence than philosophers for the reforming of morals.
78 
 
I have already argued
79 that music without words should not be considered 
irrational simply because it does not contain a proposition that is expressed verbally. 
There, I also discussed that a lack of ‘technical understanding’ of the music does not 
stop the music affecting behaviour or character. A mother singing a lullaby to her 
infant  child,  an  example  used  by  Plato  and  Aristotle,  will  soothe  the  child 
notwithstanding the fact that the child has not yet obtained the capability of speech 
or an understanding of spoken language. There should not be a problem, therefore, 
for the Stoic to accept that emotion can be affected without the expression of a 
verbal proposition. This indeed adds weight to Diogenes’, and Plato’s before him, 
concern  that  a  child  should  be  exposed  to  (the  correct  type  of)  music  as  a 
fundamental part of his education.
80 
If Diogenes is using this anecdote as evidence of one of the uses of music, is 
he suggesting that it can also be used as a type of therapy or medicine? It is clear 
that Pythagoras used different music for different situations and indeed might have 
viewed it as a type of therapy.  At VP 15.64.3–9, Iamblichus writes: 
 
[T3.i.25]    So  the  first  stage  of  his  system  of  education  was  music:  songs  and 
rhythms from which came healing of human temperaments and passions. . . . He 
made. . blends of diatonic and chromatic and enharmonic melodies which easily 
transformed into their opposites the maladies of the soul. . . all these he restored to 
virtue, using the appropriate melodies like mixtures of curative drugs.
81 
 
                                                 
78 S.E. Against the Musicians VI, 23. Loeb translation. 
79 Chapter 2, pp. 35–6. 
80 See chapters 4 and 5, below, for further, more detailed, discussion of the use of music in education. 
81 Trans. Clark 1989, italics mine.   82 
At column 36, it is clear from Philodemus’ parallel criticism (col. 117.2–26) 
that Diogenes not only claimed that music could set a soul into motion from rest, but 
similarly it could calm a troubled soul ‘into a disposition by which the soul can 
move naturally by the effect of a melody that suits it’. He also claimed, that ‘we are 
not  all  affected  in  the  same  way  by  the  same  song’  ἐπεὶ  οὐ  πάντες  ὁμοίως 
κινηθησόμεθα πρὸς τῆς αὐτῆς.  
 
[T3.i.26] τιν᾽ εἰς τοιαύτην διάθ[εσιν οἵ- 
αν αὐτῇ κινηθῆναι [κατὰ φύ- 
σιν ἔστιν ὑπὸ τῆς προ[σηκού- 
σης μελῳδίας ·
82 ἐπεὶ ο[ὐ πάν- 
τες ὁμοίως κινηθησ[όμεθα 
πρὸς τῆς αὐτῆς· 
 
Anderson
83 states that ‘here we glimpse a late stage of theory of ethos when 
music’s power was thought to be highly individualised’, but I wonder if Diogenes’ 
claim was as complicated as that. Perhaps he simply meant, as Aristotle might have 
done before him, that the educated person’s soul would be moved in a different way 
from the uneducated person’s. Although Aristotle states that ‘we should employ all 
the harmonies, yet not employ them all in the same way’, it does seem as though he 
assumes that everyone is affected in the same  way, what will differ will be the 
intensity.
84 As Anderson comments,
85 however, Diogenes’ position ‘is the point of 
                                                 
82 The use of the word μελῳδιαν is unusual in this text. Delattre remarks in his note to the line that 
the word is used only rarely in this work. It occurs just five times in Delattre’s restoration, and two of 
these occurrences are conjectural. Delattre takes it to mean ‘song’ because it is used at column 150 in 
opposition  to ‘lyre-playing’. But column 150 is part of  Philodemus’ final  conclusion to  the four 
books, whereas column 36, above, is Diogenes’ own theory. Philodemus does throughout the text try 
to suggest that Diogenes is mixing up music and poetry, and so he could be deliberately phrasing this 
ambiguously. Whilst it is impossible to be sure, therefore, the word ‘song’ need not be implied here, 
particularly  as  Aristides’  passage,  T3.i.27,  is  so  similar,  uses  the  same  word  μελῳδιαν  and  the 
translation ‘song’ is not at all implied. 
83 1966: 173. 
84 Pol. VIII. 1342a4–15, but the context here is the intensity of emotion felt hearing the active and 
passionate kinds of music when others are performing, i.e., presumably in the theatre, and of sacred 
tunes ‘ἱερῶν μελῶν’. 
85 1966: 284, n. 53.   83 
view adopted by Aristides Quintilianus Book 2, in his musical psychotherapy: ‘by 
trial and error, you will find the right kind of music for treating your subject’.  
Aristides writes, at Book II, chapter 4: 
 
[T3.i.27]  [W]e have a reply to those who doubt whether everyone is moved by 
melody (τὴν μελῳδίαν). . . Just as one and the same drug applied to the same kind 
of complaint in several bodies does not always work in the same way, depending on 
the slightness or severity of the condition, but cures some more quickly, others more 
slowly, so music too arouses those more open to its influence immediately, but takes 
longer to capture the less susceptible.
86 
 
It  is  clear  that  for  Aristides  here,  music  indeed  has  a  therapeutic  effect. 
Earlier in this section, he states that the ‘therapist’ must make a diagnosis and reveal 
(ἐκκαλύπτειν) the foul disposition. His action thereafter is to try out some music on 
the  patient  and  test  his  reaction  to  it.  This  reaction  will  be  governed  by  the 
ἐννοήματα. In chapter 9, Aristides suggests that these ennoiai are not fixed, but are 
malleable; we learn them ourselves and they can be altered by outside influences. 
The  soul  can  inflict  an  undesirable  state  of  mind  brought  about  by  emotional 
responses  to  outside  influences.  The  use  of  music  in  this  respect  is  twofold  for 
Aristides – he looks not to change character but to change natural responses to a 
different set of stimuli, just as, for example, in the training of a horse, one looks not 
to change the natural nature of the horse, but to change its response to a stimulus. 
  Thus in his theory of the use of music for the human soul, Aristides has two 
types of treatment: 
1.  to totally remove a condition and replace it with another (θεραπευτικόν); and 





                                                 
86 Greek from R. P. Winnington-Ingram’s Teubner edition of 1963; translation in Barker 1989, 460.   84 
[T3.i.28]  If you use the harmoniai in the ways we have explained, applying 
them to each soul on the basis either of their similarity or of their opposition to it, 
you will disclose the bad character that lurks within it, and cure it, and replace it 
with a better. If the underlying disposition is coarse and stubborn, it is through what 
is intermediate that you will generate persuasion and bring it to the opposite state; 
while if it is fine and good you will use what is similar to it, and thereby augment it 
to the right proportion.
87 
 
If the condition is obscure and difficult to diagnose, then the therapist should 
proceed by random trial and error; if a particular type of harmonia seems to help, 
then the therapist should continue, if not then a modulation should be introduced and 
trial and error continued until the desired effect is achieved, ‘for it is likely that 
someone who is resistant to one sort of melody will be attracted to its opposite’.
88 It 
is clear that treatment by both ‘similarity’ and ‘opposites’ is in play here. 
 
Philodemus’ criticism of Diogenes simply accuses him of seeking a ‘science 
of the non-existents [τῶν  ἀνυπάρκτων ἐπιστήμην]’, once again claiming that no 
melody  qua  melody,  and  thus  being  irrational,  could  either  arouse  a  soul  from 
tranquillity, nor calm the troubled soul.
89 However, whether we can assume that 
Diogenes’ theory could be likened to that of Aristides in toto cannot, of course, now 
be known. Aristides has earlier applied male and female characters to each soul – 
each soul will have a combination of both, but will be made up of predominantly 
male or female character, and these characters will in part dictate the soul’s reaction 
to outside influence. I have not been able to read this theory into Diogenes’ own 
psychology. 
Indeed, Diogenes does not elaborate on his almost throw-away comment that 
‘we are not all affected . . .’, or at least Philodemus does not choose to report on any 
elaboration, which does raise the question, if music is to be a useful educational tool 
                                                 
87 Aristides Quintilianus Book II, ch. 14, pp. 80, ll. 10–18 Winnington-Ingram, trans Barker 1989: 
482.  
88 Aristides Quintilianus Book II, ch. 14., pp. 80–1 Winnington-Ingram. Translation Barker 1989: 
482–3. 
89 Col. 117.2–26.   85 
to lead one to live a life of virtue, surely it is important that those who decide upon 
appropriate and non-appropriate music should know the likely effect of it upon the 
students? Cicero at Div. I.124–5 shows that the Stoics did admit the fallibility of 
human prediction, but as Anderson notes, this would imply that only trial and error 
would ascertain how to produce the desired effect on the individual, and this is 
plainly the case in Aristides’ own theory. Might it be that Aristides himself was 
drawing on Diogenes’ theory?  
  There is a discussion in Plato’s Phaedrus that could be seen as a precursor of 
Diogenes’ belief that we are not affected in the same way by the same thing. At 
Phaedrus 271b, Socrates states: 
 
[T3.i.29] [H]e will classify the speeches and the souls and will adapt each to the 
other,  showing  the  causes  and  effects  produced  and  why  one  kind  of  soul  is 
necessarily persuaded by certain classes of speeches, and another is not. 
                (Trans. Fowler) 
 
He later sums up the discussion with the statement: 
[T3.i.30] A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he 
speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has 
defined them, he must know how to divide them by classes until further division is 
impossible; and in the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must 
find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his 
discourse  accordingly,  offering  to  the  complex  soul  elaborate  and  harmonious 
discourses, and simple talks to the simple soul.  Until he has attained to all of this, 
he will not be able to speak by the method of  the art, so far as  speech can be 
controlled by method, whether for purposes of instruction or of persuasion. This has 
been taught by our whole preceding discussion.     
(Phaedrus 277b–c, trans. Fowler)   86 
 
             This would seem to me to be very close to what Diogenes would have held 
in the context of music, and also to the degree that prospective teachers of the art 
should be expert before they were qualified to teach. However the fact that we might 
fail to achieve the desired ‘end’ in practising the art does not necessarily mean that 
we have failed to practise the art skilfully.  
The second-century AD philosopher, Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Quaestio 
2.16 divides crafts into two types – stochastic and non-stochastic. Stochastic arts are 
characterised ‘first by the fact that they depend on factors beyond their own control 
for their success’. Furthermore, these stochastic arts are also identified by the fact 
that the ‘craftsmanlike action is not “definite”’ because these crafts do not ‘operate 
exclusively by regular rules’. Alexander states: 
 
[T3.i.31]  Moreover  the  things  that  come  about  in  accordance  with  the  art  are 
themselves not [completely] determinate, and they do not always produce the same 
[results] because they are not applied to [objects] that are in a similar condition in 
every way; but all or at any rate some of the things [included] in  them will be 
different and not as was expected. So [for these, stochastic arts] the end if not the 
achieving of their objective, but the completion of what belongs to the art [itself]. 
(Alexander Quaestio 2.16 ll. 19–24, tr. R. W. Sharples) 
 
It appears that Aristotle might have considered rhetoric and medicine to be 
two such crafts, and in the Rhetoric, he states: 
 
[T3.i.32] And if it is objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly 
might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all 
good things except excellence, and above all against the things that are most useful, 
as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by 
a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly. It is 
clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but it 
is like dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is   87 
not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the persuasive facts in 
each case. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of 
medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the 
road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment to those who can never enjoy 
sound health. Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to 
discern  the  real  and  apparent  means  of  persuasion,  just  as  it  is  the  function  of 
dialectic to discern the real and apparent deduction. 
          (Rhet. 1355b3–18, trans. W. Rhys Roberts) 
 
However,  in  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  in  his  account  of  the  end  of  the 
stochastic arts, he states: 
 
[T3.i.33] We deliberate not about ends, but about what promotes ends. A doctor, for 
instance, does not deliberate about whether he will cure, or an orator about whether 
he will persuade, or a politician about whether he will produce good order, or any 
other [expert] about the end [that his science aims at]. Rather, we lay down the end, 
and then examine the ways and means to achieve it.    
(EN 1112b11–15, trans. T. Irwin) 
 
               Ierodiakonou states that ‘Aristotle is at times aware of the fact that with a 
group of arts among which rhetoric and medicine are included, there is a difference 
between the end of the art and its competent exercise. So he is willing to take into 
consideration the various difficulties in the specific application of such arts, but it is 
unclear  whether  he,  because  of  this,  would  be  willing  to  compromise  in  his 
specification of their ultimate end.’
90  
  It seems to me that Diogenes, in acknowledging that not everyone is affected 
in the same way by the same music could well have been of the opinion that music 
is a stochastic art/craft. Certainly he uses the Greek στοχαστέον – ‘one must aim at’ 
in an earlier column (29) in the context of protection of the soul’s disposition, and 
this might indeed be what Philodemus is calling ‘a science of the non-existent’. 
                                                 
90 Ierodiakonou 1995: 473–85, at 476.    88 
 
 
(ii)  Diogenes’ theology in the De Musica  
 
Although Diogenes’ section of the De Musica opens with a discussion of the general 
uses of music, and his affirmation that it is useful for every part of life, at column 
38, Philodemus reports that Diogenes, in his own ‘third book’ spoke at length of 
music devoted to religion.  In words reminiscent of Plato at Republic IV, 424e,
91 
Philodemus reports Diogenes as saying: 
 
[T3.ii.1] 
    Ἔννομόν τε καὶ σ[π]ου- 
δαζομ]ένην μουσικὴν πρῶ- 
τα] μέν φη[σι]ν ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς 
τὸ θ]εῖον συνταχθῆναι τει- 
μῆς, ἔπειτα τῆς τῶν ἐλευθέ- 
ρων παιδείας. 
 
It was a serious [type of] music regulated by laws, he says, that was created, first of 
all to honour the divine, and then to educate men of free birth. 
 
  Diogenes then moves on to affirm that the etymology of the terms θεωρεῖν 
(to be a spectator),
92 θεατής (spectator), θέατρον (theatre) all confirm their relation 
to the divine (θεῖον).  
 
[T3.ii.2] 
ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τ[ὸ 
θε[ῖο]ν καὶ αὐτὰ σημαίνειν 
τὰ ὀνόματα, τὸ τε θεωρεῖν 
                                                 
91 See Delattre’s note on this in his vol. II, 353.  
92 ‘Especially at a religious ceremony’, so Einarson and De Lacy in the Loeb Plutarch De Musica at 
1140E.   89 
καὶ τ]ὸν θεατὴν [καὶ τ]ὸ θέατρον, 
. . . . .   . . . . .  . . .]τάτην προσ 
. . . . .  . .  τὰ θεάματ]α μαρτυ- 
ρ. . . . · 
Moreover, the terms themselves, theōrein, theates, and theatron are an indication of 
its [music’s] relation to theos, and [the most ancient music] addresses [the divinity], 
as shown by the word theamata.
93 
  
  There is a remarkably similar passage in the [Plutarch] De Musica, at 1140 
D–E. It is so similar that I will quote it in full: 
 
[T3.ii.3] 
Ἐπὶ μέντοι τῶν ἔτι ἀρχαιοτέρων οὐδὲ εἰδέναι φασὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὴν θεατρικὴν 
μοῦσαν,  ὅλην  δὲ  αὐτοῖς  τὴν  ἐπιστήμην  πρός  τε  θεῶν  τιμὴν  καὶ  τὴν  τῶν  νέων 
παίδευσιν παραλαμβάνεσθαι, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἤδη θεάτρου παρὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν 
ἐκείνοις κατεσκευασμένου, ἀλλὰ ἔτι τῆς μουσικῆς ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀναστρεφομένης, 
ἐν οἷς τιμήν τε τοῦ θείου διὰ ταύτης ἐποιοῦντο καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπαίνους· 
εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι, ὅτι τὸ θέατρον ὕστερον καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν πολὺ πρότερον ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ 
τὴν προσηγορίαν ἔλαβεν. 
 
Certainly in still more ancient times the Greeks, it is said, did not even know of the 
music of the theatre, and for them the whole of this science was handed down for the 
purpose of honouring the gods or educating the young. No theatre had as yet even 
been set up among the men of those days; rather music still had its abode in the 
temples, where it was used in worship and in the praise of good men. This they say 
is likely, since the word theatron at a later time, and the word theorein much earlier, 
were derived from theios.
94 
 
                                                 
93 See also below, T3.ii.6 for Philodemus’ refutation of this claim. 
94 Translation Einarson and De Lacy in the Loeb Plutarch de Musica.   90 
Nowhere in extant texts is there another claim like this for the linking of 
music to the divine on etymological grounds. Symbolic etymology was of course 
very much a Stoic practice,
95 although it must be conceded that [Plutarch] might 
have had access to another work that has since been lost.
96  
There is also perhaps another mention of this etymological link at Plutarch’s 
Table Talk IX.15, 748. Two speakers, Thrasybulus and Ammonious, are discussing 
the subject of dance, the fact that it has three elements, the nature of these elements 
and the factors common to poetry and dance. At 748D Thrasybulus states: 
 
[T3.ii.4] [Dancing] has lost her honour among men who have intelligence and may  
properly be called divine (theiois). 
 
The Loeb editor notes that ‘Plutarch may have in mind an etymology that 
connects  theatron  (theatre)  with  theios,  cf.  Ps.-Plutarch  De  Musica  1140E  and 
Philodemus De Musica.’
  97 There are indeed other possible parallels between the 
Plutarch De Musica and that of Diogenes’ part of Philodemus’ work, and I will look 
at these further below. For now, I will turn to Philodemus’ criticism of Diogenes’ 
words. At columns 118–19, Philodemus attacks Diogenes, stating: 
 
[T3.ii.5]    Πε- 
ρὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ τοῦ θεα- 
τοῦ] κα[ὶ] τοῦ θεάτρου καὶ 
. . . . .   . . ] . σι[ . . . . . ]ο[ .  ε]ἴρη- 
κε . . . . ἀρ]χαιοτ[άτην]· μᾶλ- 
λον δ ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ] θεωρ[ε]ῖν τ[οῦτο   
 ἐπωνομάσθαι φήσ|[ασ]| ει τις 
καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν τὸ θεωρεῖν 
                                                 
95 As discussed also in chapter 2, where the etymology of Erato was raised. See also, below, on the 
etymology of Metis. 
96 For a brief discussion on the feasibility of Plutarch having used either Philodemus or Diogenes’ 
own writings see the Appendix to this chapter, where I will also briefly discuss the plausibility of the 
[Plutarch] work actually being genuine. 
97 Trans. Minar in the Loeb edition; note at p. 299.   91 
καὶ τὸν θεατὴν καὶ τὸ θέα- 
τρον – οὐ γὰρ ἐπικοινωνεῖ τὸ 
θεῖον αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ θεῖν - , 
καὶ τὰ θεάματα συνάγεσθαι 
τῆς τιμῆς ἕνεκα παρ[ειλ]ῆ- 
φθαι τῶν θεῶν  *, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὴν 
μουσικήν, ἀκουστικὴ[ν] ὑπάρ- 
χουσαν  *·  
 
Concerning the terms theorein, theatēs and theatron, [my adversary] says [that it is 
to the divine that] ancient [music was addressed]. [But] it is more from the word 
theōrein that someone will say that the word theion took its origin,
98 and that it is 
from the word thein (to run or to shine) from which the words theōrein, theatēs and 
theatron derive (for the word theion has no more rapport with these words than 
thein); and further it is spectacles that tradition says were assembled to venerate the 
divine, and not music, which was created for hearing.
99 
 
  The Epicurean was not of course finding fault with the action of honouring 
the divine – he would have applauded that, but once again it is the use of the music 
at which he rails. At column 142.1–14 he strongly criticises Cleanthes, an earlier 
Stoic,  for  stating  that  ‘melodies  and  rhythms  come  closest  to  the  truth  of  the 
contemplation of the divine’, remarking ‘a more ridiculous statement than which is 
                                                 
98 I.e. ‘to watch a spectacle’. Here, suggests Delattre, Philodemus is relying on Democritus of Abdera 
whom Philodemus praises at 150.29–39 as a ‘peerless natural scientist, and who stated that music 
was  a  ‘recent  discovery’,  and  that  music  arose  ‘not  from  necessity  but  from  superfluity’.  What 
Philodemus does not mention is that Democritus also stated that ‘if children are not allowed to work, 
they cannot learn letters or music or gymnastics, nor that which above all things embraces virtue, 
reverence. For it is precisely from those studies that reverence usually grows’ (Democritus, fr. 68 B 
179 Diels). It is suggested that Democritus must have agreed that music could have had some moral 
value, because if he had not, then surely Philodemus would have mentioned that also. 
99 Delattre remarks (vol. II, pp. 218–19), that Philodemus’ comments must have been ironic here as in 
his view Philodemus was referring to Plato’s fantasy etymology of the word theos in the Cratylus. 
See further my discussion of this passage at p. 29. He also claims that Philodemus was again trying to 
show that Diogenes’ reasoning was absurd. Delattre further remarks that he found it tempting to 
translate theamata as ‘visual spectacles’ to further emphasise Philodemus’ point that they were used 
to venerate the gods, whilst music, only created later was simply used to entertain the ear (nn. 1, 2, 
vol. II, p. 219).    92 
not easy to find’. 
100 Although this criticism is located within the final, concluding 
columns of the work, and therefore the part in which Diogenes is not the sole target 
of  Philodemus’  attacks,  it  is  very  likely  that  Diogenes  had  himself  quoted  his 
predecessor as an authority for this view. The very lacunose column 53, almost at 
the  end  of  Diogenes’  section  of  the  text,  cites  Cleanthes  (παρὰ  γὰρ  Κλεάνθει), 
although  the  remainder  of  the  column  is  really too  damaged  to  make  out much 
further discussion. 
The Stoics were, as mentioned above, very fond of symbolic etymology, and 
Diogenes was no exception, as evidenced in a fragment from his book On Athena, as 
preserved in Philodemus’ own On Piety:
101 
 
[T3.ii.6] Diogenes of Babylon in his book On Athena says that the cosmos is the 
same as Zeus, or it contains him as man does a soul; and that the sun is Apollo, the 
moon Artemis; and that anthropomorphic gods are a childish and impossible story: 
and that the part of Zeus which extends into the sea is Poseidon, that which extends 
into the earth Demeter, that which extends into the air Hera, as (he says) Plato also 
says, so that if one says aer repeatedly he will say Hera; and that which extends into 
the aether Athena; this is what is meant by ‘from the head’ and ‘Zeus is male, Zeus 
is female’; but that some of the Stoics
102 say that the ruling faculty of the will is in 
the head, for it is wisdom, and therefore is called Metis; but that Chrysippus says 
that the ruling element of the soul is in the breast, and that Athena, who is wisdom, 
was born there, but (Diogenes says that) it is because the voice issues from the head 
(that) they (i.e. the people) say (that Athena was born) from the head (i.e. of Zeus), 
and (that they say she was born) with the help of Hephaestus because wisdom comes 
by art (technē); and that the name Athena is as though one were to say Athrena, and 
that she is called Tritogenis and Tritogeneia because wisdom has three branches, 
physics, ethics and logic. And he allegorizes as ‘wisdom’ her other epithets and 
manifestations very deceptively.
103 
                                                 
100 See above, chapter 2, T2.iii.3. This translation from Thom 2005: 5.  
101 SVF III, Diogenes 33; Obbink 1996: 18ff. 
102 Perhaps Cleanthes – see Thom 2005: 59, n. 81. 
103 Translation Obbink’s, 1996: vol. I, 18ff.   93 
 
 
Nothing in the De Musica would seem to contradict this belief. Diogenes 
seems to follow the traditional Stoic approach to divinity in that the god(s) were not 
simply omnipotent and benevolent, but they were also immanent, ‘rational, and the 
active principle imbuing all matter’.
104 Cicero, at De Div. I.83–4
105 states that the 
gods are friends and benefactors of the human race, and that ‘Chrysippus, Diogenes 
and Antipater employ the same reasoning’; he further comments at I.86 that ‘the 
only dissenter is Epicurus’. Diogenes is also clearly defending Chrysippus’ view, as 
reported in Galen PHP III.8, 1–27, that the hegemonikon is in the chest. Obbink 
remarks  that  according  to  Diogenes,  ‘a  vast  array  of  types  of  speech  (φωνή), 
including myths told by poets, offer evidence for this’.
106 Philodemus, within his De 
Pietate I, defends Epicurus against Posidonius’ claim that he was an atheist: 
 
[T3.ii.7]  It is doubtless therefore truer to say, as our good friend Posidonius 
argued in the fifth book of his On the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus does not 
really believe in the gods at all, and that he said what he did about the immortal gods 
only for the sake of deprecating popular idiom.
107 
 
Philodemus also accuses Chrysippus, Persaeus and Diogenes of Babylon of 
‘attempting to “accommodate” the poets and early philosophers to their views’.
108 
And this criticism can also frequently be found within the De Musica whenever 





                                                 
104 Cicero, De Div. I.39; Long and Sedley 1988: vol. I, 331–3, at 331. 
105 SVF III, Diogenes 37. 
106 Obbink 1996: 20. 
107 Cicero De natura deorum I.123 = Posidonius fr. 22a Edelstein–Kidd, trans Obbink 1996: 15. 
108 PHerc. 1428 = Diogenes’ treatise ‘On Athena, see above T3.ii.6. Discussion at Obbink 1996: 316–
17.   94 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
 
[Plutarch]’s De Musica 
 
 
This treatise is now not considered to be a genuine work by Plutarch,
1 but is nonetheless a 
valuable piece of musical writing dated probably to Plutarch’s period – the first to second 
centuries AD.
2 In this short appendix, I will explore the notion that the parallels between 
this  work  and  the  Philodemean  De  Musica  might  suggest  that  the  writer  used 
Philodemus’ work as his source, or even Diogenes’ own original writings. It might also 
strengthen the argument that the [Plutarch] could be a genuine work by Plutarch after all. 
  Einarson and De Lacy write that ‘Wilamowitz suggests that Planudes [Maximus 
Planudes, a Byzantine scholar floruit c. 1302] was the first to ascribe the dialogue to 
Plutarch.’
3  They  further  suggest,  however,  that  the  style  shows  little  of  Plutarch’s 
‘manner or skill, or powers of assimilation’. Moreover, the work does not appear in the 
so-called ‘Catalogue of Lamprias’, a list dating to the fourth century AD,
4 purporting to 
contain all of Plutarch’s works. The entry in the Suda for Lamprias states: 
 
[T3.App. 1]  Lamprias, son of Plutarch of Chaeronea. He wrote a list of his father’s 
works on all Greek and Roman history.
5 
 
The Suda apart, there seems to be no son recorded by the name of Lamprias, 
whilst the Loeb editor notes that Plutarch had  one daughter and three sons. Plutarch 
himself, however, records that he had a brother named Lamprias – could it be that the 
compilers of the Suda mistakenly inserted the word ‘son’ for ‘brother’?
 6  
                                                 
1 See, for example Barker 1984: 205; Einarson and De Lacy in the Loeb Plutarch Moralia, vol. XIV, p. 
344. 
2 Barker 1984: 205. 
3 In the Loeb edn, p. 344. 
4 OCD, third edition, p. 1200, s.v. ‘Plutarch’. 
5 Loeb Plutarch Moralia vol. XV, p. 5. 
6 Table Talk  IX. 15, 747: ‘My brother Lamprias was appointed. . . to be judge’. Langhorne, in his 1841 
Lives, suggests that Plutarch had four sons and a daughter. He also states that Plutarch’s grandfather was 
named Lamprias, although he gives no source for this information. If the name of Lamprias was a ‘family’ 
name, it is not unlikely that Plutarch would have named a son after his grandfather and brother.   95 
In volume XV of the Loeb Plutarch series, Sandbach suggests that the catalogue 
was probably written by a third- or fourth-century forger.
7 Certainly, if it is dated to the 
fourth century AD, neither a brother nor a son could have written it. However, the name of 
the author of the ‘catalogue’ is not essential for my purposes, and so I will not pursue this 
query any further here.   
The ‘catalogue’ omits the De Musica, as it does five other works considered to be 
spurious: De Liberis educandis,  Consolatio ad Apollonium, De Fluviis, De Vita et Poesi 
Homeri, Fragmentum Tyrwhittianum ii. It is also uncertain whether an item listed as 
number 58 relates to the de Fato, another work originally ascribed to Plutarch, today 
considered spurious. There were 39 MSS of the De Musica known to the editors of the 
Loeb volume. Planudes’ sources for the work are unknown. It is noted that the two oldest 
MSS, both dating to the twelfth or thirteenth centuries, have the name of Plutarch entered 
by a later hand. The anonymous state of the De Musica was, Einarson and De Lacy state, 
‘an invitation to supply’ a name,
8 and the opening sentence with its immediate reference 
to ‘Phocion the Good’ was considered a sufficient parallel with Plutarch’s work entitled 
The Life of Phocion to suggest that Plutarch was the author.
9 
  Whilst it must be accepted that it is now probably impossible to identify the true 
author,  this  does  not  detract  from  the  usefulness  of  the  work.  There  are  three  major 
translations and commentaries of the treatise from the twentieth century – two in French 
– that of  H. Weil and Th. Reinach dated 1900, and that of F. Lasserre dated 1954.
10 Weil 
and Reinach consider the treatise to be a very early work by Plutarch, from when he first 
left university, whilst Lasserre believes it to be spurious.
11 
  The most recent treatment is that of Andrew Barker, who in his 1984 translation 
and  commentary,  considers  it  spurious,  but  emphasises  that  the  treatise  is  important 
precisely because of its lack of originality.
12 Certainly, a great deal of the discussion is 
very familiar from other earlier writings on music, and it is possible to see many Platonic 
                                                 
7 Sandbach 1969: 5. 
8 Loeb Plutarch vol. XIV, p. 344. 
9 Ibid. 
10 H. Weil and Th. Reinach, Plutarque De la Musique, Edition critique at explicative (Paris, 1900); F. 
Lasserre, Plutarque, De la Musique (Olten and Lausanne, 1954). 
11 1954: 99–104, at p. 104.  
12 Barker 1984: 205–57, at p. 205.    96 
and  Aristotelian  influences  throughout  the  work,  although  their  names  do  not  occur 
frequently  as  sources.  Heraclides  of  Pontus  is  mentioned  just  once.  The  name  of 
Aristoxenus does occur frequently, and was obviously a major source.
13 However, unlike 
the writings of Plato and Aristotle, which concentrate on the uses of music and of its 
importance in education, or Aristoxenus, whose extant writings are very largely of  a 
technical nature, this work covers a much wider range of aspects, and is indeed now the 
only evidence remaining today for some of the ancient musicians mentioned.
14 
The  setting  is  a  feast  on  the  second  day  of  the  Saturnalia.  The  host,  Onesicrates 
having  brought  together  ‘men  learned  in  music’  to  provide  a  suitable  sequel  to  the 
previous  day’s  discussion  on  grammar  (1131B–E),  invites  Lysias  and  Soterichus  to 
discourse on the history of music. This they agree to do, and the discussion that follows 
can be divided into four main topics: 
 
•  1131F–1136B  The history of music and of early musicians and their styles 
•  1136B–1138C, 1140F–1143C  Innovations in and corruptions of music 
•  1138D–1140B Harmonic science and descriptions of the intervals 
•  1140B–F, 1142C–1146D Uses of music, including musical education. 
 
My  interest  lies  largely  in  the  fourth  category  –  that  of  the  uses  of  music  and  the 
discussion on the appropriate musical education, although the passages do overlap to a 
certain degree, and it has been suggested to me that Diogenes of Babylon might have 
been a major source for this treatise, although his name is never mentioned.
15 There are 
indeed a number of passages that could refer directly to the De Musica of Philodemus, 
which is, of course, the primary extant source today for Diogenes’ musical thought, and 
these are investigated and discussed within my text, particularly in chapter 3, and chapter 
5, section v. 
  Perhaps the most striking parallel between Diogenes’ thought and [Plutarch]’s 
writing occurs at column 38 of the Philodemus and 1140D–F of the [Plutarch], discussed 
                                                 
13 As will be seen in chapter 5, section v, below.  
14 The ancient musicians that also occur in Philodemus’ text are discussed in chapter 3, above. 
15 By Professor Dirk Obbink, during a conversation in Herculaneum in July of 2006.   97 
in  chapter  3,  T3.ii.2  and  3,  where  the  etymology  of  music  in  the  ancient  theatre  is 
analysed.
16  As  mentioned  there,  nowhere  else  in  extant  texts  does  such  a  discussion 
occur, and the similarity between the two text strongly suggests that the later writer had 
access either to the original, probably Stoic source, or to Philodemus’ text. 
  If the later writer was using Philodemus as his source, and if the copy of the De 
Musica from the Herculaneum library is the only one, then the date of writing of the 
[Plutarchan] De Musica would fit well with Plutarch’s own dates.
17 It is just conceivable, 
therefore,  that  Plutarch  could  have  had  access  to  the  Philodemean  work  before  the 
Vesuvian eruption of AD 79, and this would seem to fit with Weil and Reinarch’s theory 
that the work is genuine. This does of course rest on the assumption that there was only 
one copy of Philodemus’ text, and this might not be plausible. However, I have seen no 
reference to the discovery of more than one copy of any of Philodemus’ aesthetic works. 
  Lasserre
18 notes the parallel with Diogenes’ argument, as does Delattre in his 
notes to the Philodemean work,
19 Delattre suggesting that perhaps this was a common 
theme in antiquity, or that perhaps the writers had a common source, now lost. I wonder, 
however, how feasible the theory of another source is. There is no mention of any other 
Stoic having such an interest in music,
20 and it would appear that only the Stoics of all 
Hellenistic philosophers took such an interest in etymology. Perhaps indeed [Plutarch] 
had access to Diogenes’ own writings. Obbink notes that in August 45 BC, when writing 
on  his  De  Natura  Deorum,  Cicero  wrote  to  Atticus  asking  him  to  send  a  copy  of 
Diogenes’ On Athena: 
 
[T3.App. 2] libros mihi de quibus ad te antea scripsi velim mittas et maxime  
Φαίδου Περὶ Θεῶν et <Διογένους Περὶ > Παλλάδος.
21 
 
                                                 
16 See pages 88 ff. 
17 Plutarch of Chaeronea of was born c. AD 45–50, and died after AD 120. It is known that he visited Italy, 
and that he taught at Rome for some time. As he is also recorded as being a priest at Delphi for the last 
thirty years of his life, he could have visited Italy in that capacity.  
18 1954: 174. 
19 2007: vol. II, 203. 
20 Although it has to be conceded that almost all writings from the early Stoics have been lost. 
21 Obbink 1996: 22; Cicero Ad Atticum XIII.39.2.   98 
  Clearly, then, at least some of Diogenes’ writings remained extant until at least 
the first century BC. 
A second parallel between the [Plutarch] and the Philodemian De Musica occurs 
at  chapter  31,  1142C–D  of  the  [Plutarch],  and  coincidentally  at  column  31  of  the 
Philodemus,  discussed  at  T3.i.15  and  T3.i.18,  where  both  [Plutarch]  and  Diogenes 
compare the work of Pindar and Philoxenus. Lasserre remarks that ‘Le choix de Pindare 
d’une part et de Philoxène de l’autre pour répresenter, sous le rapport de la morale, les 
deux tendances contraires de la musique et particulièrement de la musique dithyrambique 
paraît avoir été traditionnel car ils les polarisent également chez Philodème, De mus. 1 
XVIII v. Krevelen [now column 31 Delattre].’
22  
Once again, this might have been a common anecdote in antiquity, and [Plutarch] 
claims to be reporting what Aristoxenus wrote, but unfortunately this exists now only in 
fragmentary form,
23 and Telesias seems to be ‘otherwise unknown’.
24 [Plutarch] is now 
one of the main sources for Philoxenus (c. 435–380  BC),
25 but the ‘deviant’ or rather 
innovative nature of his composition is also reported and remarked upon by other writers, 
notably Aristotle in his Politics, as noted at T3.i.16.  
Philoxenus was clearly renowned amongst ancient writers on music as a musical 
innovator, his work The Cyclops also being parodied by Aristophanes in Plutus, and so 
the mention of that musician by [Plutarch] is perhaps not surprising. But, the comparison 
of  Pindar  and  Philoxenus  in  the  same  context,  pace  the  remarks,  quoted  above,  by 
Lasserre, could suggest that the writer had read either Philodemus’ work or, at least a 
work that referred to it. I have seen no other use, in other musical writers, of Pindar and 
Philoxenus as examples of the different styles of dithyramb, and both Plato and Aristotle 
to name but two, were eloquent in their own condemnation of misuse of musical genera.
26 
 
                                                 
22 Lasserre 1954: 174. 
23 Fr. 76 Wehrli. 
24 Loeb Plutarch vol. XIV: 425, note h. 
25 See above, chapter 3, n. 53. 
26 For Plato and ‘New Music’, see chapter 4, pp. 118 ff. For Aristotle in the Politics, see above T3.i.16, as 
noted, and chapter 5, section i.   99 
The next chapter in the [Plutarch] (number 32), goes on to discuss the same subject as the 
next  column  in  the  Philodemus  (32),  and  groups  the  three  nations  of  Lacedaemonia, 
Mantinea, and Pellene as ‘discerning’ in their rejection of a system in the selection of 
music.  
 
[T3.App.3]  . . . χρόνον καταρξαμέν[ων 
τῶν Μαντινέων τε καὶ [Λα- 
κε]δαιμονίων καὶ Πελλ[η- 
νέ]ων· παρὰ τούτοις γὰρ κα[ὶ 
πρ]ώτοις καὶ μάλιστα τὴν 
ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιμέ[λει- 
αν] γενέσθαι τῶν τε κ[αλῶν 
ἐπιτηδευμάτων κ[αὶ τῆς 
ἄλλης μουσικῆς· 
 
as the citizens of Mantinea, as well as those of Lacedaemonia and Pellene have shown 
setting the precedent. For it was those [people] who first of all and in the best way 
developed to the highest degree the most strict of noble practices and that of music in 
particular. 
 
  [Plutarch] writes: 
 
[T3.App.4]  [T]he  discerning  reject  such  lack  of  system,  as  did  in  ancient  times  the 
Lacedaemonians and the men of Mantineia and Pellene. For these made a choice of some 
single mode or else a very small number of them, which in their belief tended to the 
formation of character, and cultivated this music an no other. 
  
Both authors seem in agreement in their rejection of the ‘modern’ taste in music, 
preferring the  music  of ‘ancient  times’,  a  common  theme  in  musical  writings,  and  a 
sentiment  expressed  also  by  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  Heraclides  of  Pontus,  as  discussed   100 
elsewhere  in  this  thesis.  It  is  interesting,  however,  that  the  discussion  in  [Plutarch] 
follows in the same order as that in Philodemus. Lasserre notes that the style of writing in 
the [Plutarch] is of an ‘Aristoxenian character’,
27 but connects the discussion only with 
that of Philodemus. Barker, however, remarks that the source of this passage is certainly 
Aristoxenus, and does not remark at all on the parallel discussion in Philodemus.
28 
There are significant similarities also in the relating of the stories of Thaletas and 
Terpander, the seventh-century musicians, discussed at pp. 67–71 above. Whilst it has 
again  to  be  conceded  that  this  might  have  been  a  common  theme  in  antiquity,  the 
similarities between the two texts seem surely too regular to be coincidence. 
Again,  both  texts  discuss  the  character  of  Olympus –  Philodemus  at  the  very 
lacunose column 19, and hence a part of Diogenes’ own claim, and a number of times in 
the [Plutarch]. Philodemus himself does not refer to Diogenes’ claim, and the text at 
column 19 is so damaged as to be almost unreadable. Delattre has managed to recreate 
the following: 
 
[T3.App. 5]  το δὲ τὸ σῶμα [. . . .  . . . . – 
ζεται τῶι [. . . .  . . . .  . . . 
Ὀλύμπου .[. . . .  . . . .  . . 
θαυμαστο[. . . .  . . . .  . .- 
,]ωδι[κ]οῖς Ὀλ[ὐμπου . . . .   
μὴ συνοπῶσι [. . . . .  . . . . .  . 
αἰτίας τῆς ψ[υχαγωγίας 
θαυμασιω[. . . .  . . . .  . .- 
την πρὸς τα[ύτην τὴν μου- 
σικῆς δύναμιν. . . 
 
                                                 
27 Lasserre 1954: 175. 
28 Barker 1984: 238n. 210.   101 
whereas that [which moves] the body is. . . . of Olympus. . . amazing. . . [of Olympus] do 
not embrace to seek the cause of [its] amazing [ability to move the soul] . . . for this 
power [of music . . . 
 
  The [Plutarchan] work is now one of the principal sources for Olympus, and to go 
into detail of the information in that work would be to digress. Suffice to say that this 
might constitute another instance of a common theme in the two writers. 
 
As suggested earlier, it is impossible to make any firm claims regarding either a definite 
source for the later work, or indeed to the name of the real author of that work. It might, 
however, be an investigation worth pursuing if further work on the Philodemean text 
enables more of the relevant columns to be read. There are, however, sufficient parallels 
within the two texts to strongly suggest either a common source, or indeed that the later 












THE RELEVANCE OF PLATONIC THOUGHT 
 
 
Plato’s musical thought remains to this day the archetype for all considerations 
of ancient musical doctrine, and must have influenced any writer on the subject 
who lived after the fourth century BC. Plato was one of the first, if not indeed the 
first,  to  have  written  at  any  length  on  the  subject  of  music,  and  as  already 
discussed, there can be no doubt in my mind that Diogenes of Babylon had 
access to, and was heavily influenced by, his writings as already suggested in my 
earlier chapters.
1 As I will show below, there is evidence that Diogenes not only 




Plato wrote no work specifically on music, but instead he incorporated his views 
into a number of his dialogues. His beliefs on the use of music as an educational 
tool,  and  this  is  the  subject  in  which  I  am  particularly  interested  here,  are 
adumbrated predominantly in the Republic and the Laws, although discussions 
on music are to be found in a number of his other dialogues.
3   
  The Republic, which contains an extensive discussion on the use of music 
within education, is the work that also contains the evidence for Plato’s views on 
the  appropriate  harmoniai,  or  modes    (rhythmic  and  melodic  forms)  –  those 
forms that he believes will encourage correct ‘moral character’ in children and 
adults.  Education  for  Plato  comprises  two  parts:  physical  education,  or 
gumnastikē and cultural education, or mousikē. The function of this education, in 
Plato’s view, is the moral improvement of the soul, and the harmonisation of the 
body with the soul. Plato clearly linked ethos and harmony: for the Socrates of 
the  Republic,  education  in  poetry  and  music  is  crucially  important  because 
‘rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold 
                                                 
1 See e.g., at chapter 2, pp. 42–9; chapter 3, pp. 85–6. 
2 See below, this chapter, esp. T4.13 and 14. 
3 References to music are also made, e.g., at Protagoras 316e and 326ab; Timaeus 18a and 47–8; 
shorter  references  in  the  Philebus  (on  which,  see  further  below,  pp.  117–18),  56a;  Cratylus 
423d–424; Sophist 253b; Laches 188d–189; and Symposium 187a–e. See also below.   103 
upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and 
otherwise the contrary’.
4  
At the outset of his discussion of mousikē in the Republic, Plato begins 
with a long treatment of the type of poetry that should be used in the education 
of the future guardians and free men of his ideal city. He argues that stories that 
depict the gods as violent, immoral and wicked should not be permitted, as these 
are not the proper role models for children to study, hence the poetry of Homer is 
banned from education.
5  
  I will not discuss Plato’s argument in detail here as it is well documented 
elsewhere,
6 but more importantly because it will not help in my comparison with 
Diogenes’ theory, as a similarly full discussion does not appear in the Stoic’s 
writings, at least as they exist today. I will, however, discuss the sections where 
there is some similarity between the two philosophers, or where the two differ in 
a fundamental way. Suffice to say that Diogenes would surely have had some 
sympathy with Plato’s strict views on ‘appropriate’ poetry, given their common 
views on the purpose of education: that is, to honour the gods and to live a moral 
life. 
 
It  is  impossible  to  estimate  today  how  Philodemus  introduced  Diogenes’ 
arguments in the De Musica, because the first five columns are completely lost, 
and the parallel opening columns in Philodemus’ own refutation are so lacunose 
as to offer little enlightenment. At column 6, however, the discussion clearly 
refers to ‘the well-regulated cities’, ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν, before another 
column and a half is also lost. The concept of eunomia as an ideal ‘represents the 
goal of Plato’s political thinking both in the Republic and the Laws’,
7 and it is 
interesting  that  Diogenes  also  uses  the  term  eunomia  and  its  cognates  when 
discussing  his  ‘cities  governed  by  good  laws’.  Diogenes’  extant  discussion 
                                                 
4 Republic III, 401d5–e1, trans. Shorey in the Loeb Plato Republic. 
5 In this respect, it seems that Diogenes of Babylon might not have had such strong views as 
Plato. As I will discuss in chapter 6.i, Diogenes uses Homeric tales as evidence of music’s value, 
although it must be conceded that the example Diogenes uses is regarding the behaviour of adults 
rather than children. 
6  See,  for  example,  Lippman  1964:  passim,  Anderson  1966:  64–110;  Barker  1984:  124–69; 
Comotti 1991[1979] passim; West 1992: 179–83 (on the modes); and, more recently Woerther 
2008. 
7 Anderson 1966: 73.   104 
resumes in column 8, affirming that, ‘. . . there is a task which regulates the 
powers in a unifying manner, namely education  – for the body, gymnastics, and 
music for the soul’: 
 
[T4.1]    ἡ[νωμ]ένως ἔργον 
εἶναι δυ[ν]άμ[εις κ]ανονίσαν 
π]αιδευτικήν, τῶι μὲν σώ- 
μ]ατι γυμνασ[τικ]ήν, τῆι δὲ 
ψ]υχῆι μουσικ[ήν]· 
 
A direct parallel, perhaps, with Plato’s sentiments as expressed at Republic 376e:  
 
[T4.2] τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου 
εὑρημένης; ἔστι δέ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ ᾽ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική. 
 
What then is our education? Or is it hard to find better than that which long ago 
was discovered? Which is, I suppose, gymnastics for the body and for the soul, 
music. 
 
  Diogenes’ discussion picks up in column 9, after another lacuna of some 
thirty lines: 
 
[T4.3] τας, οἷον τὴ[ν δωριστὶ καὶ 
τῆν φρυγισ[τὶ . . . . .  . . . . . 
τὴν μὲν γὰ[ρ . . . .  . . . . τε- 
ταγμένον [. . . .  . . . .  . . – 
την εἰς τὸ μὲν [. . . .  . . . .  
την δὴ ἀπει[. . . . .  . . . [μετ- 
τριον επεσον [. . . .  . . . .  
τόνον ο[ἰκ]εῖον [τοῖς ὑποκει- 
μένοις πάθεσι, τὸ [δὲ μελοποι- 
ίαν καὶ ῥυθμοὺς [καὶ τἆλλα 
κατὰ λόγον δι[δό]σθαι [ὥστ᾽ εἶ   105 
ναι καὶ τὰς ἐν ἡμ[ῖν διαθέ- 
σεις ἀνομίας μ[. . . .  . .- 
λαις ὡς καὶ παρο[. . . . . . . - 
μιαν λευ[. . . .  . . . .  . . . 
συγγεν[. . . .  . . . . .  . . . .  
εν μεσ[. . . . .  . . . .  . . – 
ση γινέσθω [. . . .  . . . . .
 8 
 
Surely, Diogenes must be following Plato, who at Republic 399a–c stated 
that the only two modes to be  allowed into his state are the Dorian and the 
Phrygian – the two that encourage bravery and temperance.  
  At column 12, Diogenes affirms that whilst learning music is useful for a 
life of leisure,
9 in common with both Plato and Aristotle, he asserts that it should 
not be learned to a professional standard, it is, rather, a diagōgē. A similar  belief 
is  voiced  at  Protagoras  312b2–4,  where  the  extremes  of  versatility  and 
specialisation are rejected: 
 
[T4.4] . . . the kind [of education] you got from the schoolmasters who taught 
you letters and music and gymnastics. You didn’t learn these for professional 
purposes, to become a practitioner, but in the  way of liberal education, as  a 
layman and a gentleman should.  
(Trans. Guthrie in Hamilton and Cairns 1989: 311) 
 
In  column  41.29–34,  Diogenes  voices  a  concern  about  the  child 
performing on the aulos because playing the ‘musical tune convulses his face 
into ugliness’: 
 
[T4.5] οὐ] μόνον δέ τὰς ψυχὰ[ς δια- 
τιθέναι πως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σω- 
                                                 
8  For my translation of this passage, see below T4.27. Although it must be conceded that the 
dōristi  kai  has  been  supplied,  this  restoration  seems  very  secure  from  Philodemus’  parallel 
criticism  at  column  77,  which  makes  it  clear  that  Diogenes  is  discussing  the  appropriate 
harmoniai, and assigning ethical characters to each in the ancient harmonic system followed by 
Plato and Aristotle before him. 
9 For the Greek and translation, see T3.i.1 above.   106 
ματα· παιδὸς γοῦν α[υλεῖν 
ἀσκ]οῦντος καί τι μέλος 
μουσικὸν ἀπασκαρίσαν [εἰς 
δυσεί]δεια[ν] τὸ πρόσω[πον 
. . .]οσ[. .]ο[.]δοντων [. . . 
But it is not only the soul that [music] puts into such and such a disposition but 
the  body  also.  For  when  a  child  performs  a  musical  tune  on  the  aulos,  it 
convulses his face into ugliness. 
 
Whether  Diogenes  took  this  view  from  one  of  his  predecessors,  or 
whether it was a view formed on his own, is of course, impossible to say. It was 
a  view  expressed  by  both  Plato  and  Aristotle,  however,  and  possibly  others 
before them. In Alcibiades I, Plato’s Socrates remarks to Alcibiades: 
 
[T4.6] 
SOC:  You  learnt,  if  I  recollect,  writing  and  harping  and  wrestling;  as  for 
fluting, you refused to learn it.
10 
 
And Alcibiades agrees that this is correct. Plutarch, in his Life of Alcibiades 
gives a little more detail: 
 
[T4.7] At school. . . he refused to play the aulos, holding it to be an ignoble and 
illiberal thing. The use of the plectrum and the lyre, he argued, wrought no havoc 
with the bearing and appearance which were becoming to a gentleman, but let a 
man  go  to  blowing  on  an  aulos,  and  even  his  own  kinsmen  could  scarcely 
recognise his features. Moreover the lyre blended its tones with the voice or song 
of the master, whereas the aulos closed and barricaded the mouth, robbing its 
master of both voice and speech.
11 
 
It seems that Plato would have been more concerned with the loss of 
speech than the loss of appearance, although the deformity in appearance could 
stand for ‘distortion from “proper” comportment – in physical, aesthetic, moral 
                                                 
10 Alcibiades I 106e.  
11 Loeb Plutarch Life of Alcibiades 193E–F.   107 
and social terms’,
12 and so could represent both physical and moral deformity. In 
the Alcibiades I, the Platonic Socrates is surely mocking Alcibiades in his effort 
to prove that the latter doesn’t have the knowledge he claims to have rather than 
acknowledging  something  that  he  rightly  chose  not  to  do.  Was  the  Platonic 
Socrates rather implying vanity on Alcibiades’ part, perhaps, or is he simply 
affirming  Alcibiades’  own  view  of  himself  as  a  gentleman  and  the  aulos, 
therefore, was not an appropriate instrument for him to play?
13 In the Republic, 
after all, Plato has banned the use of the aulos for all but shepherds in the fields.  
Aristotle’s own criticism of the aulos seems to be rather closer to that of 
Diogenes in that the distortion of the face is mentioned directly: 
 
[T4.8] The tale goes that [Athena] found an aulos and threw it away. Now it is 
not a bad point of the story that the goddess did this out of annoyance because of 
the ugly distortion of her features; but as a matter of fact it is more likely that it 
was because education in flute-playing has no effect in the intelligence, whereas 
we attribute science and art to Athena.
14 
 
The  distortion  detail  could  certainly  therefore  have  been  taken  from 
Aristotle,  although  given  Diogenes’  interest  in  the  gods  and  goddesses,  one 
might have expected him to mention Athena’s dislike of the instrument because 
of its alogos nature, rather than the concern about distortion of features. Perhaps 
neither Plato nor Aristotle were Diogenes’ source here as it does seem to be a 
generally known anecdote. Athenaeus at Deipn. 616e–617a, notes that the fifth-
century BC musician Melanippides
15 recounted the tale: 
 
[T4.9] On the subject of pipes one guest notes that Melanippides in his splendid 
ridicule of pipe-playing in the Marsyas said of Athena, ‘Athena flung away the 
                                                 
12 Wilson 1999: 64, and discussion passim. 
13 In the Symposium it is Alcibiades who is brought, drunk, into the room led by an aulētris, 
Symp. 212d.  
14 Politics VIII, 1341b4–9, trans. Rackham in the Loeb volume, my italics. 
15 One of the proponents of the New Music of which Plato was so suspicious. On Melanippides, 
see chapter 3, above, p. 75; on ‘New Music’, see further below this chapter.    108 
instruments from her holy hand and said, “Away with you, you shameful objects, 
outrage to the body! I consign you to ruination!”’
16 
 
   And  so  it  might  indeed  have  been  a  common  tale  in  classical  times. 
Nonetheless,  it  must  have  interested  Diogenes  sufficiently  for  him  to  make 
mention of it here, particularly as it is placed so close to his argument that music 
can put the body into various dispositions, and so close also to the very lacunose 
anecdote  about  Pythagoras.
17  Perhaps  indeed  it  forms  one  of  a  number  of 
musical anecdotes recounted by Diogenes as evidence for such claims, or indeed 
as a sort of list of ‘tales told’. 
 
The Laws contains no detailed discussion of the harmoniai, but rather builds on 
the  rules  laid  down  in  the  Republic  regarding  appropriateness  of  music,  and 
returns to the subject of the importance of good education for the well-being of 
the  state.  The  Athenian  Stranger  emphasises  that  education  consists  in  the 
establishment  within  all  people  of  correct  dispositions  for  the  feelings  of 
pleasure and pain, and the appropriate attitudes to these feelings. Mousikē is 
regarded as the primary discipline to provide the foundation for development of 
moral goodness in childhood and in adult life, and so it is important that there are 
suitably qualified overseers/guardians to ensure the correct ‘policing’ of music. 
For, as the Stranger states, ‘the postures and tunes which attach to goodness of 
soul or body, or to some image thereof, are universally good, while those which 
attach to badness are exactly the reverse’.
18 Interestingly, Diogenes uses similar 
language at column 20, 1–8 where he states: 
 
[T4.10] μ[εγα- 
λοπρε]πῆ, τὰ δὲ σωφρονι[κ]ὰ 
καὶ] ἀνδρεῖα τ[ὰ] δ[ὲ δειλὰ  
καὶ ἀκόλαστα καὶ ὅλ[ως] α[ἰ- 
σχρὰ προσαγορευόντων, ὡς 
                                                 
16 Loeb Greek Lyric pp. 24–5, s.v. Melanippides. Trans. Campbell. 
17 For the Pythagoras anecdote, see above chapter 3, T3.i.21 – it appears just one column later 
then this excerpt, at col. 42.36–45.  
18 Laws II. 655b, trans Bury.   109 
συνεπιφερούσης τὰς τοιαύ- 
τας διαθέσις – οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἴσως 
οὐδ᾽ ἐφαίνοντο, μὴ οὖσαί γε 
κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ·  
 
(there are some people) who describe certain [tunes as magnificent], others as 
temperate  and  courageous,  and  still  others  on  the  contrary  as  shameful  and 
intemperate, because according to them, [music] carries dispositions of this sort: 
and  without  doubt,  (they)  would  not  at  all  appear,  unless  they  had  some 
existence in truth.  
 
Delattre  remarks  that  it  is  unlikely  that  Diogenes’  words  bear  some 
similarity to those of Plato by chance, and given that Diogenes will be shown 
below (T.4.13 and T4.14) to have quoted Plato verbatim, I am inclined to agree 
with this view. 
Philodemus’ refutation of this claim appears at column 98, 30–45: 
 
[T4.11]  τινάς [τ]ε καὶ π|ροσαγορεύον- 
τες αὐτοὶ τὰ μὲν μ|[εγαλοπρε- 
πῆ, τὰ δὲ σωφρονι[κ]ὰ καὶ ἀν- 
δρεῖα, τὰ δὲ ταπε[ινά, τ]|οῦτ᾽ ὠ- 
νόμασαν εὐθ|[ὺ τῶι] νομί- 
ζειν *  ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως τό[δε 
ἐφηρμόσθαι, τὴν ὁμιλίαν 
δηλοῦσαν καὶ τὸν ῥήτορα· 
παρῆν δὲ καὶ βρώμ|[α]τα καὶ 
πόματα νεαν[ικ]ὰ.[. . .  . .  
και γενναῖα, τὰ [δ]ὲ | [δειλ]ὰ 
καὶ ἀκόλαστα [καλ]εῖ|ν· ἀλλὰ 
δὴ καὶ πολλὰ | [ἀνάλογα] τού- 
τοις τ[ε κ]αὶ ἔτερ|[α κατὰ] τὴν 
πρ[ώτην] φύσιν α|[. . .] καὶ τὰς 
. . . . .   110 
and in describing certain [melodies] as magnificent, and others as temperate and 
courageous, and certain others as vile, they have given this description because 
in their view it is adapted by nature [to the tunes], and is shown by the ordinary 
use of language, and the rhetor also. But it would be possible to call ‘young’, 
‘noble’, [and good], and , in other cases, shameful and intemperate, also food 
and drinks, and many other things, in [analogy] to these latter, by their primary 
nature and. . . 
 
 Another similarly opposing view can be found in the document known 




[T4.12] They [the harmonicists] also say that some melodies make people self-
disciplined, others prudent, others just, others brave, and others cowardly, not 
understanding that the chromatic cannot make cowards nor the enharmonic make 
brave men of those who employ it. . . The chromatic does not make a person 
cowardly, nor the enharmonic (make someone) brave’.
19 
 
Laws need to be set down for the poets/musicians to follow (Laws II, 
656b),  and  the  Athenian  Stranger  addresses  the  question  of  finding  and 
appointing competent judges, those who will only take pleasure from music if it 
has the correct moral effect and utility. The passage that I will look at shortly 
explains why it is so important for competent judges to be found. 





13  εὐλαβείας γὰρ [πολ- 
  λῆς αὐτὴ]ν [.] δ[εῖ]σθαι, μάλιστ[α 
15  πασῶν] εἰκόνων * · ἁμαρ[τόν- 
  τα τε γ]ὰρ τὰ μέγιστα βλά- 
                                                 
19 P.Hib. I.13. Extract from cols. 1, 15–2, 6. Trans. Grenfell and Hunt, with amendments. It is 
clear, then, that Plato, and Diogenes after him were engaging in a debate about ēthos in music 
that dated back at least to the fourth century BC, and quite possibly earlier as I will discuss later 
in this chapter.   111 
  πτεσθ]αι τὰ ἤθη, ἐργῶδές τε 
  τούτω]ν αἰσθέσθαι διὰ τὸ 
  τοὺς ποη]τὰς φαυλοτέρους 
20  εἷναι τῶ]ν Μουσῶν [ * · τ]αύτα[ς 
  γὰρ οὐκ] ἂν ποιῆσαι τὰ μει- 
  μήματα], ἐλευθέρων μέ[λη 
  τε καὶ ῥ]υθμοὺς προσα[ρμοσά- 
  σας δούλων κ]αὶ ἀνελε[υθέ- 
25  ρων, καὶ ἀνά]παλιν, οὐ[δὲ θη- 
  ρίων συνθεῖν]αι καὶ ἀν[θρώ- 
  πων καὶ ὀργά]νων πάντ[ων 
  φωνὰς . . . . . . ]ονελωνα[. . .  
  . . . . ποητὰς] μέν[τ]οι, κἀ[ν- 
30  θρωπίνους], σφόδρα τὰ τοιαῦ- 
  τα ἐμπλέκον]τας καὶ συν[κ]υ- 
  κῶντας ἀλόγ]ως καταγελα- 
  σθῆναι ἂν δι]ασπῶντας ῥυ- 
  θμὸν μὲ]ν καὶ σχήματα μέ- 
35  λους χωρί]ς, λόγους ψειλοὺς 
  εὶς μέτρα τ]ιθέντας, μέλος [δὲ 
  αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸ]ν ἄνευ ῥημάτω[ν 
  ψειλῇ κιθαρ]ίσει καὶ αὐλήσ[ει 
  χρωμένο]υς, ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχά- 
40  λεπον ἄ]νευ λόγου [γινόμε- 
  νον ῥυθ]μόν τε κα[ὶ ἁρμονί- 
  αν γιγνώ]σκειν ὅ τ[ι βούλε- 
  ται καὶ ὅτ]ωι ἔοικε τῶν [ἀ- 
  ξιολόγων] μιμημάτων· [ὑπο- 
45  ληπτέον δ ᾽ ὅτ]ι τό γε τοιο[ῦτο 
  πολλῆς ἀγρ]οικίας με[στὸν 
47  πᾶν, ὁπό]σον τάχο[υς τε καὶ 
  [ἁπταισίας καὶ φωνῆς θηρι- 
  ώδους φίλον ὥστ ᾽ αὐλήσει γε 
  χρῆσθαι . . .]    
  
Because of all the [types of] imitation, it [music] is the one with which one 
should   take the utmost caution. For, in the case of error, moral harm can be 
most great, and it is troublesome to recognise, because our poets are inferior in 
quality  to  the  Muses.  They  indeed  [the  Muses]  would  never  create  their 
imitations by adapting melodies and rhythms for free men,
20 for slaves and men 
who were not born free and vice versa, and they would not mix together the cries 
of  wild  beasts,  men’s  voices,  and  all  sorts  of  instruments.  .  .  [The  poets], 
however, precisely because they are humans, by their senselessness in entangling 
                                                 
20 Diogenes’ compression compared to Plato’s text in T4.14 is harder to follow. The Greek here 
is rather awkward, and I have attempted to give the best sense.   112 
such things and jumbling them up together, become objects of ridicule, because 
they  separate  rhythm  and  gesture  from  the  tune,  putting  bare  discourse  into 
metre, and again they isolate melody and rhythm from words, using the bare 
sounds of harp and flute, wherein it is almost impossible to understand what is 
intended by this wordless rhythm and harmony, or what noteworthy original it 
represents. One ought to realise that such methods are clownish in the extreme 
insofar as [they like] (much speed, mechanical accuracy and animals’ cries, and 
consequently employ the pipe. . .) 
 
          This may be compared with an extract from Plato’s Laws II. 669b–e. The 
italic in the two Greek texts indicates direct parallels: 
 
[T4.14] 
b7      εὐλαβείας δὴ δεῖται πλείστης  
  πασῶν εἰκόνων. ἁμαρτών τε γάρ τις μέγιστ᾽ ἂν βλάπτοιτο, 
c  ἤθη κακὰ φιλοφρονούμενος, χαλεπώτατόν τε αἰσθέσθαι διὰ 
  τὸ τοὺς ποιητὰς φαυλοτέρους εἶναι ποιητὰς αὐτῶν τῶν 
  Μουσῶν. οὖ γὰρ ἂν ἐικεῖναί γε ἐξαμάρτοιέν ποτε τοσοῦτον, 
  ὤστε ῥήματα ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ σχῆμα γυναικῶν καὶ 
5  μέλος ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μέλος ἐλευθέρων αὖ καὶ σχήματα 
  ξυνθεῖσαι ῥυθμοὺς δούλων καὶ ἀνελευθέρων προσαρμόττειν, 
  οὐδ᾽ αὖ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ χρῶμα ἐλευθέριον ὑποθεῖσαι μέλος ἢ 
  λόγον ἐναντίον ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς· ἔτι δὲ θηρίων φωνὰς 
d  καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ πάντας ψόφους εἰς ταὐτὸν 
  οὐκ ἄν ποτε ξυνθεῖεν, ὡς ἔν τι μιμούμεναι· ποιηταὶ δε 
  ἀνθρώπινοι σφόδρα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμπλέκοντες καὶ σὐκυκῶντες 
  ἀλόγως γέλωτ᾽ ἂν παρασκευάζοιεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄσους 
5  φησὶν ᾽Ορφεὺς λαχεῖν ὤραν τῆς τέρψιος· ταῦτά τε γὰρ 
  ὁρῶσι πάντα κυκώμενα καὶ εἴ τι διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν 
  μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρίς, λόγους ψιλοὺς εἰς μέτρα 
e  τιθέντες, μέλος δ ᾽ αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῇ κιθα- 
  ρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει προσχρώμνεοι, ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχάλεπον 
  ἄνευ λόγου γιγνόμενον ῥυθμόν τε καὶ ἁρμονίαν γιγνώσκειν 
  ὅ τί τε βούλεται καὶ ὅτῳ ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων· 
5  ἀλλ᾽ ὑπολαβεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὅτι τὸ τοιοῦτόν γε πολλῆς ἀγροι- 
  κίας μεστὸν πᾶν, ὁπόσον τάχους τε καὶ ἀπταισίας καὶ φωνῆς 
  θηριώδους σφόδρα φίλον, ὥστ᾽  αὐλήσει γε χρῆσθαι  . . .   
 
 
It [music] needs more caution than any of the arts. The man who blunders [in 
this  art]  will  do  himself  the  greatest  harm,  by  welcoming  base  morals;  and, 
moreover,  his  blunder  is  very  hard  to  recognise,  inasmuch  as  our  poets  are   113 
inferior as poets to the Muses themselves. For the Muses would never blunder so 
far as to assign a feminine tune and gesture to verses composed for men, or to fit 
the rhythms of captives and slaves to a tune and gestures framed for free men, or, 
conversely, after constructing the rhythms and embellishments of free men, to 
assign to the rhythms a tune or verses of an opposite style. Nor would the Muses 
ever  combine  in  a  single  piece  the  cries  of  beasts  and  men,  the  clash  of 
instruments,  and  noises  of  all  kinds,  by  way  of  representing  a  single  object; 
whereas  human  poets,  by  their  senselessness  in  entangling  such  things  and 
jumbling them up together, would become objects of ridicule to all the men who, 
in Orpheus’ phrase have attained the full flower of enjoyment. For they behold 
all  these  things  jumbled  together,  and  how,  also,  the  poets  rudely  separate 
rhythm and gesture from tune, putting bare discourse into metre, whereas they 
isolate melody and rhythm from words, using the bare sound of harp or flute, 
wherein it is almost impossible to understand what is intended by this wordless 
rhythm and harmony, or what noteworthy original it represents. Such methods, 
as one ought to realise, are clownish in the extreme insofar as they exhibit an 
excessive  craving  for  speed,  mechanical  accuracy,  and  animals’  cries,  and 
consequently employ the pipe. . .           




        So what exactly is being claimed in these two passages? That of all the 
arts, music is potentially the most dangerous, because if the wrong type of music 
is studied, the listener will be in great moral danger. What is more, it is difficult 
to  discern  whether  one  is  listening  to  morally  pernicious  music,  because  the 
human poets/musicians are far inferior to the Muses, and we as listeners cannot 
readily recognise what is morally good or harmful. And so it goes on. Are Plato 
and Diogenes really suggesting that if we listen to the wrong type of music we 
place ourselves in moral danger? Certainly Plato voices this concern many times. 
As mentioned above, in the Republic, he bans the works of Homer believing 
them to be immoral, and he bans the aulos from his ideal city, allowing only a 
                                                 
21 Greek from the Oxford Classical Text; Bury’s translation in the Loeb Plato.   114 
syrinx that may be played by the shepherds in the fields.
22 The aulos is alogos,
23 
and is therefore of no use in his education. His views on educational music are 
nothing  if  not  practical. The  moral  message  contained  within  the  music  was 
much more important than any pleasure that might be obtained from it, although 
he does concede that it is important for children to be able to enjoy what they 
listen to.
24  He believed that morality could be instilled by habituation, even 
before the child acquired the ability of reason, and so by habitually exposing 
children and adults to morally improving music and poetry, i.e. music and poetry 
that contained imitations of moral goodness, they would learn to act morally. But 
conversely, he also believed that if the child was exposed to morally damaging 
music, then the opposite actions would be learned, and his dislike of ‘new’ or 
modern music, which for Plato was a prime example of such morally damaging 
music, is particularly apparent in the Republic,
25 as it is also in the Laws. See 
further my discussion below, pages 118–20.  
  It is clear that Diogenes shared this view. The simple fact that he chose to 
quote Plato’s passage at length certainly would seem to indicate agreement, and I 
would argue that Diogenes must be quoting Plato here – the parallels between 
the two texts are surely too great to be coincidental. I will now turn back to 
Diogenes’ extract (T4.13).   
Like Plato, Diogenes affirms that of all the arts, music is the one with 
which one should take most care, for in the case of error, moral harm could be 
most great, but also that morally pernicious music is very difficult to identify. 
His  expression  reproduces  that  of  Plato  almost  word  for  word,  although 
Diogenes’ compressed paraphrase is harder to follow. He (Diogenes) affirms that 
the Muses would not make the errors which the poets of his day were making, 
                                                 
22 Rep. III, 386–99. For discussion on why Plato held the view that a child should not play the 
aulos, and Diogenes’ apparent agreement, see above, pp. 105–8. 
23 I.e. without reason, and, hence irrational.  
24  But  only  in  the  Laws.  There  is  no  mention  of  pleasure  or  enjoyment  in  the  context  of 
education  in  the  Republic.  For  more  discussion,  see  Woerther  2008:  95–7.  The  enjoyment 
discussed above is referred to at Laws II, 659d. So long, that is, as enjoyment is only found in 
music  that  has  been  deemed  ‘appropriate’  by  the  appointed  judges.  Pleasure  is  of  minor 
importance here, just as in Philebus it is only ranked fifth in importance in the final ranking of 
‘goods’ (64c–67b). See my further discussion on sections of the Philebus, below, pp. 117–19. 
25 This need not necessarily be as alien a view as it might seem at the outset. Barker  (2007: 254, 
n. 32) notes that a modern philosopher [unnamed] considers the music of Richard Strauss to be 
morally  corrupt,  although  he  did  not  suggest  that  listeners  exposed  to  it  would  become  so 
corrupted.   115 
adapting rhythms and tunes of free men for slaves, imitating the cries of wild 
beasts, mixing voices and all sorts of instruments. He regrets the separation by 
these poets of words from melody and rhythm for the solo playing on kithara and 
aulos, and remarks how difficult it is to understand the proper meaning of bare 
rhythm and harmony and indeed to recognise what model they are intended to 
resemble.
26 
              The context of Diogenes’ passage is almost impossible to ascertain. A 
whole column of some 47 lines is so lacunose as to be impossible to read directly 
before this column (51), and the first 12 lines of this column are less than clear, 
although they might relate to another excerpt from the Laws (VII. 802b–c, where 
Plato affirms that the music of the ancients should be selected as suitable for 
dancing, singing and all choral performance, chosen by judges over the age of 
fifty, taking the advice of poets and musicians on the basis that even unregulated 




[T4.15]  . . . . .  . . .]ω ταῖς ἡδοναῖς 
καὶ ἐπιθυ]μίαις μὴ ἐπι[. .]να 
. . . . .  .ἀ]λλ᾽ ἤ τισιν ὀ[λίγ]οις, 
. . . . .  . . ]λ[.]μενης αν[. . . ]ισ 
. . . . .  .]ιου[.] σινονοσο [.]η[.]σ 
. . . . .  .]λα σωφρόνος τῆς 
. . . . .  . . .]ουσης, τῆς δὲ α[.- 
. . . . .  . . . ] χαιτοσσ ἐκεινη 
. . . . .  . . .]τῆς μὲν ἡδεί[ας, 
τῆς δὲ ψυχ]ρᾶς καὶ ἀ[ηδοῦς 
. . . . .  .]σιοι[. . . . .]|.ς κ|[α]ὶ τὸ 
. . . . .  . . .]ν· 
[men who do not trust] their pleasures nor their desires, except in certain few 
circumstances . . . when [the music] is temperate. . . while when. . . one is 
                                                 
26 Note again that Diogenes states ‘it is difficult’ not ‘impossible’ to understand the meaning of 
instrumental music.  
27 Again, in the Greek of the extract, italic denotes parallels in the Greek text.   116 
pleasant, the other is cold and unpleasant. .  and the fact that. . . [regarding 
music] . . .  
 
The passage of the Laws states: 
 
[T4.16]    ποιητικοὺς  ἅμα  καὶ  μουσικοὺς  ἄνδρας  παραλαβόντας,  χρωμένους 
αὐτῶν  ταῖς  δυνάμεσι  τῆς  ποιήσεως,  ταῖς  δὲ  ἡδοναῖς  καὶ  ἐπιθυμίαιας  μὴ 
ἐπιτρέποντας  ἀλλ᾽  ἤ  τισιν  ὀλίγοις,  ἐξηγουμένους  δὲ  τὰ  τοῦ  νομοθέτου 
βουλήματα ὅτι μάλιστα ὄρχησίν τε καὶ ᾀδην καὶ πᾶσαν χορείαν συστήσασθαι 
κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ νοῦν. πᾶσα δ᾽ ἄτακτός γε τάξιν λαβοῦσα περὶ μοῦσαν διατριβὴ 
καὶ μὴ παρατιθεμένης τῆς γλυκείας μούσης ἀμείνων μυρίῳ.  
 
For this purpose we shall call in the advice of poets and musicians, and make use 
of their poetical ability, without, however, trusting to their tastes or their wishes, 
except in rare instances; and by thus expounding the intentions of the lawgiver, 
we shall organise to his satisfaction dancing, singing, and the whole of choristry. 
In  truth  every  unregulated  musical  pursuit  becomes,  when  brought  under 
regulation, a thousand times better even when no honeyed strains are served 
up.
28  
   
Pleasure, as I will discuss further below, is not an important criterion in 
the  choice  of  appropriate  music.  The  Athenian  Stranger  states  at  668d,  ‘But 
correctness in things of this kind, to put it quite generally, would be produced by 
equality of quantity and quality, rather than by pleasure.’  As Barker remarks,
29 
‘that is, a thing not to be accounted a good representation just on the grounds that 
it is pleasing to look at or hear, but only if its dimensions and qualities reflect 
those of the original’. The structure of the harmonic line is what represents and 
conveys the ethical message. Plato’s concern about the mathematical imprecision 
of  another  aspect  (i.e.,  composition  as  well  as  performance)  of  musical 
                                                 
28 Translation Bury, in the Loeb edition. 
29 1984: 152.   117 
representation is voiced further at Philebus 55e–56a, especially 56a, where it is 
clear that he regards music as a stochastic art:
30 
 
[T4.17]   For a start, then, music is full of this (τῆς στοχαστικῆς) getting its 
concordance in tune not by measurement, but by taking a shot at it on the basis 
of practice, and so too is the whole art of pipe-playing, hunting the proper pitch 
of each note by shooting at it as the note moves, so that it has a great deal of 
uncertainty mixed into it, and little that is sure.
31 
 
Plato regards it with some mistrust due to its status of an inferior technē 
because of this uncertainty. Whilst it is possible, in his view, to give an account 
of the criteria required to produce appropriate music, just as it is possible to give 
an account of the right way to practise medicine, it is still imprecise. As Gosling 
remarks to Philebus 55e, ‘it is the extent of the use of mathematical techniques 
that makes a technē [more or less] worthwhile’.
32 
  The experts or critics of Plato’s Laws (VII. 802b–c, discussed  above) 
require three types of knowledge: 
1.  Knowledge or understanding of what is being represented; 
2.  The ability to judge the correctness of the copy or representation; 
3.  A knowledge of the excellence with which the copy is executed. 
 
Glen  Morrow  asserts  that  ‘This  higher  knowledge  puts  the  masters  of  music 
above not only the younger citizens, but even above the poets, for although a 
poet needs to know the technicalities of harmony and rhythm, he may not, as a 
poet know whether the representation is “noble or ignoble”.’
33 This, I believe, is 
exactly the point, and one of the main concerns of both Plato, and Diogenes, 
after him. 
  The context of the Plato passage T4.16, above, is as follows: At 796e ff., 
Plato returns to the subject of music (having previously left it as completed at 
673e), saying ‘the gifts of Apollo and the Muses. . . one which we previously 
                                                 
30  For  further  discussion  on  music  as  a  stochastic  art  in  Plato,  and  perhaps  Aristotle  and 
Diogenes, see above, chapter 3, pp. 85–7. 
31 Trans Barker 1987: 109. See further below, this chapter. 
32 Gosling 1975: 154. 
33 Morrow 1993[1960]: 314 and n. 55.   118 
thought we had done with’. The subject is reintroduced by the Athenian Stranger 
with a discussion of the dangers of innovations, firstly in children’s games, but 
then broadening out the discussion at 797e to include ‘everything, save only 
what’s  bad  –  in  respect  of  seasons,  winds,  bodily  diet,  mental  disposition, 
everything in short with the solitary exception, as I said just now, of the bad. The 
evil wrought by changes in outward forms. . .’ (798d). He moves on to affirm 
that children should be prevented from innovating in any aspect of their learning 
or recreation, and moves on to propose a set of laws regarding music – that the 
poet shall compose nothing which goes beyond the limits of what the State holds 
to be legal and right, fair and good, nor shall he show his compositions to any 
private person until they have first been shown to the judges appointed and have 
been approved by them (801d). Finally the Stranger comes to the passage leading 
into extract T4.16, suggesting that to honour with hymns and praises the gods 
and  heroes,  choice  should  be  made  from  ‘the  compositions  of  the  ancients’. 
Amongst these, the stranger states: 
 
[T4.18]   there exist many fine old pieces of music, and likewise dances, from 
which we may select without scruple for the constitution we are founding such 
as are fitting and proper. To examine these and make selection, we shall choose 
out men not under fifty years of age, and whichever of the ancient songs are 
approved  we  shall  adopt,  but  whichever  fail  to  reach  our  standard  or  are 
altogether unsuitable, we shall either reject entirely or revise and remodel. For 
this purpose we shall call in the advice of poets and musicians, and make use of 
their poetical ability, without, however, trusting to their tastes or wishes. . .For if 
a man has been reared from childhood up to the age of steadiness and sense in 
the use of music that is sober and regulated, then he detests the opposite kind 
whenever he hears it, and calls it vulgar. . .(802b–d) 
 
This passage has been interpreted by many commentators
34 as an attack 
on  the  ‘New  Music’  of  the  fifth  century,  produced  by  musicians  such  as 
Timotheus  of  Miletus,  Philoxenus  of  Cythera  and  Phrynis  of  Lesbos,  for 
                                                 
34 For example, Anderson 1966; Barker 1984; Csapo 2004, an interpretation that I fully support, 
and which I wrote about in more detail in my MA thesis entitled ‘Plato and New Music’ in 1999. 
For more on ‘New Music’, see above, ch. 3, pp. 68 ff., and below, this chapter.   119 
example. Whilst Plato does not mention any of these musicians by name, except 
for  one  Cinesias,  mentioned  at  Gorgias  501e–502a,
35  his  references  to 
innovation in music would seem to strongly suggest that this is what was in his 
mind.  Plato’s  suspicion  of  these  innovative  musicians  can  be  seen  in  the 
Protagoras as well as the Laws and the Republic, and at Gorgias 462b8–c7, the 
music of pleasure-giving public display is argued to be of as low a status as 
flattery,  the  knack  of  producing  gratification.  Just  as  rhetoric  was  dangerous 
because of the way the well-practised speaker could manipulate his audience, so 
too clever musicians could manipulate their audiences by appealing to their love 
of novelty and pleasure. Plato’s view on the ability or lack of it of spectators to 
judge  the  merits  of  both  musical  or  rhetorical  display  are  clear  from  two 
comments made in the Laws and the Republic: 
 
[T4.19]  [Passing] of verdicts [should not be] left as it is today to the catcalls and 
discordant  outcries  of  the  crowd,  nor  yet  to  the  clapping  of  applauders.  The 
educated made it their rule to hear the performers through in silence, and for the 




[T4.20]  . . . The multitude are seated together in assemblies or in courtrooms or 
theatres. . . and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and 




Whilst musical and rhetorical display gratify the ‘multitude’, they also 
appeal  to  that  ‘unstable,  emotional  part  of  us  and  subvert  reason,  whilst  yet 
seeming  to  proceed  from  and  transmit  knowledge’.
38  Plato  regards  the  new 
musicians as aiming only at entertainment and novelty, and the whole of the 
discussion in the Laws passages above in this chapter (T4.14; 4.16; 4.18; 4.19) 
                                                 
35 Cinesias was singled out, I suggested in my MA thesis, because he came from Athens, and 
was therefore more likely to be known to Athenians, not least from Aristophanes’ parodies of 
him in Birds (esp. 1373–9) and Frogs (e.g., 152 and 366 and scholia ad loc.). 
36 Laws III. 700b ff. trans. Taylor in Hamilton and Cairns 1989: 1294. 
37 Republic VI. 492b–c, trans. Shorey in Hamilton and Cairns 1989: 728. 
38 Janaway 1995: 11.   120 
relates, I would suggest, to his concern that choices of music suitable for either 
recreation or, more importantly the ‘honouring of the gods and heroes’ not be 
left to such musicians. His seemingly staid and strict regulations regarding the 
choice of appropriate judges and the skills required to become such judges are 
his way of ensuring that music is not left to the self-proclaimed ‘experts’ who 
merely resort to innovation and entertainment. 
  It seems clear that Plato not only held an elitist view of music, but he also 
imposed upon it the requirement of containing some form of rational expertise 
and moral improvement, and criticised it when it does not. As Woerther notes,
39 
in the Republic, ‘Socrates and his interlocutors seek to purify music by following 
the same rules as those which were adopted when they defined the principles of 
imitation  for  narrative  discourse  and  poetry.  This  process  takes  place  in  two 
stops: purification of harmonies, then purification of rhythm.’  
It  has  traditionally  been  believed  by  modern  scholars  that  Plato  was 
influenced  to  some  large  degree  by  Damon  of  Athens.  A  fifth-century 
philosopher and musical theorist, and one-time adviser to Pericles, not much is 
now known of Damon’s musical theory apart from a few references in Plato, and 
fragments in various other writings.
40 Damon was believed to have formulated a 
theory  of  musical  ethics  and  was  said,  by  Plato,  to  have  been  the  leading 
authority in the field of specific moral effects of music.
41 It is also clear from a 
fragment attributed to him that he accepted that music could influence the soul: 
                                                 
39 2008: 91. 
40 A collection of Damonian fragments together with analysis and commentary, and history of 
his life such as can be constructed is currently being prepared by R. Wallace, and it is hoped that 
this important work will be forthcoming in 2009. It will be interesting to analyse just what can 
confidently be attributed to Damon himself, and what might be mythical reputation built upon 
Plato’s writings. 
41  In  his  commentary  to  [Plutarch]’s  De  Musica,  Lasserre  argued  strongly  that  Damon  had 
invented the notion of ethos in music (Lasserre 1954: ch. 6 ‘Damon d’ Athènes’). However, there 
would appear to be nothing original in any theory attributed to Damon. Even Pindar suggested 
that  there  was  ethos  in  music,  as  in  Pythian  I:  l.5,  ‘You  quench  the  warriors  Thunberbolt’s 
everlasting flame’; ll. 11–14, ‘Even Ares the violent | leaves aside his harsh and pointed spears | 
And comforts his heart in drowsiness. | Your shafts enchant the souls even of the Gods.’ There 
would  appear  to  be  no  further  references  to  the  ‘hoi  peri  Damona’,  mentioned  by  Aristides 
Quintilianus at Book II, 14 (80, 23–81, 6 Winnington-Ingram), which continues on from my 
quotation at T5.iii.5, and the notion of Damon as ‘founding father’ was possibly a creation of 
later writers, possibly on the basis of Plato’s discussion in Republic III. It is not the existence of 
Damon that is in doubt – his invention of the ‘slack Lydian’ mode, mentioned by Aristotle in the 
Politics (VIII. 1342b31–2), is evidence that he was possibly an enterprising musician, but not 
necessarily a  theorist. I must thank Professor Barker for this outline of his argument from a 
conference on Aristides Quintilianus in Corfu in July 2008.   121 
 
[T4.21]  Song and dance necessarily arise when the soul is in some way moved, 
liberal and beautiful songs and dances create a similar soul and the reverse kind a 
reverse kind of soul.
42 
 
It would appear that Plato had a somewhat ambivalent relationship with 
Damon. At Laches 180cd, Plato’s Nicias refers to Damon as ‘a teacher of music. 
. . the pupil of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, as 
well as a musician and a companion of inestimable value for young men at their 
age’. But this glowing description of Damon is given by Nicias, who is shown in 
Thucydides Book VII to have been lacking in judgement.
43 Although it will be 
seen below that Plato quotes Damon as a source for his views on the musical 
modes, it may be that he did not altogether trust Damon’s teachings. 
Warren Anderson suggests that Plato saw him as a dangerous ally. Being 
sympathetic, as Damon was claimed to have been, to the Sophists, his beliefs 
were  to  be  treated  with  caution.
44  Plutarch’s  Life  of  Pericles  4  suggests  that 
Damon used his profession as a musician as a ‘cover’ for his political activities.
45 
He  was  apparently  ostracized  some  time  after  delivering  a  speech  on  public 
morality to the Athenian Council of the Areopagus, and is said by Diogenes 
Laertius at II.19, to have taught Socrates. Plato’s Laches 197d, where Damon is 
called Socrates’ hetairos, would seem to support this to an extent. Nowhere in 
extant musical writings from the classical or Hellenistic period other than those 
of Plato is Damon mentioned directly, except where he is mentioned in similarly 
                                                 
42 Fragment 37 B6 Diels. 
43 Thuc. VII.86. Thucydides tempers his remarks by qualifying his criticism with the comment 
that  ‘he had spent his whole life in the study and practise of virtue’. Cf. also Laches 197d, where 
Damon  is  said  to  be  a  constant  companion  of  the  Sophist  Prodicos  (described  at  Prt.  315e, 
probably ironically, as a man ‘of inspired genius’), and Laches 200ab, where Damon is mocked 
by Laches but defended again by Nicias.   
44 Anderson 1955: 88–102. However, cf. now, Barker 2007: 47 and n. 18, where it is queried 
how much influence Damon actually had on Plato’s musical theory. 
45 Plutarch writes, ‘As for Damon, he seems to have been a politician, who under the pretence of 
teaching  music,  concealed his great activities from  the vulgar.  . . However, Damon’s giving 
lessons upon the harp was discovered to be a mere pretext, and, as a busy politician and friend to 
tyranny, he was banished by the ostracism’, (trans. Langhorne (Langhorne 1841)). Damon is also 
linked with Pericles in [Plato] Alcibiades I, and the Aristotelian Ath. Pol. discusses some of his 
political activities; Athenaeus 628c for more on Damon’s views on musical ēthos. For more on 
Damon and references to him, see Wallace 2004: 249–68.    122 
respectful terms by Diogenes of Babylon at column 22 of the De Musica, and not 





      ἐπιζητή- 
5  σάντος] δέ τινος πότερον εἰς 
  πάσας] τὰς ἀρετὰς ἤ τινας ἡ 
  μουσικ]ὴ προάγει, Δάμωνα 
  . . . . .  .]ειν τὸν μουσικὸν 
  εἰς πάσ]ας σχεδὸν οἴεσθαι· λέ- 
10  γειν γὰ]ρ αὐτὸν προσήκειν 
  ἄιδον]τα καὶ κιθαρίζοντα 
  τὸν [π]αῖδα μὴ μόνον ἀνδρε[ιό- 
  τερον γίνεσθαι καὶ σωφρο- 
  νέστερον ἀλλὰ καὶ δικ[αί- 
  οτερον . . . . .  
        
  
 Moreover, when someone asked if music promotes all the virtues or just some 
of them, Damon, the musician, believed that [it will incite] the listener to all of 
them or nearly all. For, he said that the effect of singing and playing the kithara 
renders the child not only more courageous and more temperate, but also more 
just. . . 
 
Plato  doesn’t  use  these  exact  words,  but  in  the  Republic,  within  the 
discussion of which modes are suitable for admission into the city, he does say 
‘Well, on this point we will take counsel with Damon, too, as to which are the 
rhythms appropriate to illiberality, and insolence or madness or other evils, and 
what  rhythms  we  must  leave  for  their  opposites’,  asserting  that  Damon  will 




   ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ἦν δ ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος βουλευσόμεθα, τίνες τε 
                                                 
46 Cols. 100 and 148; see below, T4.24. 
47 Plato, Republic III. 400b. However, cf. Barker (2007: 252, n.29), ‘Plato at Rep. 400b–c seems 
to guarantee that Damon had things to say about the ethical significance of rhythms. On the other 
hand the notions that he had set out comparable ideas about the ethical characters or influences of 
the various harmoniai,  a notion that was current in later  antiquity  and has been built up by 
modern  scholars  into  an  elaborate  “Damonian  theory  of  ēthos”,  seems  to  me  to  rest  on  the 
flimsiest of foundations.’   123 
ἀναλευθερίας  καὶ  ὕβρεως  ἢ  μανίας  καὶ  ἄλλης  κακίας  πρέπουσαι  βάσεις,  καὶ 
τίνας τοῖς ἐναντίοις λειπτέον ῥυθμούς. 
 
It may of course be that some of Damon’s writings still existed when 
Plato lived, although there is no evidence that Damon left any written work at 
all.
48  It  is  probably  implausible,  therefore,  that  Diogenes  could  have  been 
drawing on Damon’s work directly, and in no other extant text from before the 
first  century  BC  is  Damon  mentioned.  It  seems  apparent,  therefore,  that 
Diogenes must have used Plato’s writing when speaking of Damon. Amongst 
later writers, Damon is mentioned by name once by Cicero, once by Ps.-Plutarch 
in  his  De  Musica,  and  a  number  of  times  in  his  Lives,  and  four  times  by 
Philodemus – twice in the words attributed to Diogenes of Babylon, and twice in 
Philodemus’ own refutation. He is also mentioned by Proclus in his commentary 
on Plato’s Republic, as noted below (T4.26), and Aristides Quintilianus possibly 
preserves some of his musical philosophy in Book II of his own De Musica.
49  
In text T4.22 above, Diogenes appears to refer to Damon in the same way 
that Plato did before him – as a man who had some authority in musical matters, 
in other words, a mousikos, but he gives no earlier authority for this belief. Is he 
referring to Plato’s writings here also? At Republic IV. 424c–d, Plato’s seeming 
admiration of Damon’s musical philosophy is shown in the words of the Platonic 
Socrates: ‘For the modes of music are never disturbed without unsettling of the 
most fundamental political and social conventions, as Damon affirms, and I am 
convinced’.
50 Other than quoting Damon as his authority, Plato does not cite any 
evidence to support this theory, surely a reference once again to the ‘new music’. 
I would suggest that Diogenes quotes Damon with similar respect – ‘when one 
asked if music incites all the virtues or just some of them, Damon the musician . 
. .’
51 – he seems to take it for granted that Damon needs very little introduction, 
perhaps following Plato? If Plato’s comments in the Laches do indeed suggest 
that Damon’s words are not as authoritative as they appear in the Republic, the 
question  must  be  raised  as  to  whether  Diogenes  had  misunderstood  Plato’s 
                                                 
48 See Wallace 2004: 256; also Barker 2007: 47.   
49 Suggested by Lord 1982, but not, it seems supported by other modern scholars. See, e.g., 
Barker 1989, ch. 12 passim.  
50 My italics. The Greek reads οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ κινοῦνται μουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν νόμων 
τῶν μεγιστῶν, ὥς φησί τε Δάμων καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι. 
51 Extract T4.22.   124 
possible  distrust  of  Damon.  There  would  seem  to  be  no  hint  of  irony  in 
Diogenes’ writings, or indeed in Philodemus’ own criticism. Both writers seem 
to have taken Plato’s words at face value. 
Philodemus’ stinging rebuke of Damon’s view comes at column 100, 37–
45, where he says: 
 
[T4.24]  Δάμων [μ]ὲν τοί- 
νυν | [δι᾽ ἀλαζονε[ία]ν εἶπεν 
ἐν| [. . . . τ]ὴν μ[ουσι]κὴν [εἰς 
τὰς πλείσ]|τας ἀρετὰς χρή[σι- 
μεύειν, λ]|έγων δεῖν ᾄδο|ν- 
τ]α καὶ κιθ |αρίζοντα τὸν 
π]αῖδα μὴ | μόνον ἀνδρε[ιό- 
τερον γί |νεσθαι καὶ σώφρο- 
νέστερο]ν|, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκ[αι- 
ότερον. . . 
 
As for Damon, it was [quackery] when he said [publicly] that music is [useful to 
most] virtues, arguing that by singing and playing the kithara, the child will 
become not only more courageous and [more] temperate but also more just. 
 
Philodemus follows up this criticism at column 148, 1–5, where he says, 
‘and if Damon said these things to a real Areopagus and not to a fictional one, 
then he lied shamelessly’: 
 
[T4.25] καὶ Δά[μ]ων, εἰ τοιαῦτα 
πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς Ἀρεο- 
παγε[ί]τας ἔλεγε, καὶ μὴ τοὺς 
πλαττομένους, ἐφενάκι- 
ζεν ἀτηρῶς *. 
 
The evidence of Plato’s influence on Diogenes in the choice of musical 
modes  has  already  been  discussed,  above,  T4.3  and  discussion.  In  his   125 
commentary on the Republic, Proclus notes 
52 that the Platonic Socrates accepts 





τὰς δὲ αὖ ἁρμονίας ἤδη μέν τινες τῶν θρηνοποιῶν καὶ συμποτικῶν, ὧν αἱ μὲν 
τὸ  φιλήδονον  χαλῶσιν,  αἱ  δὲ  τὸ  φιλόλυπον  συντείνουσιν,  τούτων  δ  ᾽  οὖν 
ἐκβεβλημένων ἀξιοῦσιν τὰς λοιπάς, ὧν Δάμων ἐδίδασκεν, τήν τε Φρύγιον καὶ 
τὴν Δώριον αὐτὸν ὡς παιδευτικὰς παραδέχεσθαι. 
 
Clearly,  then,  if  Diogenes  had  access  to  Damon’s  writings,  which,  as 
argued  above,  seems  unlikely,  he  chose  to  follow  Plato’s  choice  of  musical 
modes rather than Damon’s, which leads me to ask the question why he also 
quoted the name of Damon in his work? If there was no written work left by 
Damon, as suggested by Barker and Wallace above, then was Diogenes merely 
perpetuating the ‘myth’ in the belief that Plato would not quote an unreliable 
source? Did Philodemus himself believe that Damon’s reputation was chiefly 
due to his being quoted as an authority by such an important philosopher as 
Plato? He certainly accords him no respect, and clearly suggests at column 148, 
above (T4.25), that the so-called speech to the Areopagus might indeed have 
been fictional. These questions of course cannot be answered now, but Diogenes’ 
references  to  Damon  are  clear  evidence  that  Diogenes  had  access  to  Plato’s 
writings, and that he held them in some regard. 
It seems clear that Diogenes of Babylon would have endorsed Plato’s 
views and arguments in the Laws, and it may be, as suggested by Delattre,
54 that 
he  did  indeed  open  his  discussion  of  the  topic  with  words  such  as  ‘It  is 
necessary, as Plato said’, but again, that is impossible to tell from the state of the 
papyrus as it is today. The column immediately following column 51 (T4.13) is 
also  almost  completely  lost,  and  certainly  unreadable,  and  column  53  is  not 
much better. It does seem, however, that Diogenes is probably continuing his 
                                                 
52 in Rempub. I. 61.19–24 Kroll.  
53  Italics  mine.  Proclus,  in  noting  that  Plato  differed  in  his  choice  of  modes  from  Damon, 
suggests that he was working from another source for Damon other than Plato alone. 
54 Delattre 2007: vol. I, 82 n. 1.   126 
discussion of ‘proper’ music, and how it is an appropriate pastime for a refined 
man. The remaining text in the section devoted to Diogenes’ writings up to the 
end  of  column  55  is  extremely  lacunose,  and  very  little  can  be  read  today. 
Despite my earlier comments about how it has been possible to reconstruct the 
text  using  parallel  columns  where  Philodemus  directly  criticises  Diogenes’ 
claims, Delattre has been unable to find any clues as to what might have been 
contained within these lacunae, and has therefore been unable to reconstruct any 
text here. 
Scholars have looked at Diogenes’ theories, such as they were available 
before Delattre’s work, and Andrew Barker has suggested that Diogenes’ theory 
was  probably  unique.
55  This  would  seem  to  be  true,  although  Diogenes  was 
clearly  very  much  influenced  by  Plato  and  perhaps  also  Aristotle,  as  I  will 
discuss  in  the  next  chapter.  I  believe,  however,  that  Diogenes’  musical 
philosophy was much more technical than that of either of these philosophers.  
           
        .   .   .   .   .   . 
  
Very early in his critique of Diogenes’ theory, Philodemus accuses his opponent 
of ambiguity, pointing to the linguistic confusion that arises when words such as 
‘hardness’ and ‘softness’ were used to describe a harmony, where they would 
have a completely different meaning in other contexts.
56 The examples he uses 
are bodily hardness compared with musical hardness, and the use of words such 
as ‘relaxed’ in relation to melody. He states that such usage renders any valid 
predication impossible, but I would suggest that he deliberately misinterprets. 
This would have to apply also to Plato in his use of similar adjectives to describe 
harmonies, and probably all the early musical theorists, and indeed modern-day 
writers on music. However, as argued by Paul Scade, ‘when viewed in the light 
of the tension that will determine the quality of a sound, or, analogously, a soul, 
this  language  does  make  sense’.
57  Scade  continues,  ‘This  understanding  is 
                                                 
55 Barker 2001: 353–71. 
56 Cols. 60–1. It was not uncommon for the Stoics to be accused of obscurity or ambiguity; The 
Academic Carneades criticised the Stoic definition of telos for lack of clarity; Cicero De Finibus 
and  Plutarch  De  Communibus  Notitiis  accuse  the  Stoics  of  inconsistency  of  terminology,  on 
which see chapter 2, p. 15 above.  
57 Scade 2007: 214. See discussion above, at chapter 2, sections 2.iii and 2.v.   127 
supported by the characterisation of some music as ‘relaxed’ (ἄνετος), which 
seems to clearly indicate the degree of tension, the particular ratio, in a thing.’
58  
This argument appears all the more plausible when, at column 77 of the De 
Musica  Philodemus  claims  that  his  adversaries  (the  Stoics)  ‘rave’  when  they 
state that ‘each harmony (ἁρμονίας) has a tension (τόνον) naturally akin to the 
emotions in question’.
59 Philodemus’ criticism at this column parallels Diogenes’ 
claim at column 9 above regarding the Dorian scale: 
 
[T4.27] . . . as for example the [Dorian and] Phrygian [harmonies]. The former, 
because, . . . ordered. . ., so that, for one part. . . assuredly. . .[measured] . . . a 
tension (τόνον) akin to the emotions [in question], and [on the other hand the 
melodic composition,] the rhythms, etc., are ‘given’ in proportion (κατὰ λόγον 
διδόσθαι [so that] the dispositions of lawlessness in us, too, are . . .
60 
 
As  Andrew  Barker  has  stated,  and  as  argued  in  chapter  5.i,  below, 
‘Diogenes argued vehemently for the reality of ethical and aesthetic attributes 
such as nobility / ugliness and appropriateness / inappropriateness within music, 
and  believed  that  these  attributes  could  have  a  significant  effect  on  human 
character.’
61 Diogenes argued, for example, that music could arouse the soul to 
valour, or calm the troubled soul.
62 As argued in chapter 2, an orthodox Stoic 
would  have  considered  these  or  any  emotions  to  be  results  of  evaluative 
reasoning – judgements following the acceptance or rejection of a proposition. 
Therefore,  to  have  any  psychological  value,  the  music  would  require  some 
rational quality to enable the soul to (a) understand the rational impression, and 
so (b) assent to, or reject, the proposition it posed. And as Scade remarks, ‘by 
assenting to the impression conveyed by a piece of music, the mind will take on 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 Or, as Delattre translates ‘ton’ – ‘tone, shade, colour or pitch’. This could be a deliberate play 
on  words.  τόνος  certainly  does  mean  tension,  or  strain  in  normal  terminology.  In  musical 
discussion, however, the more common  translation would be ‘mode’ or ‘key’, ‘difference in 
pitch, i.e. tone’. I thank Paul Scade for highlighting this particular interpretation, and his different 
reading from that of Janko 1992b: 126–7, which, in this respect, I had followed. See also my 
discussion of Janko’s interpretation of this passage in chapter 2, above, where I also differed 
from Janko, but in a different context.  
60 For the Greek, see above, T4.3 this chapter. 
61 Barker 2001: 353. 
62 Col. 36, ridiculed by Philodemus at col. 117. See also extract T3.i.26 and discussion.   128 
the structure of the impression’.
63 I believe that Diogenes argued that melody 
itself possesses ethos, even if the proposition that it contains is not expressed 
verbally,  a  fact  that  is  implied  in  passages  T4.13  and  T4.14,  even  if  both 
passages say that ‘it is almost impossible to understand what is intended by the 
wordless  rhythm  and  harmony’.
64  And  it  seems  that  both  Diogenes  and 
Cleanthes, his predecessor, believed that the structures of the musical scale could 
both correspond to and communicate the ‘qualities’ or ethical values to which 
they correspond. This is implied, for the Stoics at least, by the listing of music as 
part of the study of phōnē at Diogenes Laertius VII.44.
65 
I am not suggesting that Plato or Diogenes would normally discuss music 
in terms of rhythm and harmony only, that is, bare (psilos) rhythm. I believe 
their discussions would normally assume rhythm and words. T4.13 and T4.14 
would  seem  to  be  the  exceptions  rather  than  the  rule  in  terms  of  discussing 
wordless music. As mentioned earlier, this raises the question of if, in the context 
of these extracts, it should be understood that either Plato or Diogenes, or indeed 
both, are referring to their ‘modern poets’ only (that is, the poets producing what 
in the twenty- and twenty-first century AD discussions of the new style of music 
produced in the fourth century BC is termed ‘New Music’).
66 However, it would 
appear that their concerns would be the same whether they were directed at a 
specific group of poets, or to human poets generally – as both say, ‘our poets are 
inferior in quality to the Muses’. Does Diogenes use the word ‘poets’ in the same 
way  as  Plato?  One  cannot  be  sure.  Delattre  suggests  that  he  does,  but  that 
Philodemus does not.
67 I do not wholly agree with this, however, as I argue 
elsewhere.
68 
                                                 
63 Scade 2007: 214. 
64 The effect of the music need not be considered irrational simply because the music does not 
contain a verbally expressed proposition. For discussion, see above chapter 2 at pp. 35 ff. 
65 As remarked by Scade 2007: 216. I thank Paul Scade for his argument here. As Scade states, 
‘One might take this to refer to a combination of music and text, but. . . this would be redundant 
as written language, poetic diction and melodic speech are already listed. So there is no reason to 
believe that music, as listed here, is anything other than pure, non-verbal music.’ And as noted in 
chapter 2, section ii, Diogenes was particularly interested in, and indeed wrote a treatise on, 
phōnē. 
66 For more on ‘New Music’, see above, pp. 118–20 and e.g., Csapo 2004: 207–48. As Csapo 
writes, this term is ‘a useful but misleading term… When ancient critics spoke collectively of 
works in the style (of what we call) New Music, they tended to speak of “theatre music”,’ 207.  
67 See above, p. 7.  
68 See e.g., chapter 2, pp. 35–6.   129 
             As mentioned above, Diogenes argued that music contained ‘likenesses’ 
of characters that are not mimetic, but which at the same time make all ethical 
qualities  absolutely  clear  to  the  person  properly  trained  in  music,  i.e.,  the 
mousikos. Professor Neubecker, in her 1986 translation of the final thirty-nine 
columns of this work,
69 suggested that Diogenes’ views entailed music that we 
would today call ‘Programme music’. The term ‘was introduced by Liszt, for 
music of a narrative or descriptive kind’ … ‘music that is distinguished by its 
attempt to depict objects and events’.
70  It may well be a good analogy – music 
was certainly written for specific purposes, and, as discussed at length by Plato 
in the Republic, and referred to also by Diogenes, certain rhythmic or melodic 
forms were regarded as only appropriate for certain purposes. This would seems 
to  be  confirmed  in  the  anonymous  fragment  T3.i.17,  which  states  that  ‘the 
Dorian  harmony  is  inappropriate  to  Dionysus’.  However,  using  Scade’s 
interpretation (see above, at n. 59), it is clear that the music can also represent 
‘the  tensional  structure  of  abstract  qualities  as  well  as  being  able  to  imitate 
sounds, because. . . the quality of the music is determined by ratios (rhythmic 
and harmonic) and the structure of the sound is able to carry and communicate in 
its ratios the proportional structures that determine other qualities’.
71 Perhaps, 
then, this is what Diogenes was referring to when he stated that music contained 
likenesses  that  were  not  imitations –  the tensions  and  structure  of  the  music 
‘defined and demonstrated [or, perhaps, proved]’ and also communicated the 
qualities contained within it to the experienced musician. 
     
At  column  138,  Philodemus  claims  that  Diogenes  had  misunderstood 
Plato’s views on the relationship between music and justice. Having just refuted 
the claim that Diogenes made for Heraclides of Pontus,
72 he states that ‘what 
some people make of justice is ridiculous’, and affirms that the claim that the ear 
(which is for him alogos, and therefore has no part to play in reason), is able to 
determine in some way what is good or not for the citizens of a state, and to 
                                                 
69 Neubecker  1986.  
70 See the Grove Concise Dictionary of Music, (= Sadie 1995) s.v ‘Programme music’. 
71 Scade 2007: 214. 
72 See below, chapter 5, section iii.   130 
choose music on the basis of that with the aid of rules is totally unthinkable. He 
writes: 
 
[T4.28]   τὰ δ ᾽ ἐπι- 
χειρήματα τῆι δόξηι π[α]ρ- 
πλήσια φαίνεται· καὶ γὰρ εἰ 
Πλάτων ἔλεγε πρὸς δικαιο- 
σύνην ὠφελ[ε]ῖν, ἀπό[δ]ε[ιξ]ιν 
ἂν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ προ[σε]δεχ[όμ]ε- 
θα· νῦν δ᾽ ὅμως ἀν[α]λογ[εῖ]ν 
φησιν τῶι μουσ[ι]κ[ῶ]ι τὸν [δί 
καιον, οὐ τὸν μου[σ]ικὸν [δί- 
καιον εἶναι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ 
τὸν δίκαιον μουσ[ι]κὸν οὐ- 
δὲ συνεργεῖν οὐδέτε[ρο]ν οὐ- 
δετέρωι πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν 
ἐπιστήμην· 
 
As for ‘dialectical deductions’,
73 these are obviously very similar to ‘opinions’. 
For also if Plato had wished to say that it [the music] led to justice, we would 
have expected a demonstration from him. But what he really said was that the 
just man is analogous to the musician, not that the musician is just; just as he did 
not at all say that the just man is a musician, nor that the one helps the other to 
the knowledge that is fitting for him. 
 
He  moves  on,  ‘But  no  doubt  what  he  wanted  to  say  was  that  the  musician 
resembles a cobbler, a painter or another craftsman (τέχνιτης) in skill. . . to the 
extent that in the matter of [music] he doesn’t want to have the advantage over 
the specialist.’
74 
  Diogenes’ parallel claim is now lost, but it should have occurred very 
close  to  the  columns  where  he  was  talking  about  the  lawgivers  helping  the 
                                                 
73 Explained by Aristotle in Topics VIII, 162a16, as noted by Delattre 2007: vol. II, 269, n. 2. 
74 Col. 138. 28–35.    131 
musicians and poets to choose music suitable for education, discussed above, 
pages 115–17, and indeed Philodemus’ refutation does suggest this. 
  From Philodemus’ continued critique, it is inferred that Diogenes had 
claimed that the musician was ‘just’, and Philodemus strongly denies that music 
by nature either obeyed or disobeyed laws, contrary to what ‘certain people’ 
claimed. The ensuing discussion regarding ‘spectacles’ (ὄψεις) could very much 
parallel a similar claim to the Platonic passage at Laws 700a ff. (part of which is 
cited above, T4.19), outlining the decline of music to ‘unmusical licence’. This 
passage starts, responding to a question, posed by Megillus about the type of 
laws over which the demos had previously had no control: 
 
[T4.29]  Those [laws] dealing with the music of that age, in the first place – to 
describe  from  its  commencement  how  the  life  of  excessive  liberty  grew  up. 
Among us, at that time, music was divided into various classes and styles. . . So 
these and other kinds being classified and fixed, it was forbidden to set one kind 
of words to a different class of tune. . . but later on, with the progress of time, 
there  arose  as  leaders  of  unmusical  illegality  poets  who,  though  by  nature 
poetical, were ignorant of what was just and lawful in music. . . and they. . . 
mixed dirges with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs. . . they unwittingly bore 
false witness against music, as a thing without any standards of correctness.
75 
 
Given that Diogenes quoted an earlier passage of the Laws at such length, 
and in a similar vein, a parallel claim to that of Plato’s here would not be at all 
out  of  place  in  Diogenes’  text,  particularly  in  view  of  his  own  comments 
regarding Damon, who also advocated the use of regulation in music, if Plato’s 
comments about him are accurate. As suggested earlier, Diogenes would surely 
have shared Plato’s dislike of the ‘new music’, which must be the subject of 
criticism in the Platonic quotation here. 
  Philodemus’ choice of the wording ἐπιχειρήματα suggests that Diogenes 
might  have  used  the  same  wording.  The  word doesn’t  appear  anywhere  else 
within  the  extant  parts  of  the  De  Musica,  and as  far  as  I  have  been  able  to 
                                                 
75 Trans. Bury in Loeb Plato Laws.   132 
ascertain, is only used on one other occasion by Philodemus himself.
76 The word 
is used much more often by Aristotle than by Plato (20 occasions for Aristotle, 
only 5 for Plato), but it is used once by Plato in contexts analogous to music, in 
the Gorgias, at 502b: 
 
[T4.30]  Then what of the purpose that has inspired our stately and wonderful 
tragic  poetry?  Are  her  endeavour  (ἐπιχείρημα)  and  purpose,  to  your  mind, 
merely for the gratification of the spectators. . .?
77 
 
Aristotle’s usage would seem much more technical, and given the context 
of Philodemus’ critique, and the context of the discussion of music’s relationship 
to justice, plus the contrast with demonstration, it would seem that ‘dialectical 
discussion’ is a more appropriate translation here. This conclusion would seem 
to be supported by the discussion of Plato’s justice in the Republic in the Magna 
Moralia attributed to Aristotle at MM I, 1194a5–28, which does seem to bear 
some resemblance to Philodemus’ own discussion in T4.28 above:  
 
[T4.31]  Plato also seems to employ proportional justice in his Republic. For the 
farmer, he says, produces food, and the housebuilder a house, and the weaver a 
cloak. Now the farmer gives the housebuilder food, and the housebuilder gives 
the farmer a house: and in the same way all the rest exchange their products for 
those of others. And this is the proportion. As the farmer is to the housebuilder, 
so is the housebuilder to the farmer. In the same way with the shoemaker, the 
weaver, and all the rest, the same proportion holds towards one another. And this 
proportion  holds  the  republic  together.  So  that  the  just  seems  to  be  the 
proportional. For the just holds republics together, and the just is the same thing 
as the proportional. 
  But since the work which the housebuilder produces is of more value 
than that of the shoemaker, and the shoemaker had to exchange his work with the 
                                                 
76 I have searched the TLG for any occasion of usage by Philodemus in the few works listed 
there;  and  LSJ  indicates  that  it  was  used  once  in  the  plural  again  in  De  Signis  29,  and  the 
meaning there is ‘dialectical deductions’ as well. I have searched the index of the SVF but can 
find no listing of the word there. It must be said, however, that work is still being undertaken on 
many of the other writings of Philodemus, and therefore, my searches cannot be said to be in any 
way conclusive. 
77 Trans Lamb in the Loeb edition.   133 
housebuilder,  but  it  was  not  possible  to  get  a  house  for  shoes;  under  these 
circumstances they had recourse to using something for which all these things 
are purchasable, to wit silver, which they called money, and to effecting their 
mutual exchanges by each paying the worth of each product, and thereby holding 
the political communion together. 
  Since, then, the just is in those things and in what was mentioned before, 
the  justice  which  is  concerned  with  these  things  will  be  an  habitual  impulse 
attended with choice about and in these things. 
 
 
Although  the  specialist  in  music  is  not  mentioned  there,  the  other 
craftsmen  who  contribute  to  the  workings  of  state  are  mentioned  in  Plato’s 
‘proportional justice’ as outlined by the Aristotelian writer. However, it may be 
that the contexts are rather different, and that Philodemus is merely discussing 
stock  examples  of  craftsmen  rather  than  proportional  exchange.  It  would, 
nonetheless,  be  interesting  to  be  able  to  read  Diogenes’  exact  wording  here, 
given  the  doubt  over  the  availability  of  Aristotle’s  writings  then,  and  to 
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Chapter 5 
 




It  will  be  worth  spending  some  time  analysing  Aristotle’s  musical  philosophy, 
because it would seem that in his attack on Diogenes of Babylon’s musical theory, 
Philodemus criticises almost every claim that Aristotle makes for music. Aristotle is 
not mentioned at all by name in the De Musica as it has come down to us, and it is 
clear that Philodemus was attacking  Diogenes and not Aristotle. It would  seem, 
therefore, that Diogenes’ theory must have shared quite a lot of common ground 
with that of Aristotle, and therefore an analysis of Aristotle’s musical philosophy 
might enable some of the gaps in Diogenes’ own thought to become more clear. 
  This of course raises the question of whether or not Diogenes might have had 
access to Aristotle’s, or Theophrastus’, esoteric writings, given the doubt about the 
transmission of the two philosophers’ writings after the death of Theophrastus in 
around 288 BC, some forty years before Diogenes’ birth. According to tradition,
1 
Aristotle left his library to Theophrastus, who bequeathed his own library, which 
presumably  included  those  books  he  had  inherited  from  Aristotle,  to  Neleus  of 
Scepsis.
2 It is surely unlikely, however, that there was only one copy of each of 
Aristotle’s writings, and although they are rarely referred to until the first century 
BC,
3 this might be because they were simply ‘little read’.
4 Callimachus (305–240 
BC) clearly had read at least some of Aristotle’s work, as he quotes Aristotle in his 
                                                 
1 Importantly, Strabo 13.608; Plutarch, Life of Sulla 26. 
2 From whom the libraries were passed to his heirs, and were hidden, perhaps in a cellar or tunnels 
when it became know than the Attalids were looking to create the library in Pergamon. Some books 
might have been sent to Ptolemy II’s new library in Alexandria according to Athenaeus (3ab), but it 
seems that much of the Aristotelian corpus, as we have it today, was not available to the early 
Peripatetics. For detailed discussion on the transmission of Aristotelian texts, see e.g., Barnes 1997; 
Sharples 1999; Gottschalk 1998[1990]. 
3 Cicero clearly had read and admired some of Aristotle’s writing, see, e.g., De Finibus book III. 
4 Sharples 1999: 152. This might be because Aristotle’s esoteric writings were so much more difficult 
that those of Plato. For further discussion, see also Barnes 1997: 14.   135 
own description of the swan.
5 And, as remarked by Barnes,
6 Philodemus himself 
preserves  a  letter  from  Epicurus,  which  refers  to  Aristotle’s  Analytics.
7  Some 
writings might therefore have been still in circulation at the time Diogenes lived. 
That some more were widely available in Philodemus’ time (first century BC) does 
not seem to be in doubt, but from Philodemus’ own method of critical writing, I find 
it implausible that he might have put words into Diogenes’ own mouth if they had 
not been part of the latter’s theory in the first place. 
  It seems that some of Aristotle’s writings might have remained accessible 
throughout, therefore, particularly, remarks Barnes, the exoteric works.
8 This is not 
to suggest that Diogenes had access to them in the same way that he did to the works 
of Plato, but there is sufficient similarity between the two theories to suggest that he 
had at least read some of Aristotle’s work on music in education, as I will discuss 
below. Indeed, Diogenes Laertius records that Aristotle wrote two works on music,
9 
and perhaps at least one of these was incorporated into what we now have as the 
Politics (although it must be said that a work of eight books on Politics is also listed 
by Diogenes Laertius).
10 Boethius also presents Theophrastus as filling in points that 
Aristotle had not fully covered,
11 and it may be, as suggested by Gottschalk, that 
rather than treating Aristotle’s writings as canonical, the early Peripatetics rather 
continued his work, and perhaps his writing too, which again would suggest that 
some copies of some works were not lost to his successors, and the Politics as it has 
come down to us today at least, could be seen as one of the more exoteric works? It 
should not be forgotten also, that in later times at least, Diogenes travelled to Rome 
in 156/5 BC with Critolaus, one time head of the Peripatetic school, and so was 
definitely in touch, in some way, with Aristotle’s successors. This is of course, pure 
                                                 
5 Athenaeus 389b. 
6 Barnes 1997: 14. 
7 PHerc. 1005 fr. 111 Angeli. 
8 1997: 16. 
9 D. L. V.22–7, at 26. 
10 Albeit titled Eight books of a course of Lectures on Politics like that of Theophrastus (D. L. V.24). 
Perhaps that is not the same work that we now know as the Politics, or perhaps Diogenes (D.L.) has 
listed part of the Politics both under the general title of the whole work and as a separate work with a 
specific title. But that is another question, one that cannot be addressed here. 
11 FHS & G, fr. 72A. See Gottschalk 1990: 1089–97 for further discussion.   136 
hypothesis, but surely does leave the  way open for Diogenes to have known of 
Aristotle’s views. 
Aristotle’s views on music and its place in education are adumbrated in Book 
VIII of the Politics, within his discussion of a  proper education of the freeborn 
citizen.  His uses for mousikē were threefold: 
1.  For education – paideia; leading to 
2.  cultured exercise or leisure – diagōgē; and  
3.  for entertainment and relaxation – paidia – this was less important, and so 
on its own would not justify music forming part of a liberal education. 
For Aristotle, as for Plato, education is a matter of the public good, for the benefit of 
the state, and so is a matter that should rightly be subject to public supervision. 
Aristotle’s concerns are directed, as were Plato’s before him, towards free men and 
all education, in his view, is undertaken to habituate future citizens into a life of 
virtue. He shares with Plato, and as I will show, with Diogenes of Babylon also, the 
conception that character must be formed by habituation before the intellect can be 
instructed.
12  He  seeks  to  ensure  that  musical  education  pays  due  regard  to  its 
purpose, that is the cultivation and exercise of the virtues proper to leisure activity 
for  the  freeborn  citizen.  Music  is  for  him  one  of  those  pastimes  that  is  both 
practically useful and morally edifying (1337a42–b10), and whilst he believes that 
most people undertake music for the sake of pleasure, its original purpose would 
have been to enable them to develop their cognitive powers with a view to equipping 
them to engage properly in business of the state, but also to learn to occupy their 
leisure  time  in  a  noble  manner,  diagōgē.  The  emphasis  on  a  noble  manner  is 
important – for Aristotle it is the ‘first principle of all things’ (1337b30–3). Leisure 
too, is not play in the modern sense, but a ‘proper’ end for free-born men, a proper 
pastime; Anderson suggests that it is to be understood in this context as ‘more a way 
                                                 
12 For Plato, see e.g., Laws II. 653b–c: ‘In fact, if pleasure and the liking, pain and dislike are formed 
in the soul on the right lines before the age of understanding is reached, and when that age is reached, 
these feelings are in concord with understanding, thanks to early discipline in appropriate habits – 
this concord, regarded as a whole, is virtue,’ (trans. Taylor in Hamilton and Cairns 1989). Aristotle 
confirms his agreement at EN 2.3, 1104b10–12, saying ‘hence we ought to have been brought up in a 
particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the 
things  that  we  ought;  for  this  is  the  right  education.’  (trans.  Ross  in  Barnes  revised  Oxford 
translation.) For Diogenes’ view, see above, T4.1.   137 
of life’, not simply passing time in a trivial manner, and Aristotle’s concern for not 
making  future  citizens  ‘servile’  is  apparent (1337b21).  A  state’s  leisure  was  the 
‘central fact of existence for a fourth-century Greek eleutherios: he had no more 
important continuing problem than the proper handling of diagōgē’.
13 As stated in 
Politics VII, war is only for the sake of peace, occupation is for the sake of leisure, 
and  necessary  and  useful  things  for  the  sake  of  noble  things  (1333a33–6,  my 
emphasis). 
  At Politics VIII. 1337b23–8, Aristotle writes: 
 
[T5.i.1]  The branches of study at present established fall into both classes, as was 
said before. There are perhaps four customary subjects of education, reading and 
writing, gymnastics, music, and fourth, with some people, drawing. . .
14 
 
Diogenes of Babylon lists the same elements in his discussion of components for 
education at the beginning of column 27: 
 
[T5.i.2] || δ[. .]α[. . . . .  .]λικ[. . . . . σω- 
μ[α]τικῶι·  [τὸ] δὲ κα[λ]ῶς [καὶ 
χρησίμως κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ  
ἠρεμεῖν τῶι σώματι τῆς [γυ- 
μναστικῆς, καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τού- 
των τεταγμένας αἰσθήσεις 
κριτικὰς ποιεῖν·  ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς 
γραφικῆς τῆν ὄψιν διδάσκε- 
σθαι καλῶς κρινεῖν πολλὰ 
τῶν ὁρατῶν· τῆς δὲ μουσι- 
κῆς τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ἧ[τ- 
τον] τούτων ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ κα- 
                                                 
13 Anderson 1966: 270, n. 51. 
14 All translations of Aristotle’s Politics are those of Rackham in the Loeb edition, unless otherwise 
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λον μάλιστ᾽ ἐάν τις ἐπιβολ[ῇ 
ἀκουσ]τῆι χρῇται * 
 
Moreover,  the  beauty  and  utility  in  movement  and  rest  is  characterised  by  the 
healthy body in gymnastics, and also [the capacity to] render capable of discernment 
those senses which apply to these. Painting for its part, teaches the sense of sight to 
judge well many visible things. As for music, if it is less necessary than the others, 
its extreme beauty is obvious if it is seized by the ear.
15 
 
Delattre suggests that, ‘Le parallélisme des sujets et de la terminologie nous 
assure  que  Diogène  renvoyait  explicitement  ici  à  Aristote.’
16  Certainly  the 
terminology seems similar, and it might indeed suggest that Diogenes was referring 
to Aristotle’s writing here, although see above, chapter 3, pages 58–9 where there is 
also a suggestion that Aristoxenus might have been Diogenes’ source here. 
  For  Aristotle,  an  appropriate  education  in  music  will  not  only  assist  the 
student in judging good/appropriate music, just as studying drawing ‘also seems to 
be useful in making us better judges of the works of artists’ (1338a16–19),
17 but will 
aid  in  contemplation  and  may  lead  on  to  many  other  branches  of  knowledge 
(1338a40); and as Depew states: 
   
Contemplation is best conceived as an intensification of the learning (mathesis) that 
goes on in music, in the best regime, theoretical pursuits will be continuous with and 
to some extent will emerge naturally from musical pursuits. . . contemplation will be 
                                                 
15 See also discussion at chapter 3, pp. 58–9. 
16 Delattre 2007: vol. II, 340, n. 1. 
17  Although  Aristotle  draws  an  analogy  between  music  and  drawing  here,  he  clearly  does  not 
consider the two ‘arts’ of similar use. Drawing, he states, ‘makes a man observant of bodily beauty’ 
(1338b2–4).  Musical  likenesses  (representations  –  homoiōmata)  or  mimeseis  are  different  from 
artistic signs, or semeia, in figurative art, where ethos is concerned. With music it is a matter of 
nature  being  investigated  –  musical  homoiōmata  are  very  close  to  the  real  nature  of  the  ethical 
qualities to which they correspond (1340a19) and human beings have a natural instinct for the tones 
and rhythms. Aristotle seems to ascribe no or at least very few mimetic properties to figurative art 
where qualities of ethos and feelings are concerned. For more discussion on this, see Halliwell 2002: 
241, and my further discussion, below, pp. 147–9. See also now Woerther 2008, for a comparison 
between Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on music in education.   139 
regarded as the highest pursuit even by those. . . incapable of engaging in it. . . by 
virtue of the practical wisdom (phronesis) they can all be expected to have. 
                (Depew 1991: 347)
18 
 
Aristotle is concerned to emphasise that contemplation is as important an 
activity  in  the  well-ordered  state  as  active  politics,  for  unless  contemplation  is 
allowed and valued in its own right, correct political decisions will not be made, and 
it will not be possible to pursue ‘what is good in political life’.
19 Aristotle’s concerns 
with political science are also shown at EN X.9, 1181a14–20, where he declares the 
Sophists to be ‘altogether ignorant about the sort of thing political science is’, and 
emphasising the importance of ‘comprehension’ to enable correct judgement, which 
is the most important thing, ‘as it is in music’. This analogy between judgement in 
politics and that in music could suggest that he considers them to be of an equivalent 
importance, or, perhaps, of equivalent complexity. The ideals set down in Politics 
VII. 1–3
20 are best embodied in a state whose way of life centres on the cultivation 
and exercise of the virtues proper to leisure activity, especially the love of wisdom 
(1334a11–40).  
Aristotle states that an education in music will aid in character formation; it 
is capable of producing certain qualities of character (1339a25); it is a source of 
pleasure, as it is one of the pleasantest things, whether in verse alone, or with a 
melody (1339b21ff.
21); the pleasure that springs from it is perceptible to everyone, 
for the pleasure contained within it is of a natural kind (1340a1–5).  
At 1340b9–19, Aristotle asserts: 
 
[T5.i.3]  It is plain that music has the power of producing a certain effect on the 
moral character of the soul (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος) , and if it has the power to do this, it 
is clear that the young must be directed to music and must be educated in it. Also 
                                                 
18 In Keyt and Miller 1991. 
19 Depew 1991: 347. 
20 The best life, whether separately for an individual or collectively for states, is the life conjoined 
with virtue furnished with sufficient means for taking part in virtuous actions (1323b40–1324a2). In a 
happy state, citizens lead an active life (for happiness is activity of the soul in accord with virtue).   140 
education  is  well  adapted  to  the  youthful  nature,  for  the  young  cannot  endure 
anything  not  sweetened  by  pleasure,  and  music  is  by  nature  a  thing  that  has  a 
pleasant sweetness. And we seem to have a certain affinity with tunes and rhythms.
22 
 
Learning to take pleasure from the correct music will come from habituation, 
and the notion of the acquisition of ethical virtue by means of habituation can also 
be found in the Nicomachean Ethics 1103a17–18: 
 
[T5.i.4]  Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit (ἔθους), whence also its 
name is one that if formed by a slight variation from the word ‘habit’ (ἤθους).
23  
 
Nothing in the preceding two texts would differ in any way from Diogenes 
of Babylon’s musical philosophy, and Philodemus’ criticism in the De Musica
24  
would certainly seem to relate as much to Aristotle’s theory as to that of Diogenes.     
  Aristotle is concerned that children should actually take part in music and 
learn to play an instrument (although not the aulos (1341a17–19) nor any other 
professional instrument
25), for in his opinion, one cannot judge (music, or perhaps 
any of the arts?) unless one has taken part in it (1340b20–5). However, he does 
express a concern that the student should not become too skilled at playing because 
this  would  render  the  pastime  as  banausic  (1339a35–6;  1340b20–1341a9).  At 
1339a39–42 he appears to be testing this theory, because he suggests, ‘But if it is 
proper for them to labour at accomplishments of this sort, then it would also be right 
for them to prepare the dishes of an elaborate cuisine.’ He does not respond other 
than to say ‘but this is  absurd’ (1339a42), although he returns to the subject of 
engaging  with  the  activity  again  at  1340b35–40.
26  Here  he  asserts  that  active 
                                                                                                                                        
21 For further discussion of this passage, see below, pp. 142–5. 
22 For discussion on ‘natural affinity’ with music, see my chapter 2, section 2.iv. 
23 Trans. Ross and Urmson in Barnes 1995: 1742. 
24 Especially cols. 115 and 117 (T2.v.1a and T5.i.9); see also p. 82 above. 
25 For a discussion on why the aulos is not suitable for the free-born, see above, pp. 105–8. 
26 The analogy between music and cooking is also used to great effect by Philodemus at col. 117 
Delattre, where he suggests that music had no more similarity to moral feelings than does cookery. 
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participation  is  much  more  effective  than  passive  exposure,  although  once  the 
student reaches maturity he should be released from the need to participate, because 
by then he will have acquired sufficient skill to be able to judge correctly, and it is 
necessary to avoid the risk of being accused of being a banausos. This implies a 
definite cognitive element, it also implies acquisition of a theoretical knowledge of 
the music, although unlike Plato, Aristotle does not go into detail in his discussion 
of the music which he considers to be appropriate for education, merely stating that 
the music must be appropriate or suitable. He states that the Dorian mode ‘alone 
provokes greatest composure’ (1340b4). He does concede some usefulness in the 
Phrygian mode, but not in education. At 1342b12–17, he concludes ‘All agree that 
the Dorian mode is more sedate and of a specially manly character. . . it is clear that 
it suits the younger pupils to be educated rather in Dorian melodies.’  
At  1341b25–30  he  explains  why  he  does  not  go  into  the  details  of  his 
reasoning: 
 
[T5.i.5]  Now, we consider that much is well said on these matters by some of the 
musicians of the present day and by some of those who are engaged in philosophy 
who happen to be experienced in musical education, and we will leave the precise 
discussion as to each of these matters for any who wish it to seek it from those 
teachers, while for the present let us lay down general principles.   
 
            Just who these musicians are is not known; Lord suggests it is probably 
Aristoxenus,
27 but it could also perhaps be any one of Theophrastus, Archestratus or 
Heraclides of Pontus.
28 I am not at all sure that it could be Aristoxenus, as his extant 
writings do not suggest so great an interest in the uses of music in education.  
  It is clear throughout Aristotle’s discussion of music, however, that he does 
                                                 
27 Lord 1982. See below, pp. 173–88 for discussion of Aristoxenus’ writings. 
28 Anderson (1966: 129–30) suggests Damon of Athens, but Aristotle’s words suggest to me rather a 
contemporary of his, and both Heraclides and Theophrastus are known to have written works on 
music. Archestratus, a little-known musician of the mid-fourth century mentioned by Philodemus, 
and referred to later by Porphyry, is another possibility, although so little of his writing has been 
preserved that it is probably impossible to make any confident assertion. For discussion of these   142 
believe in music’s ability to affect the character. He states at 1340a8 that:  
     
[T5.i.6]  [W]e come to be of a certain sort [of character] both by the many other 
kinds of music and not least by the melodies of Olympus [Phrygian mode
29].     
          (Trans Rackham, with emendation) 
 
And at 1340a40–1: 
 
[T5.i.7]    [P]ieces  of  music  on  the  contrary  do  actually  contain  .  .  .  imitations 
(mimēmata)  of  character;  and  this  is  manifest,  for  even  in  the  nature  of  mere 
melodies there are differences. 
 
            These beliefs are repeated in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems. At XIX.27, 
the writer asks, ‘Why is what is heard the only object of perception that possesses 
moral character? For every tune, even if it has no words, has nevertheless character,’ 
and Problem XIX. 29 asks, ‘Why do rhythm and tune, which are only an emission 
of  the  voice,  resemble  moral  character?’  Problem  XIX.  38  asks,  ‘Why  does 
everyone enjoy rhythm and tune, and in general all consonances? . . . We enjoy 
different types of song for their moral character, but we enjoy rhythm because it has 
a recognised and orderly numerical arrangement and carries us along in an orderly 
fashion.’ 
I am not suggesting that the Problems are Aristotelian, but it is generally 
believed that they were written by one or more members of the Peripatetic school, 
and they surely echo Aristotle’s beliefs about music in his Politics.
30  The question 
of  whether  it  is  instrumental  music  that  is  being  discussed,  or  music  as  an 
accompaniment to words, or even mousikē in its broadest sense – liberal studies 
                                                                                                                                        
philosophers and their likelihood of being those referred to by Aristotle, see below, pp. 154–72. For 
more on Damon, see above chapter 4, and below pp. 169–70. 
29 For Olympus’ tunes being in the Phrygian mode, see Plutarch De Musica 1137B and Plato Symp. 
215c. Olympus was a famous aulete from Phrygia, and the Phrygian mode, in which he played his 
tunes, was named for his native country. 
30 I will return to a discussion of the Problems below, where I will briefly compare the terminology 
used with Diogenes’ own words.   143 
generally  –  is  always  one  that  needs  to  be  considered.  Aristotle  certainly  uses 
different  words  in  his  discussion  for  music,  varying  from  mousikē,  to  melos, 
rhuthmos and harmonia. Whilst it must be conceded that he more often talks of 
mousikē  seemingly  to  denote  music  generally,  he  does  on  occasion  specifically 
mention music without words in the context of moral character, as is also the case in 
the  Problems.  I  think  it  is  clear  that  Aristotle  uses  the  word  mousikē  in  three 
different senses in his discussion: 
1.  When using it in oppositon to gumnastikē he uses it in the inclusive 
way to denote music and the liberal arts (I believe there is only one 
occurrence of this use in Politics VIII); 
2.  As harmony and words – the most common usage in his discussion; 
3.  Finally, and less frequently, as harmony without words.  
Andrew Ford argues that in fact Aristotle uses mousikē throughout book VIII 
to denote harmony and words without the other liberal arts,
31 and to a certain extent I 
agree with him, but Ford’s intention stated at the very outset of his chapter is ‘to put 
the music back into Politics 8’, and so he will have been seeking evidence to aid that 
intent.
32 
At 1340a13–14 the text states ‘when listening to mimeseis, everyone feels a 
sympathetic  response,  and  [or  even]  apart  from  the  rhythms  and  melodies 
themselves’. Susemihl emended this to read ‘everyone feels a sympathetic response 
through the rhythms and melodies themselves, even apart from [the words]’.
33 The 
Greek words used by Aristotle here are rhuthmos and melos, and the argument to 
accept Susemihl’s emendation seems to me very persuasive, particularly as Aristotle 
has  just  mentioned  the  ‘melodies  of  Olympus’  (1340a9–10),  and  Olympus  was 
                                                 
31 Ford 2004: 309–36 passim. 
32 Ibid., 309.  
33 Susemihl-Hicks 1894 [1976]. The Loeb translator notes Susemihl’s emendation, but does not use 
it.  Halliwell  2002:  244  states,  ‘we  are  virtually  obliged  to  accept  the  thrust  of  Susemihl’s 
emendation’, and continues ‘Without his textual emendation, it remains opaque why Aristotle, when 
trying to show that music can change its hearers psychologically, would wish here to cite the power 
of words to elicit emotional sympathy independently of rhythms and melodies.’ Kraut 1997: 42, 194–
5, however, translates the passage as ‘everyone who listens to representations comes to have similar 
emotions, even apart from the rhythms and melodies of those representations’, with none bracketed. 
He makes no mention of Susemihl’s emendation and goes on to say, ‘even if we were to strip away 
rhythm and melody what remains (i.e., words) contain a likeness of emotions’.    144 
known as a composer for the aulos.
34 As the aulete could not sing at the same time as 
playing, this would seem to imply music without words. The three Problems quoted 
above are also quite specific – mousikē is not used at all in those contexts, but rather 
melos and rhuthmos only. 
            Halliwell cites 1339b21 as further evidence of Aristotle’s acknowledgement 
of the power of unaccompanied music.
  35 The line reads ‘τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες 
εἶναί φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας. . . ’ Presumably he 
is reading the word psilos as bare music, as I too was hoping to do, but have been 
persuaded by Lord (1982: 86) and Anderson (1966) that psilos here in fact refers to 
‘bare words’ unaccompanied by music. Barker 1984: 174 translates this line as ‘We 
all say that music is one of the pleasantest things, whether it is purely instrumental 
or accompanied by song.’ Andrew Ford also translates psilos as ‘bare music’ stating 
in his accompanying note ‘The passage is distorted by Lord. . . who incredibly, 
glosses mousikēn psilēn as poetry unaccompanied by music’.
36 Ford is not convinced 
by Lord’s argument that the normal way of referring to instrumental music would 
have been psilē kitharisis te kai aulēsis or kitharistikē.
37 However I am inclined to 
agree with Lord and Anderson, and translate ‘. . . bare poetry or accompanied by 
song’, even if it must be conceded that the usage here does seem very unclear, and 
scholars clearly still disagree about the exact meaning in this passage. LSJ, s.v. 
psilos  IV.3  also  quotes  this  very  passage  translating  as  instrumental  music 
unaccompanied  by  the  voice;  and  Kraut  translates  as  ‘music.  .  .  unadorned  or 
accompanied by singing’.
38 But, Aristotle uses the word mousikē here; generally 
when he is talking about instrumental music, I  believe he more commonly uses 
melos, rhuthmos, harmonia. Whilst I fully concur that Aristotle is clearly discussing 
music without the liberal arts at 1339b21, I do believe that elsewhere he chooses to 
                                                 
34 See above n. 29, and e.g., [Plutarch] De Musica 1133E; Plato, Symp. 215c. 
35 Halliwell 2002: 244, n. 21. See also note 38 below, for Plato’s use of psilos in the same context, 
i.e., words without music, at Symp. 215c–d. But I happily concur with Halliwell’s continuation, ‘it is 
wrong to think…that Aristotle (and others) did not conceive of music at all as a separate art’. 
36 Ford 2004: 318, and esp. n. 32. 
37 Lord 1982: 86 and n. 28, citing Plato’s Laws 669e1–2 and, more relevantly, Aristotle’s  Poet. 
1447a15, 24. For more discussion on these passages, see below, n. 39.   145 
distinguish between mousikē as harmony and words and melos and/or rhuthmos in 
the  specific  sense.    At  1341b23–4  he  defines  mousikē  as  ‘consisting  of  the 
composition of tunes and rhythms’ (ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν). 
And given that Aristotle uses mousikē (in the inclusive sense, I believe) as the other 
discipline  in  education  to  complement  gumnastikē,  then  surely  if  he  wanted  to 
specify unaccompanied music, he would have used melos, tune, which is much less 
ambiguous.
39  But,  whichever  meaning  is  to  be  applied  in  the  context  here,  it 
nonetheless  confirms  that  music  not  accompanying  words  was  a  subject  of 
discussion  just  as  was  music  with  words.  Music  without  words  is  specifically 
referred  to  from  1340a38–9,  where  Aristotle  asserts,  ‘there  are  imitations  of 
character in the tunes themselves’ (ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν 
ἠθῶν). This is important for my purposes, because in the De Musica Philodemus 
continually  either  implies  that  Diogenes  is  confusing  ‘words  set  to,  and 
accompanied by music’ with ‘unaccompanied poetry’, or asserts that it is only the 
words that accompany the music that can have any effect. As shown, particularly in 
the section where I look at Plato’s influence on Diogenes, I argue that Diogenes also 
makes claims for instrumental music. I am not suggesting that Diogenes makes these 
claims for instrumental music only, or even most of the time, but in a few instances, 
I believe it is clear that he is discussing purely instrumental music, i.e., music that 
was never intended to be accompanied by, or indeed to be the accompaniment (and 
therefore secondary) to, words.  
                                                                                                                                        
38 Kraut 1997: 42. Kraut glosses at p. 191 ‘I take unadorned music to consist in playing an instrument 
unaccompanied by the voice. Contrast Lord (1982), 86.’ But he does not discuss any further. 
39 The use of psilos with mousikē here  is  interesting. Lord, above (1982: 86) cites a number of 
passages as evidence of the use of psilos being predominantly associated with words ‘bare of music’. 
But what is clear from the examples is that the word attached to psilos is usually more explicit. At 
Aristotle’s Poetics 1447a29, the words are Ἡ δὲ [ἐποποιία] μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις 
meaning bare words, i.e., prose rather than verse; at Plato Symp. 215c the words are similarly psilois 
logois; at Menexenus 239c they are logoi psiloi; at Phaedrus 278c3 they are poiesin psilen. As I will 
discuss below, Philodemus also uses psilos in a more exact context. The word occurs five times in the 
extant text of the De Musica, always attached to an unambiguous word: logous, kitharisei, aulesin kai 
kitharisin, logou psilou, mele. I can find no other instance, in that work, of it being attached to such a 
general word as mousikē.   146 
Warren Anderson states in a note to his discussion on Aristotle’s view on 
sound as a medium in the De Anima:
40 
   
Both Plato and Aristotle contend that music is the great medium of ethos.
41 One 
view is that such sound in itself has no ethos. If we grant this, however, Plato’s 
annoyed concern over animal imitations and the like in music would seem to be 
baseless. The explanation may be that anything at all may take on potential ethical 
force, once it has been transmuted into musical terms for in music the two types of 
sound are often very closely intermingled. We know that a musical sound, i.e., a 
tone has a regular pattern of vibration frequencies, while a non-musical sound is 
identifiable as such because its pattern lacks regularity. Though Aristotle could not 
have known this, Kahl (1902, 52–3) believes that his exceptionally keen aesthetic 
sense nevertheless brought him some presentiment. Prb. 19.27 speaks of the kinesis 
that is consequent upon a tone and is perceived by the listener. According to Kahl, 
[Aristotle] means that there are tones of a class which not only please the ear, but 
also rouse in us a consciously experienced emotion, and that it is just these which 
are musical notes. 
 
 
  Although Kahl’s view that the Problems were written by Aristotle is now 
outdated, this does not also render his interpretation of the ancient writer’s aesthetic 
sense outdated. As mentioned above, Aristotle says nothing in Book VIII of the 
Politics that disagrees with the Problems quoted above, in fact the very same views 
are expressed. Frustratingly, however, Aristotle does not go into any detail, but it is 
quite possible that he either intended to, or in fact did write more on music,
42 and it 
is probable that he would have intended to set down his explanations for this very 
                                                 
40 Anderson 1966: 260, n. 2. 
41  But  see  now  Woerther  (2008:  89–103,  at  89),  who  suggests,  wrongly  in  my  view,  that  only 
Aristotle speaks of ēthos  in the context of musical education.  
42 See, e.g., Lord 1982: 204. It is suggested that 1339a11 might be the title of a separate book that 
was either never finished, or that has become separated from its remainder, which has been lost. The 
first few words, Peri de mousikēs could indeed be a new title; however the ensuing discussion does 
not run on awkwardly from what has gone on before.    147 
strong statement. Halliwell analyses Aristotle’s theory as follows: 
 
[T]he mimesis entails something like a kinetic or dynamic correspondence between 
the use of rhythms, tunings and melodies on the one hand, and the psychological 
states  and  feelings  belonging  to  qualities  of  ‘character’  on  the  other:  the  music 
‘moves’ emotionally, and we ‘move’ with   it.
43 
 
            At De anima 408b1–33, Aristotle discusses movements of the soul according 
to its state – sad/happy, cheerful/fearful. Halliwell further suggests a link here with 
Damonian theory as cited by Athenaeus Deipn. xiv, 628:  
 
[T5.i.8]  With good reason Damon of Athens and his school say that songs (ᾠδᾶς) 
and dances are the result of the soul’s being in a kind of motion; those songs which 




There are two distinct but very important points here: 
1.  The notion of imitations of character within the songs themselves; and  
2.  the ability of the songs themselves to move the soul. 
Although the implication here is that this involves words set to music, both points 
form very much a part of Diogenes of Babylon’s musical philosophy, and both are 
very heavily criticised by Philodemus. 
   At column 117, 23–28 Philodemus states: 
  
[T5.i.9]           οὐ- 
δὲ γὰρ μιμητικὸν ἡ μου- 
σική, καθάπερ τι[ν]ὲς ὀνει- 
ρώττουσιν, οὐδ ᾽ , [ὡς] οὖτος, ὁ- 
                                                 
43 Halliwell 2002: 245. 
44 This view is also echoed by Plato in Rep. 400–2, where Damon is also cited as an authority. For 
more on Damon and his possible influence on Diogenes and these matters generally, see above, pp. 
120–6.   148 
μοιότη[τα]ς ἠθῶν, οὐ μιμη- 
τικὰς δέ 
for  music  is  not  at  all  something  able  to  imitate,  as  some  dream,  nor,  as  our 
adversary claims, does it contain likenesses of characters which are not imitations.
45  
 
For  Philodemus,  therefore,  music  is  neither  mimetic,  nor  does  it  contain 
likenesses of character. Diogenes clearly believed, as did Aristotle before him, that 
music contained ‘likenesses’ that are not mimetic, as opposed to what Halliwell 
terms ‘nonmimetic “signs” or indices’.
46 This seems rather different from Plato’s 
claim, examined above, chapter 4, that the music could somehow sound like the 
character to which it is related, in for example Republic III. 399a, where he states 
‘leave us that mode that would fittingly imitate the utterances and the accents of a 
brave man’.
47 
  Diogenes uses ὅμοιος and ὁμοιότης rather than μίμησις here, as Aristotle 
also does at Politics VIII. 1340a19–20: 
 
[5.i.10] Rhythms and melodies contain representations (ὁμοιώματα) of anger and 
mildness and . . .the other moral qualities. 
 
   Although  it  has  to  be  conceded  that  Plato  also  uses  ὅμοιοτης  in  other 
contexts, there would appear to be more similarity between Aristotle and Diogenes 
than Plato and Diogenes in usage. In his discussion of Aristotle’s meaning, Halliwell 
explains: 
 
Correlates  of  ethical  qualities  exist  in  rhythms  and  melodies  in  a  sense  not 
predicable  by  visual  art.  .  .  paintings  and  sculptures  can  convey.  .  .  features  of 
character . . . indications which fall short of ethical qualities, e.g., a painting might 
give evidence of  characters of those involved. . . The qualities of music on the other 
                                                 
45 Probably responding to the very lacunose column 36. See Delattre 2007: vol. II, 409, although 
Philodemus uses the word μουσική here rather than ᾠδή. 
46 Halliwell 2002: 242.   149 
hand . . . have a direct communicative effect on the mind and the emotions of the 
(appropriately receptive) hearer.
48   
 
Halliwell  moves  on  to  say  that  the  hearer  ‘doesn’t  infer  that  the  music 
embodies certain ethical traits, but seems to experience appropriate feelings as a 
necessary part of attending the music: the listener’s mind is “changed” in the very 
act of listening’. For Philodemus, music, as a mere sound, cannot have such an 
effect.  He  argues  that  everyone  will  hear  the  music  in  the  same  way,  just  as 
everyone  will  experience  taste  in  the  same  way,  thus  simplifying  it  to  mere 
comparison with taste and smell – purely sensory, with no cognitive element. He 
states that music is no more capable of imitating moral character than is cookery.
49 
He makes no mention of personal preference here, although the way is clear for him 
to do so, but once again to discuss preference would require the admission of some 
cognitive element. 
  At column 36, Diogenes also states that music can arouse the soul from a 
state of inactivity and draw it towards a natural disposition, but that it could also 
bring it from a state of excitement into a state of calm, a claim once again ridiculed 
by Philodemus.
50 Both the claim that music is in itself kinetic, and that it contains 
‘non-mimetic likenesses’ are also made in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, and 
in particular at Prb. XIX.27 and 29: 
 
                                                                                                                                        
47 Trans Shorey in the Loeb edition. 
48 Halliwell 2002: 242–3. 
49 Halliwell 2002: 255 remarks, ‘ the rhetoric of the comparison with tastes and odors betrays a 
failure on Philodemus’s part to see why a model of music as mere auditory stimulus cannot begin to 
do justice  to the emotional value  attached  to it  in the Greek (or any other)  tradition’, but  as  an 
Epicurean, he would probably have refused to recognize such a value – music for him was alogos, 
and hence could only affect the irrational sense, i.e. the ear. Neubecker in the commentary to her 
earlier edition observed that Philodemus betrays his view of music with this analogy. She writes, ‘For 
him it stood on just the same level as the arts that minister to the other senses, e.g., cookery, which 
works upon our sense of taste.’ Anderson states, ‘Here. . . [Philodemus] tacitly bases himself on the 
older Greek estimate of the artist, an attitude which had been generally overcome in the Hellenistic 
period. It will be noted that the attempt to ridicule musical ethos by means of this analogy is one 
which we have already seen in Aristotle’s acknowledgment of opposition views.’ Anderson 1966: 
283, n. 37, and Neubecker apud Anderson ibid. Aristotle’s acknowledgement occurs at Pol. VIII. 
1339a ff., see my discussion above at p. 140 this chapter.  
50 Col. 117.2–26. See above, chapter 3, pp. 82–3.   150 
[T5.i.11]  Prb. XIX.27 
διὰ  τί  τὸ  ἀκουστὸν  μόνον  ἦθος  ἔχει  τῶν  αἰσθητῶν;  καὶ  γὰρ  ἐὰν  ᾖ  ἄνευ  λόγου 
μέλος, ὅμως ἔχει ἦθος·  ἀλλ ᾽  οὐ τὸ χρῶμα οὐδὲ ἡ ὀσμὴ οὐδὲ ὁ χυμὸς ἔχει. ἢ ὅτι 
κίνησιν ἔχει μόνον, οὐχι ἣν ὁ ψόφος ἡμᾶς κινεῖ; τοιαύτη μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἅλλοις 
ὑπάρχει· κινεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸ χρῶμα τὴν ὄψιν· ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑπομένης τῷ τοιούτῳ ψόφῳ 
αἰσθανόμεθα κινήσεως. αὕτη δὲ ἔχει ὁμοιότητα ἔν τε τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν 
φθόγγων τάξει τῶν ὀξέων καὶ βαρέων, οὐκ ἐν τῇ μίξει. ἀλλ ᾽ ἡ συμφωνία οὐκ ἔχει 
ἦθος.
51 ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰσθητοῖς τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν. αἱ δὲ κινήσεις αὗται πρακτικαί 
εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἤθους σημασιά ἐστίν. 
 
Why is what is heard the only object of perception which possesses moral character? 
For  every  tune,  even  if  it  has  no  words,  has  nevertheless  character;  but  neither 
colour, smell nor flavour have it. Is it because sound alone has movement, though 
not of course the movement which it produces in us? For movement of this kind 
exists in other senses too, for colour moves our sight; but we are conscious of the 
movement which follows such and such a sound. This movement has a semblance 
[of moral character] both by the time and by the arrangement of the higher and 
lower sounds, but not in their mixture. Consonance
52 has no moral character. This 
character does not exist in the other perceptibles. But the movements with which we 




As  Andrew  Barker  states,  the  resemblances  between  the  Problem  and 
Diogenes’ passage ‘seem altogether too striking to be coincidental’.
54 Barker goes 
                                                 
51 Forster (1927) surely mistranslates here; he writes ‘for symphony does possess moral character’. 
The οὐκ appears not to have been translated.  
52 ‘Consonance’ (sumphonia) here probably means a number of notes played together. The double 
aulos could play one note underneath the musical line, and this may be what is being referred to here; 
or, of course, multiple notes on more than one instrument. The moral character lies in the consonance 
between  the  individual notes  in  the scale. See  also  Barker 1984: 197, n. 55: ‘moral  character  is 
represented by movement from note to note, not by notes played simultaneously’. 
53  For  strikingly  similar  language  see  below  my  discussion  of  extract  T5.v.9,  an  extract  from 
[Plutarch] De Musica, which has been identified by some scholars as deriving from Aristoxenus. 
54 Barker 2001: 363.   151 
on to remark, ‘All of the major ingredients of Diogenes’ theory seem to be present 
in this passage, along with pivotal elements of his terminology.’
55 
  The Problem states that every tune, even if it has no words, possesses ēthos, 
a claim implied by Diogenes at column 51, T4.13 above.  Melody (melos) is kinetic, 
and the kinēsis in the melody contains homoiōtes – likeness, not imitation, of ēthos. 
As mentioned above, both Diogenes and [Aristotle] use the word homoios or its 
derivatives, and Diogenes actually specifies ‘likenesses which are not imitations’ 
(column 117, 23–8). And as argued above in chapter 2, it is the movement of the 
harmonic line itself that both contains and communicates the likeness of ēthos, and 
thus  inspires  movement,  not  the  individual  notes  themselves,  which,  heard  in 
isolation would have no meaning at all.  
  As Barker further states, ‘It would be unreasonable to doubt that the theory 
of this Problem and the theory of Diogenes are intimately related to one another, and 
the Problem unquestionably enriches our understanding of Diogenes.’
56 The theories 
outlined in both the Problem and in Diogenes’ own writing certainly seem to have a 
common view – unfortunately neither go far enough to make the treatment fully 
explained. The Problem does, however, help to explain why Diogenes’ theory was 
not as ridiculous as Philodemus claimed, and why the latter’s attempt to view music 
on a par with cookery was not justified. 
 
(i.i) Music and Catharsis 
It is necessary to address the subject of musical catharsis, because several scholars
57 
have  suggested  that  Diogenes  of  Babylon  might  have  adapted  the  theory  that 
musical catharsis could contribute to virtue to his own musical philosophy. Much 
has been written regarding Aristotle’s theory of tragic catharsis and its relevance to 
the notion of ethos/character within music, and, thus, in education,
58 but I want to 
argue that neither Aristotle nor Diogenes believed that catharsis had any place in 
                                                 
55 Barker 2001: 363–9 at 363. 
56 2001: 365. 
57 E.g., Zagdoun 2007: 95; Janko 1992: 127. 
58 For example, Lord 1982; Janko 1987 and 1992b; Delattre 2007.   152 
education.  Thus,  I  would  support  Ford’s  view  that  it  simply  does  not  apply.
59 
Aristotle’s theory of education is surely directed, in the first instance at any rate, at 
the young. At Politics 1341a17–24, Aristotle states quite clearly that one of the 
reasons he will not allow the aulos into schools is that ‘it has rather an exciting 
influence so that it ought to be used for occasions of the kind at which attendance 
has the effect of purification rather than education’ (my emphasis). The context of 
Politics Book VIII is education, and purification is only mentioned on a couple of 
occasions,  and  both  times  it  is  clearly  distinguished  from  ‘education’.  Whilst 
Aristotle certainly argues for the use of all types of music, he clearly believes that 
different types of music should be used in different situations. At 1341b37–9, where 
he states that music ought to be employed not for the purposes of one benefit that it 
confers, ‘but on account of several (for it serves the purpose both of education and 
purgation  [katharsis]  –  the  term  purgation  we  use  for  the  present  without 
explanation,  but  we  will  return  to  discuss  the  meaning  that  we  give  to  it  more 
explicitly in our treatise on poetry – and thirdly it serves for amusement . . .)’. Here 
he has once again given the music three distinct uses, and he goes on to say that ‘we 
should not employ all “the harmonies” in the same way’. Once again, therefore, he 
has distinguished the cathartic melodies from the ‘ethical’ melodies. Whilst catharsis 
is  mentioned  regularly  in  the  Poetics,  in  the  context  of  performance,  this  is  a 
different medium. In the context of education, at Politics VIII. 1341b32–1342a18, 
Aristotle is surely emphasising the importance of moulding the young characters by 
habituation – that is by habitual exposure to the right melodies and tunes, not those 
that excite, but those which create the right movements of the soul, and instil in the 
students a ‘proper’ character. At 1342a18–28, he remarks that what gives pleasure to 
the educated isn’t the same as what gives pleasure to the uneducated, and that one 
should make allowances for this in criticising entertainment. Cathartic melodies are 
fine in tragedy, but the place for such music is the theatre, and not the schoolroom. 
Jonathan Lear has given a very clear account of the most ‘sophisticated view 
of catharsis, which has been powerfully argued in recent years’.
60 He writes that it 
                                                 
59 Ford 2004: 325–7. 
60 Lear 1988: 297–326, at 303.   153 
has been argued that catharsis could contribute to education of the emotions – an 
ethical education consists in training youths to take pleasure or pain in the right sort 
of objects. If Aristotle did admit catharsis into his education, the argument goes, 
then perhaps tragedy helps us to better understand the world, and thereby gain a 
deeper  insight  into  the  human  condition.
61  Aristotle  did  concede  that  it  was  not 
necessary to attend a performance of tragedy – reading the text should be sufficient 
to feel the effects.
62 However, Lear argues strongly that this is still wrong for two 
reasons: 
1.  A virtuous person will experience the catharsis, but he does not need 
further education; and 
2.  The  Politics’  discussion  of  music  distinguishes  music  that  is 
educative from that which produces catharsis, as argued above. 
Therefore, whilst musical catharsis is fine for the theatre, and might be the subject of 
enjoyment for all, as Aristotle seems to recognise that everyone takes a particular 
pleasure from tragic catharsis, it will not fit into his educational curriculum insofar 
as ethical education is concerned. 
I would take this still further in respect of Diogenes of Babylon – I cannot 
see how the introduction of the notion of catharsis into a Stoic ethical account of the 
emotions can be at all plausible.
63 As argued in my chapter 2, pp. 34–6, and n. 52, 
Janko’s argument rested heavily on his own insertion of the Greek ἐκστάσεις in line 
12 of column 18 for Delattre’s αἰσθήσις, and the argument that any ‘enjoyments, 
emotions,  and  sensations’  would  be  irrational,  against  which  I  argued  there. 
However, the Greek word κάθαρσις nowhere appears in the Philodemian text as it 
has come down to us, nor any apparent argument for or against it. I would suggest 
that had there be any suggestion of such a notion, Philodemus would have railed as 
strongly  against  that  as  he  does  Diogenes’  belief  in  music’s  kinetic  power,  as 
discussed in chapter 2. 
 
                                                 
61 Lear 1988: 303–4. 
62 Poetics 1450b18–19; 1453b4–7; 1462a11–12. 
63 Pace Janko 1992a and b; Zagdoun 2007.   154 




Very little is known about Archestratus of Gela. A mid fourth-century poet, the main 
evidence  for  him  is  contained  in  Athenaeus’  Deipnosophistai,  and  this  largely 
comprises fragments from Archestratus’ poem The Life of Luxury. That work is 
concerned  with  food,  more  primarily  ‘the  [selection]  and  purchase  of  the  best 
produce  that  could  be  found’,
64  and  as  such  does  not  contain  any  evidence  for 
Archestratus’ musical theories. 
  More useful evidence in this context is to be found within Philodemus’ De 
Musica Book IV, column 137 Delattre, and reads as follows: 
 
[T5.ii.1]  The followers of Archestratus, who say that issues about the natures 
of sound and notes and intervals  and similar things are philosophical  aspects of 
music,  were  quite  intolerable,  not  only  because  they  set  off  into  a  thoroughly 
extraneous  domain  of  theory,  and  babbled  childishly  about  these  things  with  no 
benefit to knowledge, but also because they represented music as no more than study 
of these matters. (Trans Barker 1989) 
 
The only other definite mention of the philosopher thus far found is in Porphyry’s 
Commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics. 26.6–29, where Porphyry cites the writings 
of Didymus ‘the musician’, an author of significant harmonic writings.
65 He states: 
   
[T5.ii.2] And there are others who give a place to both perception and reason [in 
music],  but  who  give  some  sort  of  precedence  to  reason:  one  of  these  is 
Archestratus.      (Trans Barker 1989) 
                                                 
64  For  this  work,  see  Athenaeus  Book  VII,  or  Archestratus,  The  Life  of  Luxury,  translated  with 
introduction and commentary by John Wilkins and Shaun Hill, 1994 (Prospect books). Quotation 
from Wilkins and Hill 1994: 30.  
65 Ptolemy’s description in Harm. Book II. Not much is known about Didymus apart from references 
in Ptolemy and Porphyry. Barker suggests (OCD s.vv. that he might be the Suda’s son of Heraklides 
the Younger, ‘a grammarian and musician in Neronian times’.   155 
 
Barker comments,
66 ‘These remarks show plainly that Archestratus was a devotee of 
musical theory rather than practice, and that he was no Aristoxenian.’ As will be 
shown in section 5.v, Aristoxenus, whilst giving a place to perception and reason, 
argued that ‘they should keep abreast of each other’, neither taking precedence.
67 
This  is  interesting,  because  by  the  time  of  Archestratus,  most  musical  theorists 
followed one of two schools of thought: the Pythagorean / mathematician school, or 
the Aristoxenian school. However, it seems clear from the writings of Didymus that 
there was a further group, who, as Barker suggests, were ‘too rationalistic in [their] 
approach to fall into the latter group, but too empirical to fit into the former group’.
68 
I will argue that there is very little, if any Aristoxenian theory contained within 
Diogenes’ music theory either. 
The citation in Philodemus’ work is particularly interesting because it comes 
within the author’s criticism of Diogenes of Babylon’s musical theory, and therefore 
implies that it is answering a statement made by Diogenes. However, there is no 
mention  of  Archestratus  within  the  extant  columns  of  Diogenes’  thought.  He  is 
mentioned  in  column  137,  as  stated  above,  just  before  Philodemus  answers 
Diogenes’  claims  regarding  Heraclides  of  Pontus.  If  Philodemus  is  answering 
Diogenes’ points in the same order as his opponent’s, as he often does, as can be 
seen from the parallels identified by Delattre, Archestratus should be mentioned just 
before the discussion of Heraclides in column 49,
69 where there is a lacuna of some 
fifteen lines, following a discussion of how good the study of music was to the 
intelligence, and the claim that musicians were almost akin to the kritikoi only in the 
subject of music.
70 
                                                 
66 Barker 1989: 243, n. 153. 
67 See below, extract T5.v.11. 
68 Barker 2001: 366. 
69 Although it must be conceded that here Heraclides’ name is supplied by Delattre on the basis of 
the parallel passage in Philodemus’ critique (col. 137, l. 30). Here only part of the name can be read 
(Ἡρα). The restitution does appear safe, however; see my discussion on restoration of text, chapter 2, 
pp. 11–12. 
70 De Musica col. 48, ll. 22–6 Delattre, on which, see my discussion in chapter 6, pp. 206 ff.   156 
  The context would, therefore, seem to be appropriate for a theorist such as 
Archestratus to be introduced, but if he was, none of the discussion remains, only  
(perhaps) the criticism thereof. Given Diogenes’ provision for ‘knowing perception’ 
in column 34, as discussed in my chapter 2, pages 36 ff., and Porphyry’s mention of 
Archestratus in the context of perception and reason above, it seems quite feasible 
that  Archestratus  might  have  been  one  of  the  musical  philosophers  with  whom 
Diogenes shared some sympathies. Archestratus also seems to be qualified to be one 
‘of  those  engaged  in  philosophy  who  happen[s]  to  be  experienced  in  musical 
education’ mentioned by Aristotle at 1341b25–30. It seems impossible to be able to 





(iii) Heraclides of Pontus 
 
In his commentary on Aristotle’s Politics VIII. 1341b25, where Aristotle has left to 
the philosophers who are also engaged in musical education the details of which 
modes are or are not suitable for use in the realm of education, Kraut suggests that 
Aristotle is referring to either Theophrastus or Aristoxenus.
71 Kraut does not appear 
to entertain Heraclides as a possibility, although Heraclides would appear to have 
been a closer contemporary of Aristotle, and, in Cicero Laws III.14, is apparently 
regarded as on a par with Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus, at least as a writer on 
political philosophy.  
Rather more is known of Heraclides of Pontus than of Archestratus. Attested 
by Diogenes Laertius at Book V, 86–94, and floruit (probably)
72 around 360 BC, he 
was a pupil of Speusippus, and later of Aristotle, probably whilst Aristotle was still 
at the Academy.
73 Further, Heraclides stood for, but was defeated by Xenocrates for 
                                                 
71 1997: 206. 
72 Although see Gottschalk’s comments on Heraclides’ dates below, p. 157. 
73 D.L. V.86.   157 
the scholarchate of the Academy in 339BC following the death of Speusippus,
74 so 
he must have been in a position of some seniority. Diogenes Laertius attests that he 
wrote two books on music, but a third book is mentioned by Athenaeus, in which 
Heraclides discussed the number and characters of the true Greek modes.
75 Although 
Plutarch clearly regarded Heraclides primarily as a musical historian, the fact that he 
is attacked by Philodemus for his views on musical ethos indicates that he was much 
more than this, and like Archestratus, must be considered as a likely candidate to be 
one  of  Aristotle’s  philosophers  with  a  musical  interest,  and  almost  certainly  an 
influence on Diogenes of Babylon’s musical philosophy.  
Gottschalk  notes  some  discrepancy  amongst  the  sources  regarding 
Heraclides’ relationship to Plato, Aristotle and their schools, which also places some 
doubt  about  Heraclides’  exact  dates.
76  The  discrepancy  is  not  important  in  the 
context  of  this  thesis,  apart  from  one  point,  as  whichever  sources  are  correct, 
Heraclides will not move significantly in historical time, and so the order of possible 
influence on Diogenes will not change. It is reported in various sources, amongst 
which Diogenes Laertius (V. 92), that Chamaeleon, a ‘compatriot who probably 
joined the Peripatos in Athens’,
77 complained that Heraclides had plagiarised him in 
his own works on Homer and Hesiod. This is interesting, because both Heraclides 
and Chamaeleon are mentioned by name both by Diogenes of Babylon, at column 
49,  and  by  Philodemus,  at  column  131.  Given  that  Philodemus  complains  that 
Diogenes is writing as a historian rather than a philosopher, this might be additional 
evidence that the two (Heraclides and Chamaeleon) were indeed contemporaries. 
  It is also interesting that there was  a connection between Heraclides and 
Speusippus.  I  have  argued  in  the  Appendix  to  chapter  2,
78  that  Speusippus  was 
                                                 
74 Fr. 9 Wehrli. 
75 D.L. V, 87; Athenaeus, Deipn. xiv. 624c. For more on Heraclides’ discussion on the Greek modes, 
see below, pp. 159–60. 
76 Gottschalk 1998[1980]: 2–5. 
77 Fr.  176 Wehrli . 
78 See above, pp. 50–4.   158 
probably not Diogenes’
79 main influence in his concept of ἐπιστημονική αἴσθησις.
80 
However, as I will show below, Diogenes certainly relied upon and directly referred 
to Heraclides for a part of his own musical theory; perhaps Heraclides had also 
developed Speusippus’ earlier theory, and so influence on Diogenes theory there 
maybe should not be ruled out. 
  [Plutarch] writes at De Musica 1131F–1133F that Heraclides paid particular 
attention to the divine origin of the modes, and that he attempted to trace each back 
to a god or goddess, and a part of Heraclides’ account of music’s early history is 
preserved within [Plutarch]’s writings. Parallels with Diogenes’ own account are 
noted  in  section  i  to  chapter  3  where  I  discuss  Diogenes’  writing  on  music’s 
origins.
81  Heraclides  was  also  interested  in  the  ethical  character  of  music,  and 
Diogenes of Babylon quoted his writings in support of his own belief in the moral 
value  of  education.
82  Heraclides’  interest  in  music’s  divine  origin  is  particularly 
interesting  here,  and  Diogenes  was  clearly  also  very  interested  in  that  aspect. 
although it appears that the gods to whom Heraclides gives particular prominence 
are  not  mentioned  in  Diogenes’  text  as  we  have  it  today.  Nonetheless,  it  does 
indicate that Diogenes was not alone in emphasising music’s divine origins. Both 
philosophers  refer  to  Amphion  and  Terpander  and  his  contemporaries.
83  Both 
philosophers also remark that Terpander and his followers adhered to the ‘grand 
style’, and as Gottschalk remarks, ‘Heraclides, like most theorists in the Academic-
                                                 
79 Future remarks in this chapter to ‘Diogenes’ will all refer to Diogenes of Babylon; if Diogenes 
Laertius is mentioned again, either the name will be written out in full, or in the abbreviated form 
‘D.L.’. 
80 Eleanora Rocconi remarked in her paper given at the Moisa Annual Seminary on Ancient Greek 
Music in July 2005 that some scholars have suggested that Diogenes was influenced by Aristoxenus 
of  Tarentum  in  this  theory,  wrongly  in  the  view  of  Prof  A.  Barker.  On  Aristoxenus  and  the 
unlikelihood of his having any influence on Diogenes’ musical theory, see below, section v. I must 
thank Professor Rocconi for allowing me to use the unpublished transcript of her paper on chapters 
31–44 of [Plutarch’s] De Musica, where this discussion occurs at p. 3. 
81 See above, T3.ii.1 and discussion. 
82 H. B. Gottschalk 1998 [1980]: 135, 138–9. 
83  For  Diogenes’  references,  see  chapter  3  above  p.  63  (Amphion),  p.  69  ff.  (Terpander);  for 
Heraclides’, see [Plutarch] De Musica 1131F–1132 (Amphion); 1132C–F (Terpander), although on 
whether the whole of this section can rightly be ascribed to Heraclides, see Gottschalk 1998 [1980]: 
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Peripatetic  tradition,  favoured  the  old  style  against  more  recent  innovations’,
84 
something that seems almost to go without saying – none of the musical writers thus 
far encountered has any time at all for music of the ‘new style’.  
  Heraclides’  account  of  the  musical  modes,  mentioned  above,  is  further 
evidence of his interest in the ethical nature of music. He asserts that there are only 
three true Greek modes since ‘there are also only three kinds of Greeks – Dorians, 
Aeolians  and  Ionians’,  and  he  continues,  ‘There  is  no  small  difference  in  the 
character of these three. . .’
85 The characters of the three modes therefore reflect the 
characters of the Greek races: 
1.  The Dorian reflected ‘manly vigour, of magnificent bearing, not relaxed or 
merry, but sober and intense, neither varied nor complicated’;
86 
2.  The  Aeolian  ‘contains  elements  of  ostentation  and  turgidity,  and  even 
conceit. . . yet this does not mean malice, but is, rather, lofty and confident. 
Hence also their [the Aeolians’] fondness for drinking is appropriate to them, 
also their love-affairs, and the entirely relaxed nature of their daily life’;
87  
3.  The Ionian mode is ‘neither bright nor cheerful, but austere and hard, having 
a seriousness which is not ignoble; and so their mode is well adapted to 
tragedy. But the character of the Ionians today is more voluptuous and the 
character of their mode is much altered’.
88 
      The other modes mentioned are all stated to be ‘originating with barbarians’, 
and hence brought to Greece from elsewhere. No mention is made by Athenaeus 
here of any use Heraclides might have ascribed to the modes; indeed other than 
assigning character to them, Heraclides’ comments would seem to fit easily into a 
historical  account  of  the  origins  of  the  various  modes.  Gottschalk  notes  that 
                                                 
84 Gottschalk 1998 [1980]: 134. 
85 Athenaeus Deipn. 624c ff.; Gottschalk 1998 [1980]: 134–5.   
86 Athenaeus 624d–e. 
87 Ibid., 624e. 
88 Ibid., 625c.   160 
Heraclides’  groups  have  some  affinity  with  Dicaearchus’  account  of  the 
development of Greek civilisation.
89 
The only other real evidence for Heraclides’ concern with the ethical nature of 
music  is  contained  within  Philodemus’  De  Musica.  At  column  49,  Philodemus 
reports that: 
 
[T5.iii.1]  . . . ]ποις κατανοήσαντά τι- 
να τῶ]ν εἰρημένων, ἐν οἷς 
περὶ πρέποντος μέλους καὶ 
ἀπρεποῦς καὶ περὶ ἠθῶν ἀρσέ- 
νων καὶ μαλακῶν καὶ περὶ 
πρά[ξ]εων ἁρμοττουσῶν κα[ὶ 
ἀ]ναρμόστων τοῖς ὑποκειμέ- 
νοις προσώποις· ἅπερ ὁμολο- 
γουμέ]νως οὐ μακρὰν ἀπηρτ[η]- 
μ[έ]ν[α τ]οῦ φιλοσοφεῖν· καὶ παρα- 
λαβὼν] πο|λὺ πρ[ὸ] | τού|των Ἡρα- 
κλείδ]ου πλείω φησὶ|ν ἐ[ξ] αὐ- 
τῶ]ν [εἶ]ναι φανερὸν [τ]|ὸ πρὸς 
π[ο]λ[λ]ὰ μέρη τοῦ βίου χρησι- 
μεύειν τὴν μουσικήν, [καὶ 
δύ]νασθαι τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν  
φ|ιλοτεχνίαν οἰκείως ἡμ[ᾶς 
δ|ιατιθέναι πρὸς πλείους ἀ- 
ρ|ετὰς δοκεῖν αὐτῶι, καὶ πρ[ὸς 
π|άσας *. 
 
                                                 
89  Gottschalk  1998  [1980]:  136–7.  Gottschalk  notes  here  that  this  might  have  been  why  Sotion 
classified Heraclides as a Peripatetic. At a conference on Heraclides in June 2003, it was argued 
strongly that Heraclides should in fact be regarded as a Platonist rather than a Peripatetic. I thank 
Professor Sharples for his notes and comments on that conference, which I was unable to attend. I 
will not attempt to catalogue or analyse the arguments surrounding that discussion in this thesis.     161 
. . .  reflecting well on [some] of the things said [by Heraclides of Pontus], in which 
the topics are the question of appropriate and inappropriate melody, masculine and 
effeminate characters and actions that are or are not in harmony with the persons 
they represent, which subjects that are not remote from philosophy. And having 
before this helped himself to much more from Heraclides, he says that it is manifest 
from it that the usefulness of music shows itself in many areas of life, and that [in 
his opinion] working hard at this skill can put us in an appropriate disposition to 
many virtues, perhaps towards all. 
 
   In his parallel criticism in columns 137 and 138, Philodemus remarks that he 
has already attacked this theory in the third book of this work,
90 where he says he 
showed ‘point by point’ how ‘all of this is sheer delirium’.
91 Andrew Barker has 
drawn attention to a passage in Aristides Quintilianus’ De Musica Book II, where a 
similar  view  is  expressed  and  the  male/female  dichotomy  is  related  to  the 
composition  of  the  soul  and  the  types  of  music  that  would  have  appealed  to 
individual souls. At a note to the Aristides passage, Barker writes, ‘There is a hint in 
Philodemus (De Mus. IV.23.27–24.9)
92 that the idea was adopted by Heraclides.’ 
The Aristides passage reads: 
 
[T5.iii.2]  when  [the  soul]  turns  towards  earthly  things  and  seeks  to  learn  by 
experience about life here, it comes to need a body, and seeks one that is suitable for 
it.  It  has  a  capacity  to  perceive  the  duality  that  exists  among  them  (male  and 
femaleness, I mean), a duality which is present not only in those that have souls, but 
also in those that are directed by nature alone. . .
93 
 
                                                 
90 Columns 137, 27–138, 9. Delattre’s footnote at this point remarks that Gigante (1999) does not 
doubt that the theory belonged to a Peripatetic. But see also n. 89, above. 
91 Or as Barker translates, ‘<and> we showed what a heap of nonsense it is’ (Barker’s paper given at 
the conference on Heraclides of Pontus in 2003). 
92 This passage has now been renumbered 137.27–138.9, following Delattre’s reconstruction of the 
text. See Delattre’s concordance of editions at his 2007: vol. I, CCLXXVII–CCLXXXI. 
93 Aristides Quintilianus, De Musica Book II, chapter 8, 1–10 in Barker 1989: 469–70.   162 
This male/female dichotomy is central to, although greatly developed in, the 
musical theory that followed in Aristides’ work, and a discussion of this may throw 
light on Heraclides’ own theory, if indeed he did adopt that idea. There is also a 
similar view expressed in Plato’s Laws VII. 802e, where the Athenian states: 
  
[T5.iii.3]  It will further be necessary to make a rough general distinction between 
two types of song, those suited for females and those suited for males, and so we 
shall have to provide both with their appropriate scales and rhythms; it would be a 
dreadful thing that the whole tune or rhythm of a composition should be out of 
place, as it will be if our various songs are inappropriately treated in these respects.
94 
 
It must be emphasised, however, that it was not only Heraclides who might 
have adopted this theory; as Diogenes clearly did, this might be evidence that he is 
using Heraclides as an authority. The first mention of this male/female dichotomy in 
the  Philodemean  work  is  at  column  48,  within  the  report  of  Diogenes’  musical 
theory. Further, Philodemus’ refutation comes at columns 137–8, firmly within the 
part of the treatise where he is attacking Diogenes’ theory. His general rounding up 
of the work starts only at column 143. At column 137, Philodemus explicitly states 
that he will not revisit the arguments against the theory here because he has already 
done this in his Book 3, where he is probably arguing against Heraclides, on which, 
see below, T5.iii.6. The theory must, therefore, have been part of Diogenes’ own 
philosophy as well. 
  Aristides’ psychology proceeds as follows, having been introduced at the end 
of his chapter 7 (pp. 65–6 Winnington-Ingram) with the words ‘But since music is a 
treatment for the passions of the soul, we should first investigate the ways in which 
they arise in it. . . If these points are not established, our discussion of subsequent 
matters will fail to be clear.’
95 ‘Passions arise in the soul’, he states, ‘out of its 
                                                 
94 As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, at pp. 115–16, it is very likely that Diogenes alludes to this 
chapter of Plato in his own theory, which further suggests to me that both Heraclides and Diogenes 
himself may have thought along similar lines. 
95 This and subsequent quotations from Aristides come from Barker’s translation in his 1989, this 
from p. 469.   163 
affinity with the male or the female or with both. The female is slackened, and has a 
lack of resistance to pleasures and desires, whilst the male is predominantly self-
confident,  has  courage,  but  also  has  anger  and  recklessness.’
96  Since  the 
predominance of male or female differs from soul to soul, so too  will arise the 
difference of conception (ennoia). 
 
[T5.iii.4] It is through conceptions, then, that approval of things in life first comes, 
conceptions that have either grasped each thing successfully through an inherent 
capacity for learning,
97 or have later been persuaded to change. Here the common 
talk of the majority has as much power to instil character as have the doctrines of the 
sciences.  For  everyone’s  soul  constantly  remodels  the  impressions  and 
representations that it contains in light of the ideas aroused through words. . .  Moral 
education is divided into two types. One kind, that through which we correct vice is 
therapy. . . the second kind is cultivation.
98 
 
Having assigned the male/female dichotomy to souls, so too for Aristides 
letter-sounds and the harmoniai are either male, female, or intermediate, hence their 
appeal  to  different  types  of  souls  as  discussed  in  chapter  3,  pp.  82–7.  At 
Winnington-Ingram 80, ll. 22ff., Aristides writes: 
 
[T5.iii.5]  . . . at any rate, in the harmoniai that he (Damon) handed down we 
can see that of the moveable notes it is sometimes the female and sometimes the 
male that are in the majority, or else are used less or not at all. The reason is clearly 
that the usefulness of the harmoniai depends on the character of each individual 
soul.  Hence  the  most  important  part  of  melodic  composition  is  that  known  as 
‘distribution’  (petteia),
99  which  consists  in  the  selection  of  the  notes  most 
appropriate on each occasion. 
                                                 
96 Barker 1989: 470; p. 67, ll. 15 ff. Winnington-Ingram. 
97 Could this be a hint of the Stoic concept of oikeiōsis? For discussion of this, see ch. 2, section iv. 
98 Barker 1989: 471–2; p. 68, ll. 14 ff. Winnington-Ingram. 
99  LSJ  s.v  πεττεία  I  translates  as  a  ‘game  resembling  draughts’  or,  in  Cleonides’  Harmonics, 
‘repetition of the same note’. This might suggest that the meaning in Aristides is metaphorical as it   164 
 
   This passage clearly suggests that Aristides is drawing on earlier writers, as 
he  refers  to  Damon  here.  Whether  or  not  it  implies  that  the  male/female 
classification was handed down from Damon has been the subject of some debate 
for  many  years.
100  But  Aristides  is  also  aware  of  the  views  of  other  earlier 
philosophers; indeed he refers to Plato as ‘the wise Plato’ at chapter 6, (p. 59, l.24 
Winnington-Ingram).  He  affirms  that  early  education  must  be  ‘training  by 
habituation’,
101 and his views on education seems to reflect a combination of both 
Plato  and  Aristotle.  Aristides’  use  of  the  words  ‘appropriateness’  and 
‘inappropriateness’  (τὸ  πρέπον,  τὸ  απρέπον)  also  recall  the  writings  of  Plato, 
Heraclides, and indeed, the Stoics.
102 
  It is, of course, impossible to claim with any certainty that Heraclides’, and 
so Diogenes’, musical philosophy is the basis for Aristides’ theory, but I would 
suggest that there are sufficient similarities for it to be considered a real possibility. 
It is clear from Philodemus’ words at columns 138 that when he attacked the 
theory  in  his  ‘third  book’,  he  was  attacking  a  view  that  came  not  only  from 
Heraclides, but probably from the Peripatetic school generally, when he says: 
 
[T5.iii.6] ἐκθέντες ἡμεῖς 
ἐν τῶι τρίτωι τῶν ὑπομνη- 
μάτων καὶ τὰ παρ᾽ ἄλλοις δὲ 
συγγενῶς εἰρημένα 
103 παρεδεί- 
ξαμεν ὅσης ἐστὶν γέμοντα 
ληρείας. 
                                                                                                                                        
seems unlikely that the most important part of melodic composition would be the ‘repetition of the 
same note’. Does it perhaps infer ‘a game of chance’ or indeed ‘a game of skill’? 
100 In his footnote to this passage, Andrew Barker outlines the debate that has occurred amongst 
many scholars. However, see my notes 40, 44 to chapter 4, where I explain that Professor Barker has 
now changed his view, and moots the possibility that Damon has been credited with much more 
influence than he actually had. 
101 Chapter 3, p. 55, ll. 8–11 Winnington-Ingram. 
102  Gottschalk  remarks  that  the  ideas  of  appropriateness  ‘became  fundamental  principles  of 
Hellenistic  and  Roman  criticism’  (1998  [1980]:  138),  and  that  Heraclides’  views  on  this  were 
criticised by Aristoxenus, on which, see below, section 5.v.   165 
We set all this out in the third [book] of our commentary, as well as other things 
from other [writers], and we showed point by point how all this is sheer delirium.  
 
This seems perfectly feasible – Dicaearchus and Heraclides are both named 
within Diogenes’ part of the text, and from Philodemus’ criticism it is clear that 
Archestratus and Theophrastus were also cited by Diogenes as authorities.




As  mentioned  above,  Theophrastus  is  also  suggested  by  Kraut  to  be  one  of  the 
philosophers to whom Aristotle refers at Politics VIII. 1341b25 (‘some of those 
engaged in philosophy who happen to be experienced in musical education’),
105 and 
certainly he would also appear to be a plausible candidate. However, my reasons for 
looking into his views on music are rather that he is mentioned in the Philodemean 
De Musica, and therefore he possibly had some influence on Diogenes of Babylon’s 
musical  philosophy.  A  pupil  first  of  Plato,  and  then  of  Aristotle,  Theophrastus 
succeeded Aristotle as head of the Lyceum.
106 He also wrote at least two books on 
music.
107   
Sources attest to his belief in music’s power to cure ills; both Athenaeus 
(Deipn. 624a–b) and Apollonius (Historia Mirabilium  49.1–3) write of his view 
that playing the aulos could relieve and even cure sciatica. However, very little of 
Theophrastus’ writing on music survives today. The largest fragment exists within 
Porphyry’s Commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics, and is, according to Ptolemy, an 
extract from Book II of Theophrastus’ own De Musica.
108 It primarily constitutes a 
polemic against the group of writers he calls the mathematikoi regarding the human 
ability  to  replicate  musical  melody.  The  fragment  has  attracted  more  scholarly 
                                                                                                                                        
103 Emphasis mine. 
104  Dicaearchus  is  mentioned  at  column  49.20–3;  see  T6.i.7,  where  it  seems  plausible  that 
Dicaearchus was one of Diogenes’ sources. 
105 Kraut 1997: 20. 
106 Diogenes Laertius V.36. 
107 Porphyry, On Claudius Ptolemy’s Harmonics 13 (FHS & G 716).   166 
attention than any of the other of Theophrastus’ musical fragments today extant, but 
because of the nature of the fragment, the ensuing discussions are more on the lines 
of  technical  musical  analysis.
109  The  fragment  is  largely  a  technical  discussion 
regarding  melodic  accuracy,  arguing  against  the  view  that  ‘music  exists  in 
quantity’,
110 with very little discussion of any psychological value in music. 
Theophrastus refutes the theory of this group of writers who say that ‘the 
accuracy of the intervals [of singing] arises in accordance with the ratios of the 
numbers’
111 i.e., that the soul identifies the mathematical relations between the notes 
in a melody and reproduces them in perceptible form.
112 The mathematikoi would, of 
course, include the Pythagoreans, but also to an extent Plato, Aristotle and other 
Peripatetic writers. Although not directly aligning himself with the alternative group 
identified  at  the  outset  of  the  discussion,  ‘the  harmonikoi,  who  judge  by 
perception’,
113  Theophrastus  does  seem  to  prefer  their  position,  as  I  will  discuss 
below. It could be, suggests Barker,
114 that Aristoxenus might be included in this 
latter  group  –  certainly  as  will  be  shown  below,  section  v,
115  ‘[Theophrastus] 
dismisses  the  independent  claims  of  logos’  in  musical  analysis  and  ‘bases  his 
investigations  on  aisthēsis  first  and  foremost.
116  However,  it  is  clear  that 
Theophrastus does not accept Aristoxenus’ framework of musical analysis either, 
and from 64.24 (Düring) sets out to attack that theory also. He emphasises that it is 
not the interval (diastēma) that gives different notes their pitch, because an interval 
is, by definition, a gap between notes, and therefore silent, hence the pitch of a note 
must be something intrinsic to itself. My understanding of his theory of the creation 
of accurate musical melody is discussed further briefly below, but more importantly 
for my purposes are the two hints of Theophrastus view of music’s psychological 
                                                                                                                                        
108 Porphyry, On Claudius Ptolemy’s Harmonics 61.17, Düring; Barker 1985: 289. 
109 See, e.g., Barker 1977, 1985, 2007; Sicking 1997. 
110 Porphyry, Commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics  62 Düring. 
111 Page 62, lines 10–12 Düring. 
112 Barker’s explanation, 2007: 413. 
113 Page 62.2 Düring. 
114 1985: 308ff. 
115 Pages 173–88. 
116 Barker 1985: 308.   167 
value within the fragment; both relate to its creation. The first hint occurs near the 
beginning of the fragment:
117 
 
[T5.iv.1]    ἔστι  γὰρ  τὸ  γινόμενον  κίνημα  μελῳδητικὸν  περὶ  τὴν  ψυχὴν  σφόδρα 
ἀκριβές, ὁπόταν φωνῇ ἐθελήσῃ ἑρμηνεύειν αὐτό, τρέπει μὲν τήνδε, τρέπει δ ᾽ ἐφ᾽ 
ὅσαν οἵα τ ᾽  ἐστὶ τῆν ἄλογον τρέψαι, καθ᾽ ὃ ἐθέλει·  
 
For the movement productive of melody, when it occurs in the soul, is very accurate, 
when it (the soul) wishes to express it (the movement) with the voice. It (the soul) 
turns it (the voice), and turns it just as it wishes, to the extent that it is able to turn 
that which is non-rational.    (Trans Barker, as amended) 
 
This does not necessarily mean that the ‘movement productive of melody’ in 
the soul is a sudden imagining of a melody ‘in the mind’s ear’,
118 but the occurrence 
of an emotion or disturbance within the soul that can be interpreted by the singer in 
the  language  of  melody.
119  By  producing  appropriate  vocal/musical  sounds 
accurately – and the discussion would appear to be about a musical line, not words – 
the singer expresses the psychic movements that have the required effect on the soul, 
i.e., to release it from the evils due to the emotions. In so doing, states Barker,
120 the 
singer stimulates these movements in the souls of others, and perhaps reinforces 
them in his own: ‘that this should be so is no causal secondary effect, but constitutes 
its essence’.
121 But to accurately interpret the emotion within the soul, Barker states, 
‘he must be able to discriminate between what makes melodic sense and what does 
not. He must also be able to produce a melody of the right sort to represent his 
psychic state’.
122 Barker’s first sentence would seem to bring us back once again to 
                                                 
117 Page 61.25–62 Düring = FHS &G 716 (part). 
118 See Barker 1985: 313. 
119 For my discussion of the notion of melody as language, see chapter 2, pp. 18–19, 35–6. 
120 1985: 316. 
121 Ibid.  
122 Barker 1985: 313–14.   168 
Plato’s ‘judges’, and Aristotle’s ‘experts’, and perhaps even to Diogenes’ equivalent 
of the kritikoi. 
 
The second fragment occurs right at the end of Porphyry’s extract:
123 
 
[T5.iv.2]  μία δὲ φύσις τῆς μουσικῆς· κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ κατ᾽ ἀπόλυσιν γινομένη 
τῶν διὰ τὰ πάθη κακῶν, ἣ εἰ μὴ ἦν, οὐδ᾽  ἂν ἡ τῆς μουσικῆς φύσις ἦν.  
 
The  nature  of  music  is  one.  It  is  the  movements  of  the  soul  that  occurs  in 
correspondence with its release from the evils due to the emotions; and if it were not 
this, neither would the nature of music exist.
124   (Trans Barker) 
 
             Music and melody, for Theophrastus therefore, originate within us; when 
either is played or sung in public, it is a secondary manifestation of music, wholly 
dependent upon the first, i.e., the composer in whom the music originated.
125 That is, 
the soul brings about the transition from psychic movement, i.e., the movement of 
the soul, into audible sound – that is it interprets or expresses outwardly the inward 
movement of the soul. There are two important points here: 
1.  Music has its primary mode of existence within the soul; and 
2.  Its role there is essentially therapeutic. 
 
‘By producing appropriate vocal/musical sounds [not words, but sounds] the singer 
expresses the psychic movements that have the required effect on the soul [i.e., to 
release  it  from  the  evils  due  to  the  emotions].  In  so  doing,  we  may  infer,  he 
stimulates these movements in the souls of others, and perhaps reinforces them in 
his  own;  that  this  is  so  is  not  a  casual  or  secondary  effect  but  constitutes  its 
essence.’
126 
                                                 
123 Page 65.10–15 Düring = FHS & G 716 (end). 
124 Barker’s alternative translation, ‘neither would it be the nature of music’, 1989: 118 seems to be 
less apt. See also FHS &G 716 for the same translation and note. 
125 See Barker’s very clear discussion on this rather complicated extract at 2007: 411 ff. 
126 So Barker 1985: 316.   169 
 
       As Barker remarks, ‘No other Theophrastean view about music, in fact, is so 
frequently mentioned in later antiquity, and it probably figured prominently in the 
work from which our fragment is taken,’
127 and certainly the same view is expressed 
in the two extracts below, T5.iv.3 and 5.iv.4. Sicking claims that Theophrastus had 
little or no affinity with Damon or Plato’s belief that music had an important role to 
play in the education of the human soul to aretē,
128 and whilst it must be conceded 
that there is no specific statement to state that Theophrastus did see such a role for 
music, nor, I would suggest, is there any statement to the effect that he did not. If 
Theophrastus was in any way influenced by Damon, then it is much more likely that 
he saw some educational role for music, even if in a lesser way than, say, Plato. 




[T5.iv.3]  Sosius says. . . that one would not be approaching the matter badly if one 
began from what Theophrastus said about music, ‘For I recently’, he said, ‘read the 
book,  and  he  says  that  there  are  three  sources  of  music:  pain,  pleasure  and 
inspiration, for each of these emotions turns the voice aside and deflects it from its 
usual (inflection). 
 
A similar view is repeated by Aristides Quintilianus in his De Musica Book 
II, 57.31ff.: 
 
[T5.iv.4]  It has also been observed that there is no one single cause that makes us 
turn to making melody. For those who are happy it is pleasure, for those in sorrow it 
is grief, and for those possessed by the impulse of a divine breath, it is inspiration.
130 
 
                                                 
127 Barker 2007: 433–4. 
128 Sicking 1997: 142. 
129 = FHS &G 719A. 
130 Translation by Barker 1989: 462. Cf. also Plato Ion 536c, where people will react differently to 
music according to which god is possessing them.   170 
Aristides does not give a source here, but what he says certainly reflects the 
views of Theophrastus as outlined in T5.iv.3. As Barker notes, the extracts that can 
be linked to Theophrastus hint at his view of the power of music, a view that bears 
some similarity in part to Plato’s with respect to emotion and character, which was 
believed to be in turn very much led by Damon,
131 who also is attested to have 
written that music arises from the soul.
132 
  ‘If music’s nature is that of a movement of the soul, and specifically that of 
one capable of releasing it from emotional stress, the patterns of movement which 
constitute the music will be marked off from those that do not by criteria of an 
essentially  psychological  sort.’
133  The  principles  governing  it  will  be  those  that 
determine which inner movements are capable of generating emotional ‘release’. 
This,  remarks  Barker,  sounds  very  similar  to  the  sentiments  outlined  in  Plato’s 
Timaeus 47d–e: 
 
[T5.iv.5]  [M]usic too, in so far as it uses audible sound, was bestowed for the sake 
of harmony. And harmony which has motions akin to the revolutions of the Soul 
within us, was given by the Muses, not as an aid to irrational pleasure, as is now 
supposed, but as an auxiliary to the inner revolution of the Soul, when it has lost its 
harmony to assist in restoring it to order and concord with itself.
134  
 
However, as Barker states, whilst the end result is a harmonised soul, the 
origins of the music cannot be the same in Plato’s mind as in Theophrastus’. It is 
difficult to understand how the very music that will restore the afflicted soul to 
harmony  could  have  originated  within  that  same  troubled  soul.  On  this  basis, 
concludes  Barker,  Theophrastus  cannot  have  supposed  that  a  healthy  soul  was 
structured on a musical basis in precisely the same way as it was for Plato in the 
Timaeus,  given  that  for  Theophrastus,  music  was  psychic  movement  of  an 
                                                 
131 But see now Barker’s query about the extent of any Damonian influence on Plato, see chapter 4, 
pp. 120–6 and notes. 
132 By Athenaeus Deipn. 628c: ‘With good reason, Damon of Athens and his school say that songs 
and dances are the result of the soul’s being in a kind of motion’ (Loeb translation). 
133 So Barker 2007: 434–6.   171 
essentially therapeutic sort.
135 Furthermore, the ideal musical structure of the soul in 
the Timaeus is grounded in the principles of mathematical order and perfection, but 
it is the mathematikoi who hold this view that Theophrastus has spent so much time 
arguing against in the fragment. 
   There are just two references to Theophrastus in the Philodemian De Musica, 
and it must be said that neither reference really adds to our knowledge of either 
Theophrastus  or  Diogenes.  Further,  whilst  the  Theophrastean  fragments  above 
perhaps  account  for  (in  Theophrastus’  view,  at  least)  the  origins  of  music,  and 
perhaps to a lesser extent their effects, Diogenes’ theory would seem to be primarily 
interested in the effects of music rather than its creation. The Philodemus references 
do, however, serve to confirm that both philosophers, unlike Philodemus, but in 
accordance with the other philosophers cited by Diogenes, believed that music had 
some psychological power, and indeed some therapeutic value. 
  It was previously thought that the suggestion of expulsion of evils mentioned 
above in T5.iv.2 also arises in Philodemus’ De Musica, at column 81, although it 
does not in Delattre’s newly constructed text. Delattre’s text runs as follows: 
 
[T5.iv.6]  . . . . ]ωντος Θεοφράσ[του 
. . . . π]ρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τοῖς 
. . . .  .]ιν μόνον, ἴσως δὲ 
. . . . .  ἀ]κολασίαν συνερ- 
γεῖν . . ]ντας φαίνεται βέλ- 
τιον . . . . ] ἀποτε[θε]ωρημέ- 
ν. . . . .  .]α καὶ φυ[σι]κῶς καὶ 
. . . .  ἀ]πορίπτ[εσθ]αι τὸ με- 
. . . . .  .]ε` ι´ σ[ώ]ματος ε` ἶ ´ ναι τι 
. . . . .  . . . . .].ς καὶ τὸ τῶν 
. . . . .  . . . . .]εν εὐκοσμίαν 
 
                                                                                                                                        
134 Trans Bury, in Loeb edition. 
135 Barker 2007: 434–5.   172 
we [don’t agree] at all, with the permission of Theophrastus, that [melodies] 
contribute for those [who sing] only to virtue, and perhaps [also] to disorder, it is 
clearly preferable for [us], who have for our part developed some serious thought on 
[these questions] from the point of view of physics, to reject [the claim that a tune] 
will be [naturally] [able to move] the body and . . . good conduct.
136 
 
Whilst the expulsion of evil may well have formed part of Theophrastus’ 
theory, if Delattre’s reconstruction is correct I do not see any mention of that within 
Diogenes’  writings  as  they  have  come  down  to  us,  although  Diogenes  clearly 
allowed for some therapeutic value in music.  




[T.5.iv.7] . . . Moreover, when Theophrastus writes that it is unreasonable that music 
does not at all move and harmonise souls, he is far from proving that my statement 
conflicts with the truth. 
 
           Unfortunately, the claims that Philodemus is refuting are not extant in the 
text, but clearly Diogenes must have written that Theophrastus held the view that 
music  both  moved  and  harmonised  the  soul,  and  indeed  the  writings  of  both 
Philodemus and Porphyry are evidence that he believed that music could in some 
way contribute to virtue and the expulsion of evil. Censorinus, too, recorded that 
Theophrastus ‘[thought] at any rate it has a great deal of divinity and has great 
                                                 
136 Philodemus is, of course, speaking in propria persona here, rather than reporting Diogenes. I 
insert the Greek with Delattre’s preferred translation here as it differs a little from that of Sedley in 
FHS  &  G  (720,  pp,  574–6).  Sedley’s  reconstructed  text  and  translation  ran,  [συνορ]ῶντος 
Θεοφράσ¦[του π]ρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τοῖς ¦ [παισ]ὶν μόνον, ἴσως δὲ ¦ πρὸς ἀ[κολασίαν συνερ¦[γοὺς ὄ]ντας, 
φαίνεται  βέλ¦[τιον  ἂν]  ἀποτε[θε]ωρημέ¦[νος  ἔνι]α  καὶ  φ[υσι]κῶς  κα¦[κiῶν  ἀ]πορίπτ[εσθ]αι,  τὸ 
μέ¦[λος δὲ] σώματος  εἶναι τι ¦ [κεινητικὸν], καὶ τὸ τῶν ¦[χ¦] [παθῶν χαρί]εν εὐκοσμίαν  ¦ ‘Since 
Theophrastus sees that (rhythms barely) contribute to virtue and only for children, and that perhaps 
they contribute to intemperance, it seems as if he would have been better speculating that some vices 
are  also  expelled  naturally,  and  that  a  tune  is  something  capable  of  moving  the  body,  and  that 
gracefulness of the passions (produces) orderliness. . .’ 
137 FHS & G 721A, pp. 576–7.   173 
influence in moving (our) souls’.
138 Plutarch (Non posse 1095E–1096A) attests to the 
fact that Theophrastus was also quite willing to take part in discussion of music at a 
banquet,  unlike  the  Epicureans,  confirming  that  one  might  find  him  giving  ‘a 
discourse on concords’. 
  The  Theophrastean  fragments  considered  are  good  evidence  that 
Theophrastus regarded music as an important therapeutic tool, and in this respect at 
least, Diogenes could have used him both as a source and/or as an authority for his 
own views. If Theophrastus did indeed privilege aisthēsis over logos, then Diogenes 
might  even  have  adopted  some  of  his  psychology.  Sadly,  Diogenes’  citation  of 
Theophrastus, if indeed there was one, is no longer extant; the columns where, on 
the  basis  of  the  positioning  of  Philodemus’  refutation,  any  discussion  on  this 
philosopher should appear, are extremely damaged, and no hint of his name can be 





When analysing the musical theory of any writer who lived after the fourth century 
BC,  the  possible  influence  of  Aristoxenus  of  Tarentum  must  be  considered.  A 
member of the Peripatetic school, and a philosopher in his own right,
139 Aristoxenus 
is best known for his developments in the science of harmonic theory. Whilst, as I 
will discuss below, he may have allowed some ethical value in music, as did Plato, 
Aristotle, and members of his school before him, his primary concern seems to have 
been with the strict science of harmonics and rhythmics, and a theory of musical 
aesthetics. 
  Born around 370 BC,
140 his best-known, and only work preserved in more 
than  fragmentary  form,  entitled  Elementa  Harmonica  (henceforth  El.  harm.),  in 
three, now incomplete, books comprise most of the extant evidence of his harmonic 
                                                 
138 Censorinus, About the Day of Birth 12.1 = FHS & G 721B. 
139 Suda fr. 1 Ἀριστόξενος. 
140 The Suda lists him as a contemporary of Dicaearchus of Messina.    174 
theory. Of a second work entitled the Elementa Rhythmica, only a very small part 
survives today. 
  As mentioned above, and as quoted elsewhere,
141 Aristoxenus did not appear 
to be convinced that music could have any effect on the character, as spelt out in the 
El. harm. at 31.16–32.9: 
 
[T5.v.1]  Mistakes can be made in either of two directions. Some people suppose 
that the discipline is massively important, and that by listening to a discussion on 
harmonics they will become not only mousikoi but better in their characters. They 
have misunderstood things that we said in our deixeis: ‘we are trying to create each 
kind of melodic composition’, and of music in general, ‘one sort damages peoples’ 
characters, while another sort benefits them’. They not only misunderstood that, but 
completely failed to notice our qualification, ‘in so far as music can provide such 
benefits’. Others imagine it to be insignificant, of no importance, and yet profess 
themselves not to be ignorant of what it is. Neither of these positions is correct. The 
science is not to be despised by anyone of intelligence: that will become clear as our 
discussion  progresses:  nor  is  it  so  important  as  to  be  sufficient  on  its  own  for 
everything, as some people think.
142 
 
  However,  Aristoxenus  clearly  believed  that  musical  compositions  could 
contain ēthos and could indeed, in the right circumstances, express that character. As 
highlighted in text T5.v.1 above, however, he was not convinced that in expressing a 
certain ēthos, music also had the power to influence human character and in this 
belief, he clearly differed from the other, earlier, philosophers I am considering in 
the context of their possible influence on Diogenes of Babylon. 
  Most of the evidence for Aristoxenus’ views on the ethical value of music is 
preserved in the Plutarchan De Musica, and, in particular within chapters 31–7.
143 At 
the very beginning of chapter 31 (1142B2), Sotericus of Alexandria, the musical 
                                                 
141 Ch. 2, pp. 47–8 and nn. 102–3. 
142  Trans.  Barker  1989:  148–9,  as  amended  by  Barker  2007:  251.  Unless  otherwise  stated,  all 
translations from the El. harm. are taken from Barker 1989. 
143 See Rocconi 2005: 1.    175 
expert talking here about music training states, ‘That success or failure in music 
depends on one’s training and instruction is shown by Aristoxenus.’ Unsurprisingly, 
the analysis that follows opens with a comparison between, the ‘καλλίστῃ μουσικῇ’ 
of the ancient poets, such as Pindar, Dionysius of Thebes, Lamprus and Pratinas, 
and the ‘New Music’ of Philoxenus and Timotheus, which contained ‘variety and 
innovation’ (ποικιλά and καινοτομία). Like his predecessors, Aristoxenus firmly 
favours the old style. Earlier in the De Musica (1135C–D), albeit in a passage not 
attributed to Aristoxenus, the Plutarchan writer states: 
 
[T5.v.2] Crexus, Timotheus, Philoxenus, and the composers of that time had a streak 
of coarseness in them, and were fond of novelty, aiming at the manner that is now 
called ‘popular’ and ‘mercenary’.
144   
 
A similar comparison between Philoxenus and Pindar is, of course, made by 
Diogenes of Babylon in the Philodemian De Musica, at Col. 31.8, where Diogenes 
states: 
 
[T5.v.3]  κ[αὶ τοὺς] δειθυραμβι- 
κοὺς δὲ τρόπ[ο]υς εἴ τις συγ- 
κρίναι, τόν τε κατὰ Πίνδα- 
ρον καὶ τὸν κατὰ Φιλόξε- 
νον, μεγάλην εὑρεθήσεσθαι 
τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἐπιφαι- 
νομένων ἠθῶν, τὸν αὐ- 
τὸν δ᾽ εἶναι τρόπον· 
 
Moreover, concerning the styles of the dithyramb, if one compares one [written] by 
Pindar  with  one  of  Philoxenus’,  you  will  see  that  the  difference  between  the 
characters of each is very great, but the style (τρόπον) is the same. 
   176 
The Plutarchan treatise, this time quoting Aristoxenus moves on to state: 
 
[T5.v.4]    And  so,  if  one  wishes  to  cultivate  music  nobly  (καλῶς),  and  with 
discrimination, one should copy the ancient manner. But one should not stop there, 
one  should  supplement  it  with  the  disciplines,  and  take  philosophy  for  guide  in 
youth, since philosophy is competent to decide the point to which the various skills 
can be employed so as to be appropriate to the musical art (τὸ μουσικῇ πρέπον), and 
thus determine the question of their use.    (De Mus. 1142c–d) 
 
The  translator  of  the  Loeb  edition  notes  here  the  similarity  with  Plato’s 
Phaedrus  268e6–270a8,  where  the  Platonic  Socrates  and  Phaedrus  discuss  the 
various disciplines that are appropriate to one another, but as Barker remarks, ‘there 
is nothing surprising about that’.
145 Barker continues, ‘[Aristoxenus] is assigning the 
whole business of critical judgement to an intellectual elite’, as indeed did Plato 
before him.  
  There  is  also  a  distinct  similarity,  however,  to  the  opinion  attributed  to 
Heraclides  of  Pontus  by  Diogenes  of  Babylon,  where  he  (Diogenes)  remarks  at 
column 48: ‘[T]he question of appropriate and inappropriate melody. . . you will see 
that  they  are  subjects  not  remote  from  philosophy’  (for  more  on  this  and  other 
references to Heraclides, see above, sub-section (iii) this chapter, and in particular 
T5.iii.1). Plato, Aristotle, Heraclides, and I would suggest, Diogenes of Babylon 
would all have agreed with Aristoxenus in ‘assigning the whole business of critical 
judgement to an intellectual elite’.
146 This, as I will argue in chapter 7, below, is the 
crucial point to which Philodemus objects, and probably one of his primary purposes 
of this polemical work. I believe that he felt that Diogenes (and, probably, all those 
who influenced him) had lost sight of what was for him the primary purpose of 
                                                                                                                                        
144 Loeb edition, trans Einarson and De Lacy. 
145 Barker 2007: 259. 
146 Quotation, as above, from Barker 2007: 259, emphasis mine.   177 
music – pure pleasure – in favour of their intellectualised theory ‘linking music to 
morality and psychology’.
147    
  The Plutarchan writer continues, still with Aristoxenus as authority: 
 
[T5.v.5]  Now first it must be understood that all the instruction given in music is a 
mere habituation which has not yet advanced to any insight into the reason why each 
detail is a necessary part of what the student must learn.
148 
 
Again,  the  Loeb  commentator  notes  the  similarity  with  Plato’s Phaedrus 
270b5–271c1, the principal point of which is where Socrates emphasises that one 
cannot understand the nature of the soul without an understanding of the nature of 
the whole body. But once again, these are sentiments with which Plato, Aristotle and 
later Peripatetics would surely not find fault. This is an important component in 
laying down a secure grounding on which the student may build. At El. harm. 33.6–
10, Aristoxenus states: 
 
[T5.v.6]  Taken as a whole, our science is concerned with all musical melody, both 
vocal and instrumental. Its pursuit depends ultimately on two things: hearing and 
reason. Through hearing we assess the magnitudes of intervals, and through reason 
we apprehend their [the intervals’] functions (dunameis). We must therefore become 
practised in assessing particulars accurately. 
   
In this important respect, I would suggest, it is clear that Aristoxenus differs 
from Diogenes of Babylon. As discussed in chapter 2, Diogenes believed that those 
who  had  learned  the  technical  discipline  of  music  judged  good  and  bad  music, 
melody,  harmony  and  rhythm  with  a  rational  or  ‘scientific’  sense  of  hearing 
(ἐπιστημονικὴ  αἴσθησις),  sensation  was  always  involved  rather  than  reason;  for 
Aristoxenus, judgement involved both hearing and reason (see T5.v.6 above, and 
further discussion below, at T5.v.11).  
                                                 
147 Delattre’s words, Delattre 1998: 226. 
148 [Plutarch] De Musica 1142D–E.   178 
  The Plutarchan writer now moves on to remark how a systematic approach is 
required to learn the appropriate modes, a practise not followed by ‘the majority’, 
who tend to learn at random. He remarks that the ‘discerning reject such a lack of 
system as did in ancient times the Lacedaimonians, and the men of Mantineia and 
Pellene’.
149 
  This passage is very interesting, because there is a direct parallel to this in 
Diogenes’ writings, at (the Philodemian) De Musica column 32, ll. 1–11: 
 
[T5.v.7]   
. . ] χρόνον καταρξαμέν[ων 
τῶν Μαντινέων τε καὶ [Λα- 
κε]δαιμονίων καὶ Πελλ[η- 
νέ]ων· παρὰ τούτοις γὰρ κα[ὶ 
πρ]ώτοις καὶ μάλιστα τὴν 
ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιμέ[λει- 
αν] γενέσθαι τῶν τε κ[αλών 
ἐπιτηδευμάτων κ[αὶ τῆς 
ἄλλης μουσικῆς· 
. . . as the citizens of Mantineia as well as those of Lacedaimonia and Pellene have 
shown the example. Amongst them was developed first of all, and to the highest 
degree,  the  rigorous  practice  of  the  most  noble  activities,  and  that  of  music 
(mousikēs) in particular. . .to be. . . the one starting from the others. . .
150 
 
If indeed the Plutarch text is still quoting Aristoxenus,
151 and the reference to 
the Mantineans does fit with records of Aristoxenus having stayed there around 
350BC,
152 then this is also good evidence that Diogenes might have had access to, 
and  was  familiar  with,  the  content  of  Aristoxenus’  ethical  writings  at  the  very 
                                                 
149 De Musica 1142E. 
150 Here the text becomes very lacunose, a number of lines being completely lost. 
151 Rocconi (2005) is confident that Aristoxenus may be read as the authority right up to at least 
1144E, contra Wehrli fr. 76 and comments there. 
152 Suda s.v. Aristoxenus; I owe this point to Eleonora Rocconi, see Rocconi 2005: 6.   179 
least.
153 Philodemus makes no reply to this claim of Diogenes, although at col. 109 
he states: 
 
[T5.v.8]   Ἀριστόξενος [δὲ] τὴν ὅρ[ασιν 
καὶ τ]ὴν ἀκο[ὴν λ]έγων [καὶ 
γεγεν]ῆσθαι τὸ κύριον τῆ[ς δι- 
ανοί]ας καὶ θειοτέρας τ[ῶν 
ἄλλω]ν αἰσθήσεων, οὐ μ[ό- 
νον δι]ὰ τὸ τετυφῶσθαι δ[ι- 
έπιπ]τεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ [λέ- 
γειν] προάγειν καὶ παῖ[δα, 
ὄντα] παντελῶς ἀναν[δρον, 
εἰς ἀνδ]ρείας παρασκευά- 
ζουσαν] 
 
When Aristoxenus said that sight and hearing [constitute] the most important part of 
the intellect, and are the most divine senses of all,
154 he was wrong, not only because 
he  was  consumed  by  a  foolish  pretentiousness,  but  also  because  he  said  that  it 
[music] incites even a child, a being completely lacking in courage into acts of 
courage. . . 
 
If  Philodemus  is  following  his  usual  pattern  of  parallel  criticism,  then 
Diogenes’ claim, which this refutes, should appear towards the end of column 27, 
and  the  fact  that  Philodemus  mentions  Aristoxenus  by  name  here  also  strongly 
suggest to me that Diogenes would have done so as well. Philodemus, as far as I can 
see,  nowhere  introduces  new  ‘characters’  into  his  polemic  whilst  attacking 
Diogenes’ theory. He may well do so in his concluding columns, where he rounds 
up  his  four  books,  but  not,  I  believe,  elsewhere.  It  is  clear,  also,  that  where 
                                                 
153 Pace Barker 2001: 354. 
154 Cf. [Aristotle] Magna Moralia II.7, 1205b25–8, where [Aristotle] remarks ‘the pleasures of sight, 
hearing and thought will be best’.   180 
Philodemus mentions Aristoxenus again, in his own conclusion, he treats him with 
respect, perhaps because by then Aristoxenus’ own reputation amongst Philodemus’ 
contemporaries  was  such  that  anything  he  claimed  would  be  treated  with  some 
seriousness,  unlike  Philodemus’  own  treatment  of  Diogenes’  claims.
155  Delattre 
suggests,
156 ‘[Aristoxenus] was, in [Philodemus’] eyes, the most important musical 
authority to have deliberately cut off music from ethico-pedagogical thought, which, 
until  then  had  been  considered  essential  as  a  means  to  lead  a  child  to  virtue.’ 
Philodemus  indeed  would  have  applauded  such  sentiments,  although  I  am  not 
convinced that Aristoxenus removed music from this field altogether. Philodemus, 
also, is reluctant to see Aristoxenus as a serious philosopher – for Philodemus he is 
simply, I would suggest, a (much respected) musical expert, no more.
157 
  At column 95, however, Philodemus has already remarked that the senses 
relative to sight and sound are much less important than those relating to those of 
taste – these are of course necessary to life. Here, remarks Delattre,
158 Philodemus is 
probably  responding  to  a  claim  made  by  Diogenes  (now  lost)  regarding  the 
hierarchy of the senses, a claim Philodemus also appears to be refuting at column 
109 (above, T5.v.8). For an Epicurean, things necessary to life would of course be 
privileged above those not so. 
  Returning to the text at the first fifteen lines of column 27, then, it is clear 
that a discussion of the senses and their appreciation of beauty is beginning,
159 but 
there is a lacuna of some thirty lines before the very damaged first twenty-five lines 
of the next column, plenty of room, therefore, for some claim citing Aristoxenus as 
authority to parallel Philodemus’ criticism at column 109. This cannot, of course, be 
taken as firm evidence that Diogenes had seen Aristoxenus’ writing, but taken with 
                                                 
155 This either suggests that Philodemus misrepresented Aristoxenus in T5.v.8, which is unlikely in 
my view as he does not usually misrepresent even his opponents’ claims, or that he has conveniently 
forgotten what he said in that column. I would suggest that the latter possibility is more likely. 
156 2007: vol. I, CCXLIII. 
157 For further discussion on this, see Delattre 2007: vol. II, 203, n. 3. But Philodemus probably 
would not have seen any non-Epicurean as a serious philosopher. 
158 2007: vol. II, 184, n. 2. 
159 As discussed above, T5.i.2, and pp. 137 ff., Delattre (2007: vol. II, 340, n. 1) suggests that 
Diogenes is referring back explicitly to Aristotle’s Politics VIII. 1337b23–8 here, evidence perhaps   181 
the  common  discussion  of  the  citizens  of  Lacedaimonia,  Mantineia  and  Pellene 
discussed above, it does constitute a definite probability, I would suggest. Evidence, 
also perhaps, that Aristoxenus was not as sceptical about music’s ability to affect 
human behaviour as previously thought.
160 
 
At El harm. 2.1–6, Aristoxenus states that melodic composition does not 
form part of the science of harmonics included within his own mousikē paideia. 
Instead, he states that it belongs to the ‘[science] which includes both this and others 
through which all musical matters are investigated, and that is the science whose 
possession makes a man a musical expert’. 
  The composition of a piece of music, however, is an important element when 
its character is to be identified, as stated by the Plutarchan writer: 
 
[T5.v.9]  The science of harmonics. . . is blind to the nature of appropriateness (tēs 
oikeiotētos dunamin). For neither the chromatic nor the enharmonic carries with it 
an understanding of what it is to be appropriate, through which the moral character 
of a musical composition (to tou pepoiēmenou melous ēthos) is revealed. This is the 
task of the possessor of the art. It is clear that the sound of a sustēma and that of the 
melody composed in it are two distinct matters, and the study of the latter is not 
within the scope of the science of harmonics.
161 
 
For  discussion  of  the  two  musical  styles,  enharmonic  and  chromatic,  see 
below, p. 186. For now, the ability to judge music is the subject in hand, and in 
language that sounds very similar to Problem XIX.27, T5.i.11 above, the Plutarch 
writer  continues,  ‘Good’  and  ‘bad’  do  not  exist  in  isolated  notes,  but  ‘in  the 
series’,
162 i.e., in the way they are mixed; hence an understanding of continuity is, 
according to Aristoxenus, essential if one is to be able to make a judgement on the 
                                                                                                                                        
that Aristoxenus at least agreed with his predecessor that practice at analysis of the arts did indeed 
assist in learning how to analyse and understand music. 
160 See, e.g., Barker 1989: 148–9; Woodward forthcoming. 
161 De Musica 1143A. 
162 Above, pp. 149–51, and nn. 51–3.   182 
ēthos of a piece.
163 Proficiency in practical music, and possession of the theoretical 
knowledge  of  music  in themselves  are  not  sufficient  to  become  a mousikos,  for 
Diogenes  of  Babylon,  the  equivalent  to  a  kritikos.
164  For  Aristoxenus,  music  is 
beneficial  to  understanding,  as  it  was  for  Plato,  for  whom  music  could  aid 
development of comprehension and judgement of ethical value, as stated at Republic 
402c: 
 
[T5.v.10]  Then, by heaven, am I not right in saying that by the same token, we shall 
never  be  true  musicians,  either,  neither  we  nor  the  guardians  that  we  have 
undertaken to educate, until we are able to recognise forms of soberness, courage, 
liberality, and high-mindedness and their opposites too, in all the combinations that 
contain and convey them, and to apprehend them and their images wherever found, 
disregarding them neither in trifles, nor in great things, but believing the knowledge 
of them to belong to the same art and discipline? 
 
For  Plato,  then,  as  for  Aristoxenus,  in  order  to  fully  understand  a 
composition,  both  perception  and  interpretive  thought  will  be  involved,  as 
confirmed at [Plutarch] De Musica 1143F–1144A: 
 
[T5.v.11]  Thus, to speak in the broadest terms, perception (aisthēsis) and the mind 
(dianoia) must keep abreast of each other when we pass judgement on the various 
elements of musical composition, and the ear must not outstrip the mind, as happens 
when perception is hasty and in headlong motion, nor yet lag behind, as happens 
when  perception  is  sluggish  and  inert.  In  some,  perception  even  suffers  from  a 
combination of the two failings and is both too slow and too fast, owing to some 




                                                 
163 1144B. 
164 Philodemus, De Musica col. 48, on which see chapter 6, section ii. 
165 Trans. Einarson and De Lacy (Loeb edition) as amended.   183 
Diogenes of Babylon also likened his musical experts to the kritikoi, when he 
stated that ‘music is good for the intelligence. . .’
166 However, for Diogenes the 
crucial  part  of  judgement  was  made  by  ‘knowing’  or  ‘scientific’  sensation 
(epistemonikē aisthēsis), rather than aisthēsis and dianoia together. It is clear, then, I 
would suggest, that in this respect too, Diogenes differed from Aristoxenus. 
  At column 112, 16–28 of his De Musica, however, Philodemus is clearly 
addressing a claim that also involves the pairing of perception and the mind, where 
he writes: 
 
[T5.v.12] . . . . . . . . . . . . .π]αιδὸς [ . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . ]ς ὠφελι- 
. . . . . . . . . .]     τὸ τὴν αἴ 
σθησί]ν τε [πρ]ός τι τῶν κα- 
λῶν π]ροσβάλλειν καὶ συν- 
εθίζε]ιν τὴν διάνο[ι]αν ἀ- 
ποδέ]χεσθαι καὶ στέ[ργειν 
τῶι ὄ]ντι τὸ καλὸν κ[αὶ τὸ 
ἀγαθ]ὸν οὐδ᾽ ἐν ὕπνω[ι . . . 
. . . . κ]αὶ τὸ τὴν ιν [. . . . .  
. . . τ]ινὰ δ.[. . . . ]λου[. . 
. . . . κ]ατὰ τούτω[ν] ἔλε[γ. ν· 
 
. . . of the child. . . profitable. . .[the fact that] if he applies his perception to one of 
the  noble  subjects  and  accustoms  his  thought  to  welcome  and  to  cherish  the 
beautiful [and the good] in a real way, and not in a dream . . . 
 
Was Diogenes utilising Aristoxenus’ pairing of perception and reason in his 
discussion of the way music could accustom the child to beauty and prepare him 
little  by  little  to  virtue  (columns  22–7)?  Unfortunately  both  Diogenes’  and 
Philodemus’  arguments  are  very  lacunose  at  this  point.  From  his  discussion  at 
                                                 
166 Column 48; for more discussion on this passage, see below chapter 6, section ii.   184 
column 34 on epistēmonikē aisthēsis, I cannot see that this would sit easily within 
Diogenes’ theory unless this could be the means by which ‘scientific’ sensation is 
developed. This could, perhaps, be the case – Diogenes cannot, and indeed did not, 
claim  that  we  are  born  with  this  ‘scientific’  sensation,  but  simply  with  natural 
sensation  –  that  of  recognising  hot  and  cold.  If  the  Plutarchan  extract  (T5.v.11) 
reflects Aristoxenus’ true view, which, given Aristoxenus’ own writing at T5.v.6 
would seem to be the case, this would also align well with the Peripatetic concept of 
‘dual criterion’,
167 explained, for example, by Sextus Empiricus at M. VII.217–18: 
 
[T5.v.13]  The followers of Aristotle and of Theophrastus, and the Peripatetics in 
general, since the nature of things is at the highest level double, some, as I said 
beforehand, being perceptible by the senses and others intelligible, themselves too 
bequeathed [us] a double criterion, sense-perception for the perceptibles, intellect for 
the intelligibles, and for both in common, as Theophrastus said, clarity. In order the 
irrational and indemonstrable criterion comes first, [that is] sense-perception, but in 





  But  this  process  of  acquisition  might  indeed  be  hinted  at  by  Diogenes 
himself at column 18, where he states:
169 
 
[T5.v.14]  [for] music also allows [the child] to acquire a good ear, and in general, a 
great sensitivity to the rhythm, given that it [the music] possesses certain natural 
virtues; for he says that what is strongest in all things is what is proper, and it is 
                                                 
167 For a concise discussion on the dual criterion, see e.g., Barnes 2007: 550–9. 
168 I thank Professor Sharples for bringing this extract to my attention, taken from his forthcoming 
Sourcebook (Sharples forthcoming). 
169 For the Greek, see above, chapter 2, T2.iv.1.   185 
what is similar that is assimilated most swiftly and easily being borne directly to 
[one’s] being like certain sensibles. . .
170 
 
Further  possible  agreement  between  Aristoxenus  and  Diogenes  might  be 
suggested by Diogenes’ comments regarding the use of music and wine at banquets, 
at column 46.19–28: 
 
[T5.v.15]  καὶ γὰρ εἰ μή τις ἐπι- 
τηδεύοι, «τὸν οἶνον ἐκκαλεῖ- 
σ[θ]αι πολύφρονά π[ερ μά]λ᾽ [ἀεῖ- 
σα]ι καί θ᾽ ἁπαλὸν γ[ελάσαι 
κ]αί τ ᾽ ὀρχήσα σ[θ]αι», ταῦτα [δὲ 
ποιεῖν ὅλ[ως ἀ]ναγκαίω[ς·  κα- 
λῆς δὲ δι[αγω]γ|ῆς οὔση[ς], ἐμμε- 
λῶς ἢ μὴ σκαι`ῶς´ ἐν αὐτ[οῖς] ἀνα- 
στρέφεσθαι φιλο[πότας . . .  
]ναι π[. . . . .  ]υτ[. . . .  . 
 
Indeed, even if one is not used to these activities [singing, playing the cithara and 
dancing] ‘wine incites however sedate [or wise?] you might be, to sing as well as 
laugh kindly and dance’ and one gives oneself up to it in [an altogether] necessary 
way, but since it is itself a good pastime [diagōgē], appropriately or not awkwardly 
do those who love to drink behave in [the banquets] . . . 
 
The Plutarchan De Musica records at 1146F–1147A: 
 
[T5.v.16]  Song and dance, the ‘graces of a feast’ . . . For it is a fact that music was 
there introduced for its efficacy in counteracting and  soothing the heat latent in 
wine, as your favourite Aristoxenus somewhere says, for it was he who said that 
                                                 
170 Delattre remarks that any parallel criticism would probably occur at column 95 or 96, both of 
which are too badly damaged to be read. See also chapter 2, at T2.iv.1 and discussion.   186 
music  was  introduced  for  as  much  as  wine  makes  the  bodies  and  minds  who 
overindulge in it disorderly, while music by its order and balance brings us to the 
opposite condition and soothes us. 
 
This  latter  quotation,  however,  is  also  reminiscent  of  the 
Pythagorean/Damonian  anecdote  related  at  chapter  3,  pp.  78–81  and  notes. 
Philodemus’ criticism of Diogenes’ column 46, at column 131, remarks that music 
is  no  better  when  played  to  the  poems  of  Homer  or  Hesiod.  Here,  however, 
Philodemus clearly implies that Diogenes is confusing music and poetry – perhaps 
because there is no other way for him to find fault with Diogenes’ statement? 
 
 
In my examination of the musico-ethical theory of Aristoxenus, I have not attempted 
to analyse his very complex science of harmonics, as set out in the El harm., firstly 
because there is nothing in Diogenes of Babylon’s ethical theory with which to 
compare  it,  and  secondly,  but  more  importantly  perhaps,  because  Aristoxenus’ 
theory is clearly just that – theoretical. Diogenes’ theory is, on the other hand, more 
practical – he is not suggesting, I believe, proofs such as mathematical theorems, 
which can be shown on paper, as Aristoxenus’ theory of genē, correct intervals, etc., 
may be, but as proofs that will be displayed on living individuals, the evidence will 
be apparent in the way human beings react, or not, to different types of music.  
  At column 116, Philodemus argues that the musical modes are the business 
of opinion, not sensation. People will have different opinions about different modes, 
he states. The important point about this particular discussion is the different modes 
referred  to.  Only  enharmonic  and  chromatic  modes  are  mentioned –  there  is  no 
reference at all to the third of Aristoxenus’ three genera – the diatonic; nor are they 
referred to as ‘genē’ as they would have been by Aristoxenus, but as mousikē. This 
is  one  of  the  main  reasons  that  Barker  uses  in  his  argument
171  that  Diogenes’ 
musico-ethical theory differed in its very essence from that of Aristoxenus. Certainly 
for  the  latter,  the  three  genera  formed  the  basis  of  his  theory,  and  no  extant   187 
discussion by Aristoxenus considers only two. If the Aristoxenian system of genera 
were being discussed here, holds Barker, it should be the diatonic and one other at 
the mainstay of the discussion.
172 Further, as argued above, Aristoxenus was of the 
view that ‘no conclusions about ethical and aesthetic qualities of a piece of music 
could legitimately be drawn from a technical analysis of its harmonic structure’.
173 
 
In looking at Aristoxenus’ ethical theory of music, so far as he had one, what I have 
not considered thus far is whether or not Diogenes’ theory of the soul, i.e., that 
which is affected by the music, is in any way similar to that of Aristoxenus, and in 
this study, I am much indebted to an article written by Annie Bélis in 1985.
174 
  There are two main sources for Aristoxenus’ theory of the soul, and both 
would seem to confirm that his theory would not have been acceptable to any Stoic. 
  Eusebius, in his Evangelical Preparation 15.20.6,
175 states: 
 
[T5.v.17] [The Stoics] say that the soul is subject to generation and destruction. 
When separated from the body, however, it does not perish at once, but survives on 
its own for certain times, the soul of the virtuous up to the dissolution of everything 
into fire, and of fools only for certain definite times. 
 
This notion that the soul lives on once the person has died does not, I would 
suggest, go as far as Plato’s ‘immortal’ soul as depicted in the ‘Myth of Er’ in 
Republic Book X, but it is certainly in direct opposition to the Aristoxenian theory 
of  the  soul  as  adumbrated  in  Cicero’s  Tusculan  Disputations,  and  Lactantius’ 
Divinae Institutiones and De opficio Dei. 
  Cicero suggests that Aristoxenus was incapable of understanding the whole 
concept of the soul. At Tusc. I. xxii, 51–2 he states: 
 
                                                                                                                                        
171 2001: 357–9. 
172 2001: 357. 
173 Barker 2001: 358; Plutarch De Musica chs. 33, 36 above, and Aristoxenus El. harm. 31, 16–32, 8. 
174 ‘Le théorie de l’âme chez Aristoxène de Tarente’, Révue de Philologie LIX. 2 1985: 239–46.  
175 Long and Sedley 1987: 53W, their translation.   188 
[T5.v.18]  It is true that Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus said that the  soul had no 
existence at all, because of the difficulty of  understanding what the soul was and 
what its nature was.
176 
 
  Lactantius goes further at Inst. VII. 13.9–10, where he states: 
 
[T5.v.19]  What about Aristoxenus, who said there is absolutely no soul at all, even 
when it is alive in the body? He made comparison with stringed instruments, saying 
that a power of perception exists in bodies as a result of the structure of the guts, and 
the vitality of the limbs in the same way that a harmonious sound, the harmony that 
musicians speak of, can be produced from tensioning the strings of an instrument. 
Nothing can be madder than that. Aristoxenus’ eyes were sound enough, but his 
heart was blind: he failed to see that he was living by his heart, and did possess a 
mind with which he had done his thinking. Philosophers commonly disbelieve in the 
existence of anything not visible to the eye, though their ability to see mentally 
things whose force and aim are felt rather than seen ought to be much greater than 
their ability to see physically.
177  
 
Clearly,  then,  whilst  Diogenes  might  have  had  some  sympathies  with 
Aristoxenus’ musico-ethical theory, he would have had no time for his psychology. 
The notion that the mind/soul had no existence outside the body would have been 
anathema  to  the  Stoic.  Further,  as  outlined  by  Lactantius,
178  it  appears  that 
Aristoxenus  drew  a  direct  analogy  between  the  soul  and  the  lyre,  although  this 
would seem to contradict Lactantius’ own statement in T5.v.19, above:
179 
 
                                                 
176 Trans. J. E. King, Loeb edition. 
177 Lactantius Inst., trans. A. Bowen and P. Garnsey in Lactantius Divine Institutes. Liverpool: 2003. 
178 De Opif. Dei. XVI. Translation W. Fletcher in The Writings of Lactantius, 2 volumes, Edinburgh: 
1871. 
179 Perhaps this is to mean that for Aristoxenus, the soul did not have a separate existence, therefore, 
but was simply a way of describing the body when it is in a certain state, e.g., tense, or relaxed? As 
Gottschalk suggests (1971: 187–8), ‘the soul is not a distinct entity. . . having any claim to exist in its 
own  right,  but  psychic  activity  or  consciousness  is  a  secondary  manifestation  of  the  correct 
functioning and interaction of the bodily parts of organisms’.   189 
[T5.v.20]  And as in the lyre, when anything has been interrupted or relaxed, the 
whole method of the strain is disturbed and destroyed; so in the body, when any part 
of the limbs receives an injury, the whole are weakened, and all being corrupted and 
thrown into confusion, the power of perception is destroyed: and this is called death. 
 
Such an analogy is, perhaps, not surprising for a musical theorist, and is in 
fact reiterated by Cicero at Tusc. I. x. 19–20: 
 
[T5.v.21]  There was Aristoxenus, musician as well as philosopher, who held the 
soul to be a special tuning-up of the natural body analogous to that which is called 
harmony in vocal and instrumental music. 
 
But, Cicero qualifies his view of Aristoxenus’ theory with the words:  
 
[T5.v.22]  [Aristoxenus] is so pleased with is own tunes that he attempts to bring 
them into philosophy as well.
180   
 
Whilst it is clear that both Cicero and Lactantius were using Aristoxenus’ theory to 
attack him, as Bélis points out,
181 the fact that the two highlight different parts of 
Aristoxenus’ theory, whilst both provide evidence of a similar theory, would seem 
to confirm their fidelity to Aristoxenus’ own writing.  





   
 
 
                                                 
180 Tusc. I. xviii, 41. 
181 1985: 239.   190 
Chapter 6 
 
STOICS AND EPICUREANS ON POETRY 
 
In the De Musica, whilst Philodemus is primarily concerned with reporting and 
attacking Diogenes’ views on music, in the course of the work he also says quite 
a lot about poetry. Further, on a number of occasions, he implies that Diogenes 
confuses music with poetry, as for example at col. 131.14–17: 
 
[T6.1] 
μουσικῇ δὲ πῶς ἀμείνονι 
χρῆται ποητάς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μου- 
σικ[ο]ύς, τούς γε τῶν μέτρων 
είσ[ά]γοντα; 
but how do they [ sc. the banquets] employ a better kind of music in introducing 
epic poets as poets and not as musicians ? 
 
   However, whilst it is clear that Diogenes at times certainly talks about 
music and poetry together in the traditional way,
1 I would suggest that he does 
not at all confuse the two. It would seem useful, therefore, to briefly discuss the 
ways in which Philodemus and Diogenes use poetry. Further, as mentioned in 
the Introduction and in chapter 2,
2 Diogenes saw an analogy between the experts 
in music, the mousikoi, and the critics of poetry and literature – the kritikoi. This 
claim in itself is clear evidence that Diogenes consciously considered music and 
poetry separately at times. In section (ii) of this chapter, I will examine this claim 
and attempt to further analyse Diogenes’ analogy.  
  There  would  seem  to  be  a  number  of  apparent  contradictions  in 
Philodemus’ own views on poetry, one of which was that whilst he asserted that 
like music, it was only useful as a form of entertainment, he still considered both 
sufficiently important to write four books on music, the fourth running to some 
155 columns, and at least five books on poetry. Furthermore, he wrote a number 
of epigrams, which in itself would seem to go against Epicurus’ own teachings 
                                                 
1 Indeed, more often than not Diogenes discusses the two together. 
2 See page 42 above.   191 
that one should not spend time in the pursuit of poetry.
3 It may be, however, that 
Epicurus’ own view of poetry was similarly contradictory; Diogenes Laertius 
writes that Epicurus himself only turned to philosophy ‘because he despised the 
schoolmasters since they were unable to explain to him the passage about Chaos 
in  Hesiod’.
4  It  seems  that  Hesiod’s  poetry  could  not  provide  answers  to 
Epicurus’ questions, and  so Epicurus thereafter turned to the philosophers to 
further his education.
5 This did not, however, mean that Epicurus did not himself 
quote poetry when it suited his purpose; Diogenes Laertius reports at X.137–8 
that Epicurus quotes two lines from Sophocles’ Trachiniae in an explanation of 
how  men  seek  to  avoid  pain.
6  Epicurus  describes  Heracles  actions  when 
‘devoured by the poisoned robe’ as crying aloud, ‘And bites and yells, and rock 
to rock resounds, | Headlands of Locris and Euboean cliffs.’
7 
In the first section of this chapter, therefore, I propose to test the theory 
that far from considering music and poetry as unimportant, Philodemus certainly, 
and probably Epicurus and members of his school generally, considered that it 
indeed  had  an  important  function  to  play  in  life,  but  outside  the  field  of 
education.
8  Perhaps  Philodemus’  concern  was  to  demonise  the  view  held  by 
Plato and the Stoics alike, that to have any worth, something must be of some 
moral  value,  and  to  assert  that  pleasure  and  entertainment,  whilst  not 
fundamentally necessary to life itself, nevertheless formed an important part in a 
balanced life. Indeed, Philodemus might be seen to be accusing both Plato and 
the Stoics of intellectualising all pleasures, as I will discuss further below. 
  In  this  chapter  I  will  use,  principally,  two  of  Philodemus’  works, 
sometimes  in  parallel  with  the  De  Musica,  in  an  attempt  to  reconcile  these 
problems, and to further elucidate Philodemus’ own aesthetic theory. The two 
                                                 
3 See D. L. X.120–2, although as pointed out by Asmis (1995a: 22), Epicurus’ teaching, as 
transmitted by Diogenes Laertius is ambiguous on this point. The traditional interpretation is that 
whilst the wise man has poetic ability, he will not use it. But Diogenes’ report could also mean 
that that he will not practise poetry in the manner of a professional. Therefore, Philodemus’ 
writing of epigrams might not go against Epicurus’ teaching in the strict sense. This suggestion is 
supported by Sider 1995a: 36, responding to Asmis’ chapter in the same book. 
4 D.L. X.2. 
5 For more discussion of this, see Obbink 1995: 190. 
6 Of course, there is always the possibility that Diogenes (Laertius) added this himself. 
7 Sophocles, Trachiniae 787–8, trans. Hicks in the Loeb Diogenes Laertius II. 
8 Although compare Lucretius, a contemporary of Philodemus, who clearly believed that poetry 
could also be used in the field of education, and indeed wrote his De rerum natura, in six books, 
all on poetry.    192 
works are the short political treatise On The Good King According to Homer, 
and On Poems, mainly Book V, but with some use of Book I. 
 
           
For Epicurus, technē is a method of producing what is advantageous to life.
9 
Like Plato, Epicurus thought the educational system was corrupting, because it 
used  the  teachings  of  Homer  and  the  poets.  It  seems  that  Philodemus  also 
believed that the poetry of Homer could do much harm. In his De Pietate, he 
cites a number of examples of how Homer encouraged false beliefs about the 
gods. For example he states: ‘[D]oes Homer not represent Ares, the son of Zeus, 
as foolish, lawless, murderous,  a lover of strife and battle, and generally such a 
one as his closest relations disparage?’
10 But unlike Plato, Epicurus approved of 
poetry as entertainment. Plato’s concern with poetry seems to have been from 
two points of view: firstly he considered it unsuitable from the point of view of 
the listener, as stated at Republic III. 387b: 
 
[T6.2]  We will beg Homer and the poets not to be angry if we cancel those and 
all similar passages, not that they are not poetic and pleasing to most hearers, but 
because the more poetic they are, the less are they suited to the ears of boys and 
men who are destined to be free and more afraid of slavery than of death. 
            (Trans. Shorey in Loeb edition) 
 
Secondly, Plato was also concerned with the effect the performance of 
poetry  might  have  on  the  performer,  as  evidenced  a  little  later  in  the  same 
discussion, at Republic III. 395c–e: 
 
[T6.3]    But  if  they  imitate  they  should  from  childhood  up  imitate  what  is 
appropriate to them – men who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things of that 
kind – but things unbecoming to the free man they should neither do nor be 
clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from imitation they 
imbibe the reality, or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from 
                                                 
9 Fr. 227b Usener; Obbink 1995: 178–9. 
10 De Pietate, P. Herc. 1088 fr. 10.26–8; Obbink 1995: 205.    193 
youth far into life, settle down into habits and second nature in the body, speech 
and thought. . . We will not allow our charges. . . to play these parts. . .
11 
 
The  apparent  contrast  between  Plato’s  and  Epicurus’  views  on 
performance of poetry might, however, be more chronological, as by Epicurus’ 
time, poetic performance would have been increasingly professional. Plutarch 
states that Epicurus, in his Problems, declares that the wise man is ‘a theatre 
lover, who gets more joy than anyone else from festival concerts and shows’.
12 
‘Presumably’, suggests Asmis,
13 ‘[Epicurus believed that] a person would derive 
enjoyment. . . without being contaminated by morally bad subject matter. . . [H]e 
held  that  it  is  sufficient  protection  to  come  to  a  poetic  performance  with  a 
philosophically  trained  mind.’  Plato,  however,  disagreed,  and  he  refers 
disparagingly to theatre-goers as ‘the rabble at large’ at Laws 700c.
14  
Philodemus, as it would seem Epicurus would have done, approves of 
Diogenes of Babylon for admitting Homer, Hesiod and the other poets, but does 
not approve of his reasons.
15  
 
[T6.4] τὴν μέν- 
τ[ο]ι μουσικὴν οἰκείαν μὲν 
ε[ἶ]ναι συμποσίων, κα[ὶ] τὰ παρ᾽ 
Ὁμ]ήρωι δεόντως ἐπισεσή- 
μανται *· 
The  Homeric  poems  too  have  shown,  in  the  required  fashion,  that  music  is 
appropriate at symposia. 
 
[T6.5] 
    κἀκεῖνο δὲ 
χρηστομαθῶς εἴρηται τὸ 
«φαίνε[σ]θαι μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἰδι- 
                                                 
11 See also above chapter 4, where the Athenian Stranger shows similar concerns with regard to 
musical imitation; relevant also is the discussion of oikeiōsis in chapter 2 above. 
12 Plutarch, Non posse 1095C, trans. Einarson and De Lacy in the Loeb edition. 
13 Asmis 1995a: 21. 
14 See above, chapter 4, T4.19 and discussion. 
15 De Musica 130. 17–21 and 131.2–13.   194 
ώτας ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκειότητος 
παραλαμβάνειν γέ τοι καὶ 
ἀκροάματ᾽ εἰς τὰ συμπόσι- 
α * , διαπίπτειν δὲ τῶι μὴ 
τὸν Ὅμηρον καὶ τὸν Ἡσίο- 
δον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποητὰς 
τῶν μέτρων καὶ μελῶν» 
βελτίω γὰρ ἔστω τὰ χρώμε- 
να συμπόσια τοῖς τούτων·
16 
 
Moreover, as one who was adept in polite learning said, ‘It is clear that because 
of  the  appropriate  character  [of  music],  even  the  ignorant  have  professional 
musicians at their banquets as well, but they fail in their purpose because they do 
not have Homer, Hesiod and the other epic and lyric poets. One should recognise 
the superiority of those banquets which call on the ornaments of these poets. 
   
Philodemus is looking simply for enjoyment, whilst Diogenes is looking 
for  some  moral  worth  just  as  Plato  would  have  done.  In  the  De  Musica, 
Philodemus claims to enjoy musical and poetical performances so long as they 
are in the correct media – both are fine as entertainment, but neither have a place 
in education, moral or otherwise. At column 151.8 ff., Philodemus further states 
that the acquisition of technical skill in music adds nothing to happiness – so 
many people do it, it is not worth toiling at oneself. Expertise in musical theory 
is equally an obstacle to happiness as this requires practice: 
 
[T6.6] 
μικρόψυχον δὲ καὶ 
μηδὲν ἀξιόλογον ἐχόν- 
των ὧ[ι] παραπέμψουσιν 
αὑτούς – τί γὰρ δεῖ λέγειν 
εὐδαίμονας ποήσουσιν; - 
 
                                                 
16 See T6.1 for the next four lines.   195 
τὸ διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῖς γέ ποτε 
παρασκευὴν τῆς τέρψε- 
ως ζημίωσιν μανθάνειν, 
καὶ τὴν ἀφθον[ί]αν οὐχ ὁ- 
ρώντων ὅση τῶν ἀκροα- 
μάτων ἐστὶν τῶν δημο- 
σίαι παρισταμένων, οὐδὲ 
τῆν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ διὰ παν- 
τός, εἰ [β]ουλοίμεθα, μετέχε[ι]ν 
κατὰ πόλιν * , οὐδ᾽ ἐφισταμ[έ- 
νω]ν ἐπὶ τὸ κα[ὶ] διὰ μα- 
κρῶν χρόνων τὴν φύσ[ιν 
ἐπακούειν καὶ ταχέως προσ- 
κο[ρ]ῆ [γ]ίνεσθαι *· δι ᾽ ὃ καὶ 
πα[ρε]κτεινόντων πολλά- 
κι τῶν ἀγώνων ἄλλο τ[ι 
πράττομεν *. ἐῶ [γ]ὰρ τὸ τὴν 
μὲν ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἀναγ- 
καίαν εἶναι, τῆν δὲ μάθη- 
σιν καὶ μελέτην, ἵνα τέρ- 
πωμεν αὑτούς, ἐπίπονον 
τ ᾽ εἶναι καὶ τῶν κυριωτά-  
των πρὸς εὐετηρίαν ἐκκλεί- 
ουσαν καὶ τε[ί]νου[σ]αν π[ρ]ὸς ἀ- 
πρ[έ]πειαν τοῦ μειρακιω- 
δῶς [ᾄδ]οντος ἢ κιθαρίζον- 
τος ἐπ ᾽ ἔργωι *· 
 
It is a sign that men are poor spirited and have nothing worthwhile with which to 
occupy themselves – for why should I say make themselves happy? – if they 
labour to learn music for the sake of providing pleasure for themselves in the 
future, and do not realise what a wealth of recitals is provided publicly, nor the 
possibility of taking part continuously in the city if you want to, and if they fail   196 
to consider that when it [here, the labour of learning] goes on for too long it 
exhausts our powers and begins to pall, for which reason on many occasions, 
when the exercises [with the instruments?] are extended for too long, we do 
something else; not to mention that the pleasure is not necessary, and the process 
of learning and practice that our enjoyment involves is laborious, and excludes 
the things most important to our well-being and tends towards the unseemliness 
in the person, in the manner of a youth who sings or plays the kithara as work.. 
17 
 
Philodemus claims that poetic expression blunts any useful message a 
poem might have. Similarly, melody weakens any utility in the words as the 
listener is distracted by the pleasure he derives from the melody (De Musica col. 
152). Just as with musical rhythm, so too the rhythm of the poem distracts the 
listener from the actual message being enunciated.
18 
  However,  Philodemus  did  write  poetry  in  the  form  of  epigrams,  as 
already mentioned – he did not find that ‘culture’ suffocated moral progress, as 
previously claimed by Epicurus, who is famously reported by Athenaeus (588a) 
as saying, ‘I congratulate you, Apelles, for embarking on philosophy while still 
untainted  by  any  culture.’
19  This  enabled  Cicero  to  taunt  Philodemus  for  his 
association  with  Lucius  Calpurnius  Piso,  against  whom  Cicero  delivered  a 
speech in 55BC. At the same time, however, Cicero conceded that Philodemus 
cultivated with refined elegance not only philosophy, but ‘those other disciplines 
that  were  commonly  neglected  by  Epicureans’.
20  Epicurus  had  banished 
traditional ‘culture’
21 from philosophy – he formulated the position that natural 
philosophy  did  not  need  traditional  education,  even  while  allowing  it  some 
entertainment value. Indeed, it seems from the Athenaeus quote, above, that he 
welcomed the uneducated to his school. But Philodemus seems to have given 
music and poetry superior roles to those afforded by Epicurus, although he did 
not deny that the teaching of moral truths is the province of philosophy – poetry 
in his view had no moral use qua poetry. But that surely would not preclude the 
possibility that a poem might have, incidentally, a moral message. I suggest that 
                                                 
17 Trans. Wilkinson 1938: 180, with some amendments. 
18 As will be repeated in On Poems, see below, section (ii). 
19 Trans. Long and Sedley 1987: 25F. 
20 Against Piso 70, trans. Watts in the Loeb edition. 
21 I.e. a liberal education.   197 
Philodemus, in using the poetry of Homer as a tool for education in politics, 
believed that this was the case. Homer was, of course, in public ownership, and 
as  such  would  be  known  by  all,  even  those  less  well  educated,  as  Piso  was 
claimed  to  be  by  Cicero,  above.  ‘The  lewd  Piso’  is  how  he  is  described  at 
Against Piso 69. But even he would have been familiar with the stories of Homer 
and Hesiod, particularly as a member of the upper classes. 
 
(i) The use of Homeric tales 
 
As  mentioned  above,  and  in  chapter  3,  Diogenes  of  Babylon  explicitly  used 
anecdotes from Homer to illustrate his views. In column 49 of the De Musica, 
Diogenes  asserts  that  in  older  times,  poets  and  musicians  were  held  in  high 
regard,  and  were  seen  almost  as  sages,  and  as  evidence  of  this  he  cites  the 
example of Agamemnon (only referred to as ‘the one’), who left Clytemnestra 
with his bard when he went off to fight in the Trojan war: 
 
[T6.i.1]  τὸ τοὺς πα- 
λα]ιοὺς καὶ σοφὸν τὸν ᾠδὸν 
νο]μίζειν, ὡς εἶνει δῆλον  
ἐπὶ] τοῦ παρὰ τῆι Κλυταιμή- 
στραι κατ]αλειφθέντος·
22 
                                                 
22 Column 49.23–7, referring to Odyssey Book III. 265–72. As Warren Anderson remarks of the 
episode, ‘the reference to Agamemnon’s leaving his wife under the protection of a bard may be 
thought more appropriate to “Dark Age” conditions. Still, it shows a court bard entrusted with 
grave responsibilities.’ Anderson 1994: 24–5. On the other hand, one could argue that it might 
simply have been the case that all able-bodied men went to war with their king, leaving only 
those who could not fight at home with ‘the women’? Professional musicians might not have 
been the most feared in battle. Interestingly, this episode is also recounted, but with a little more 
detail in John Case’s 1586 The Praise of Musicke, mentioned in chapter 3, above. Case states, at 
Praise, chapter 4, ‘Touching the first effects of musick (sic) we read that “Agamemnon going to 
war of Troy left behind him Demodocus, an excellent musician, skillfull in Modo Dorio to keep 
chast his wife Clitemnestra, whom he nicely had in suspicion of wantonness and leuity with 
Aegistus”.’ (Sourced from the same Birmingham University website as in chapter 3, above.) The 
Odyssey passage makes no direct mention of the name of the bard. In his note to the column, 
Delattre  comments  that  the  scholia  to  the  Odyssey  suggest  the  bard’s  name  to  have  been 
Chariades,  brother  of  Phemius.  However,  Demetrius  of  Phaleron  identifies  the  bard  as 
Demodocus, whom he also names as brother of Phemius. Demetrius writes that Menelaus and 
Agamemnon ‘went with Odysseus to Delphi to consult the god about the imminent expedition. . . 
Demodocus the Laconian won first prize – a student of Automedes of Mycenae, who was the 
first to write in epic verses. . . Agamemnon took Demodocus to Mycenae with him and set him 
the task of watching over Clytemnestra’. (Demetrius of Phaleron, fr. 144 in Fortenbaugh and 
Schütrumpf 2000.) See also Wilson 2004: 269–306, at 269–70. A blind bard named Demodocus   198 
   
The fact that the ancients surely held the bard to be a sage; as is evident in the 
case of the one who was left in charge of Clytemnestra. 
 
 
Delattre  remarks  in  his  notes  to  the  passage  that  this  incident  was 
described by many ancient authors.
23 Sextus Empiricus relates the anecdote in M. 
VI.11–12: 
 
[T6.i.2]  Furthermore, it was customary for other heroes, whenever they left 
home and set out on a long voyage, to leave the musicians behind as being the 
most  trusty  guardians  and  controllers  of  their  wives.  Thus  Clytemnestra  was 
accompanied by a minstrel, to whom Agamemnon gave strict orders regarding 
chastity of his wife.             (Trans. Bury) 
 
It was only once the ‘minstrel’ had been taken to, and abandoned on, a 
desert  island  that  Aegisthus  was  able  to  seduce  Clytemnestra.
24  In  his 
corresponding comment at VI.26, Sextus remarks: 
 
[T6.i.3]    These  [claims  that  ‘minstrels’  are  sober-minded  guardians]  are  the 
fiction of story-tellers. . . for if music was trusted as a means of rectifying the 
passions, how was it that Clytemnestra slew Agamemnon on his own hearth-
stone ‘like an ox at the stall’?         (Trans Bury) 
 
  Of  course,  Sextus  had  answered  his  own  question  at  VI.12  where  he 
stated that Aegisthus had removed the ‘minstrel’, thus removing the music, and 
with it Clytemnestra’s protection. 
                                                                                                                                   
appears in Alcinous’ palace on Phaeacia, but this cannot be one and the same. One has to wonder 
about the source of the sixteenth-century scholar, there are no notes as to sources on the most 
recent  edition  of  this  text,  that  of  Ben  Byram-Wigfield,  in  electronic  format  at 
[www.cappella.demon.co.uk/music/goodies.PraiseMusic.pdf], dated 2002. Despite inspection of 
the four sixteenth-century copies held in the British Library, no annotation as to sources can be 
found.  
23 Delattre 2007: vol. I, 80. 
24 Sheppard (1980:169) remarks, ‘Homer, exalting his own profession, implies that the bard had 
a good influence on Clytemnestra. . . The Homeric account led later writers to stress this bard’s 
sōphrosyne.’ I must thank Dr Sheppard for drawing my attention to the reference in Proclus, 
which is part of a discussion of eikastic poetry – and to other references relating to this anecdote.   199 
  At  columns  64  and  65,  Philodemus  berates  Diogenes  for  using 
Agamemnon  as  an  example  of  the  usefulness  of  poets  and  musicians  as 
custodians  of  wives  and  daughters  –  he  remarks  that  no  one  should  entrust 
kitharodes (κιθαρῳδοῖς) with the safety of their wife or daughter – and suggests 
that it would be some sort of joke to use Agamemnon as an example of someone 
who charged his poet (ποητήν) with the safety of his wife, simply because those 




[T6.i.4]  τὰς δ ᾽ οἰκείας γ[υ- 
ναῖκας ἢ]  θυγατέρας οὐδ[εὶς 
ἀ]πὼ[ν ἂν] κιθαρῳδοῖς φ[υλά- 
ξ]ειν [ἐ]ν[χ]ειρίσ[ειε]ν, οὐ[χ ὅ-  
τι φίλωι συλ[. . ]ουν[. . . . .   
ἐπιτ]ρέψειεν· ὡς δὲ πάλι[ν 
. . . . ]οντα συνηγορεῖν τἀ- 
γαμέ]μνον[ι] ῥάιδιον, λέγοντα 
ποητ]ὴν εἶναι τὸν παραζευ- 
χθέν]τα, τῶν τότε σοφῶν νο- 
μιζ]ομένων τοιοῦτο εἶδος 
ἐπιτη]δευόντων.  
No  one  should  hand  over  their  [wives]  and  daughters  in  his  absence  to  the 
kitharodes to keep them safe, let alone entrusting a friend . . . But . . . one more 
time . . .  it is easy to defend Agamemnon by saying that he who is yoked with 
the protection [of his wife] was a poet when the people thought to be wise at that 
time practised that type of thing. 
  
                                                 
25 The parallels between the report of Sextus and that of Philodemus here suggest that Sextus 
might have been drawing directly upon Philodemus.  Certainly  there are a number of similar 
discussions in the two works. Apart from the Clytemnestra anecdote, both authors refer to the 
discussion on the merits of music in education: Sextus at VI.4, Philodemus at IV.20 and 77; both 
refer to  the Spartans going into battle to  the sound of music: Sextus at VI.8, Philodemus  at 
IV.72–7: both also use the music–food analogy: Sextus at VI.25, Philodemus at IV.114, 118. Of 
course, these might all have been common themes in antiquity, and Sextus adds nothing to the 
information in Philodemus. Asmis (1995a: 29) suggests that Philodemus’ teacher, Zeno, might 
have been the two authors’ common source; as mentioned in chapter 2, above, Philodemus drew 
upon Zeno’s lecture notes when writing his own works.   200 
In using the term ‘kitharodes’ here, Philodemus seems to be implying 
something like ‘a common musician’, a mere banausos; then later he uses the 
term ‘poet’ rather than ‘musician’. Perhaps he deliberately juxtaposes the two 
terms musician–poet to once again imply that Diogenes is confusing music with 
poetry. Philodemus is certainly taking another opportunity to claim that music 
could have no effect. Music cannot guarantee the virtue of one’s spouse, as the 
example of Agamemnon’s wife clearly shows! 
  Just  why  Diogenes  used  this  specific  example  is  not  clear,  given 
Agamemnon’s subsequent murder by his wife as recounted further on in the 
Odyssey, at XI. 453, and Aeschylus’ Oresteia, which surely must also have been 
known to Diogenes. Perhaps, however, his discussion should be read as another 
example of the moralising effect of music (and poetry), and the whole anecdote a 
metaphor for the disastrous results of the removal of music. Athenaeus, reporting 
the same anecdote, writes: 
 
 [T6.i.5]  Agamemnon,  for  example,  leaves  his  bard  behind  to  guard 
Clytemnestra and serve as a sort of adviser. The fellow used to offer her first of 
all, a detailed account of feminine virtue to inspire her with eagerness to become 
a noble person, while also providing a pleasant way of passing the time so as to 
divert her attention from base thoughts.
26 
 
Demetrius of Phaleron suggests that Clytemnestra did indeed need some 
distraction, although Demodocus, if that was his name, only partially succeeded. 
Demetrius writes: 
 
[T6.i.6]    People  used  to  have  vast  respect  for  singers  as  teachers  of  matters 
divine  and  of  the  noble  deeds  of  men  of  the  past.  Even  Clytemnestra 
demonstrates her respect for the man: for she gave orders not for his slaughter 
but his banishment. . .
27  
 
                                                 
26 Athenaeus I, 14b, Loeb translation. An intriguing insight into how women’s behaviour was 
perceived. 
27  See  Wilson  2004:  270,  supporting  Gostoli’s  argument  (1986)  that  these  lines  should  be 
ascribed to Demetrius.   201 
  The  clear  implication  is  that  Clytemnestra  herself  arranged  for  the 
musician to be removed. The absence of music was certainly traditionally seen as 
a manifestation of the absence of pleasure, such as in times of war, and/or death, 
but here it could be seen as the removal of moral rectitude as well. It is indeed 
quite common for the Stoics to use ancient myths to make sense of their past, 
and their world,
28 although it would seem that they were more often used in 
theological discussions and analysis. 
  Diogenes’ source (other than Homer) here might, for once, be explicitly 
named. Immediately before the example of Clytemnestra, Philodemus writes: 
 
[T6.i.7] 
ἐξ ὧν δὲ παρατίθετ[αι 
Δ[ικ]αιάρχου λάβοι τις ἄν ὅ- 
σ᾽ ἂν κ]αὶ πρὸς τῆν ἐνεστηκυ[ῖ- 
αν] ὑπόθεσιν ᾖ[ι]· τὸ τοὺς πα- 
λα]αιοὺς καὶ σοφὸν τὸν ᾠδὸν 
νο]μίζειν. . .  
Moreover, amongst the citations that he [Diogenes] makes of Dicaearchus, one 
should  derive  as  much  as  one  wants  for  our  present  discussion:  the  ancients 
thought that the singer was also wise.
29  
 
Dicaearchus of Messana was a ‘polymath and prolific writer, pupil of 
Aristotle,  and  contemporary  of  Theophrastus  and  Aristoxenus’.
30  The  use  of 
Dicaearchus’ name is a rare indication by Philodemus of Diogenes’ sources, and 
it would seem to suggest that Diogenes quoted Dicaearchus on other occasions. 
This would seem quite feasible – at other places in the work, although not within 
Diogenes’ own section, Philodemus cites both Aristoxenus and Theophrastus, 
and Diogenes was surely influenced by the writings of the Peripatetics, as I have 
                                                 
28 For discussion, see Long 1996[1992]: 58–84; also briefly, chapter 2 above. 
29 Column 49.20–3. Delattre (2007: vol. II, 375) remarks that Dicaearchus of Messana was a 
follower  of  Aristotle  and  author  of  a  short  history  of  the  Greek  people,  known  through 
Porphyry’s De Abstinentia IV.2. See also fr. 39 in Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2001. 
30 Dicaearchus fl. 320–300 BC. Suda s.v. Δικαίαρχος; fr. 2 Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2001; 
Suda s.v Ἀριστόξενος.  See my earlier reference to Dicaearchus at pp. 67 and 165.   202 
argued in chapter 5, and as suggested by his own reference to Chamaeleon at 
column 47.5.
31  
        .   .    .    . 
 
Philodemus’  use  of  Homer  is  much  more  extensive  in  On  the  Good  King 
According  to  Homer.  The  treatise  is  short,  consisting  of  just  one  book,  and 
extends  to  some  eighty  columns,
32  and  as  with  the  majority  of  Philodemus’ 
writings, is very fragmentary. In this treatise, a prose work addressed to the man 
considered  to  have  been  his  patron,  Lucius  Calpurnius  Piso  Caesoninus,
33 
Philodemus judges the best ruler on a par with the archetype found in Homer, 
and ‘thus eliminates’, claims Gigante, ‘in a unique demonstration, the separation 
that Epicurus had made between philosophy and poetry’.
34 Although it could be 
argued that this might be overstating the case somewhat, it is indeed surprising 
that Philodemus should use a poem, albeit Homer, as a didactic tool, given his 
claims to be an orthodox Epicurean. However, as mentioned above, Cicero had 
suggested  that  Piso  was  not  well  educated,  and  if  this  was  indeed  the  case, 
perhaps  Philodemus  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  examples  from  Homer 
might more easily elucidate the points he wished to make.  
Philodemus compares Hellenistic rulers with the mythological characters 
of  the  Iliad  and  Odyssey.  Gigante/Obbink  states,  ‘By  mining  from  Homer 
suggestions for the reform of political rule, Philodemus links poetry as a basis 
for moral education with the figurative art that evokes the sovereigns in sculpture 
in the Villa’ [of the papyri, Piso’s (probable) home at Herculaneum].
35 Perhaps 
Philodemus  even  used  the  art  of  the  villa  to  further  illustrate  his  work.  The 
treatise, whilst clearly written as an educational tool directed at Piso, could in 
fact  also  be  read  as  an  attack  on  Plato’s  poetic  theory  as  presented  in  his 
Republic  Book  III,  with  his  denial  of  any  good  in  Homeric  poetry,  and  his  
insistence  on  the  exclusion  of  poetry  from  his  ideal  city.  Philodemus  seems 
almost to copy the style utilised by Plato there – but for the opposite reasons. 
Whereas Plato uses extracts from the Homeric texts to illustrate his argument 
                                                 
31 See above, chapter 3, p. 62 and note 21. 
32 Asmis 1991: 19–20 with nn. 90, 91. 
33 Cicero, in Pisonem 68ff.; Gigante, trans. Obbink 2002: 49. 
34 Gigante, trans. Obbink 2002: 66. 
35 Ibid. 69.    203 
that poetry should be banned from his ideal state, so Philodemus uses extracts to 
highlight the actions of a good ruler. 
  Discussion of a number of columns of On the Good King will provide 
examples of Philodemus’ usage of the Homeric poem: 
  At columns 4–5,
36 Philodemus depicts the good ruler, citing Hector as 
one such, referring to such a leader as ‘god-fearing’. 
  Column 13 refers to Iliad 19.228–31, and Odysseus’ advice to Achilles 
on  the  death  of  Patroclus  –  it  is  good  to  moderate  one’s  grief.  Philodemus 
illustrates Homer’s disapproval of excessive mourning, perhaps something that 
the Epicurean would have had in common with the poet. Plato, too, condemns 
excessive mourning at Republic III. 388b, but does not refer to Homer’s own 
disapproval of this, he simply condemns Homer for portraying grief at all. The 
Stoics too might have been in agreement with Philodemus here. Epictetus
37 in 
his Enchiridion 5 writes, ‘. . . death is nothing terrible, otherwise Socrates would 
have thought so. What is terrible is the judgement that death is terrible.’
38 
Homer’s Telemachus is used by Philodemus in columns 22 and 23. At 
column 22, Philodemus asserts ‘Let Telemachus’ [who left home to save his 
property] ‘be an example for us’, contrasting him with the suitors who left their 
homes  to  ‘waste’  (Asmis’  term)  other  people’s  property.  Philodemus  also 
identifies  Nicomedes  (probably  Nicomedes  III),
39  father  of  Nicomedes 
Philopator,  who  resembled  the  suitors  in  trying  to  take  over  neighbouring 
properties.  In  the  column  that  follows,  Telemachus  is  again  contrasted 
favourably with the suitors, claiming the latter to be ‘wastrels’. 
  At column 24, Philodemus moves on from leisure activities and states, 
‘Let  us  advise  serious  [concerns]  for  the  king’,  and  he  proceeds  to  list  the 
attributes of a good king: ‘to practise mildness, fairness, royal gentleness, and 
harmony of disposition to the greatest extent possible, as leading to a  stable 
monarchy and not to a despotic exercise of fear’. Although not directly relying 
                                                 
36 All column references to On the Good King According to Homer are from Asmis’ translation 
in Classical Antiquity of 1991: 1–45. 
37  Whilst  Epictetus  was  a  later  Stoic  (mid-first  to  second  century  AD),  his  philosophy  was 
largely consistent with earlier Stoicism, and he quoted the basic works of Stoicism, especially 
Chrysippus. Further, because for the Stoics, good health was merely a preferred indifferent, they 
would not have seen death as anything other than a ‘dispreferred indifferent’ (D.L. VII.103).  
38 Trans. Long and Sedley 1987: 65U. 
39 Asmis 1991: 24.   204 
on Homer here, it may be that the description ‘he was gentle like a father [to his 
subjects]’ refers to Homer’s ideal of kingship
40 – Telemachus’ description of 
Odysseus  at  Odyssey  II.47,  again  an  Epicurean  view  of  a  good  ruler  in 
opposition to the Stoic view cited by Diogenes Laertius at VII.123:   
 
[T6.i.8]  At the same time, [the wise] are not pitiful and make no allowance for 
anyone; they never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since indulgence and 
pity and even equitable consideration are marks of a weak mind which affects 
kindness in place of chastising. Nor do they deem punishments too severe. 
   
  At column 25, Philodemus reminds Piso that just as a ruler should be 
kind, he should also be ‘strict when appropriate in order that he may not be 
despised’.  
  He then moves on to army discipline, introducing the section with ‘if it is 
fitting  for  a  philosopher’  to  deal  with  such  things  –  an  acknowledgement, 
perhaps, of Epicurus’ views that philosophers should not partake in politics, in 
keeping with his desire for a pleasurable life? Or, perhaps, an indication that 
Philodemus  is  aware  of  the  need  to  maintain  the  good  will  of  his  patron? 
Dorandi’s view in his 1982 edition of the work is that Philodemus wished to act 
as mentor to the ‘young Piso’.
41 Perhaps this treatise was written, therefore, to 
persuade Piso that Philodemus could be such a mentor. 
  Philodemus  moves  on  to  cite  Homeric  kings  as  evidence  that  good 
discipline is only secured by a system of punishment and reward, and asserts, at 
columns 27–9, that Homer disapproved of war, reminding his reader that Homer 
depicted  Zeus  as  calling  Ares  ‘the  most  hateful  to  him  of  the  gods’  at Iliad 
V.890–1;
42 and Agamemnon rebuking Achilles for the same reason at Il. I.177: 
‘you  are  most  hateful  to  me  of  Zeus-nurtured  kings’.  Nestor  is  used  as  an 
example of a peacemaker compared with a ruler promoting discord amongst his 
subordinates to secure his own position, when Nestor shows that such discord 
leads to the overthrow of kings. 
                                                 
40 Asmis 1991: 39. 
41 In Asmis 1991: 1.n.1. 
42  A  reference  to  Ares  is  also  to  be  found  at  De  Musica  IV,  columns  67.5  and  72.33, 
acknowledging the god’s connection to war, but without any apparent disapproval.   205 
  However, Philodemus moves on to assert that those trained and prepared 
for wars can, in reality, enjoy a secure peace, this time citing the Phaeacian 
people as an example of a nation who pride themselves on athletic prowess and 
so can ‘dine and listen to song’, relaxed.
43  
  In the final four columns, Philodemus discusses trust and the subject of 
fame. He cites Clytemnestra (Od. XXIV.200–1) as an example of someone who 
is famous because of her terrible deeds, in contrast, perhaps, to Diogenes of 
Babylon’s use of the same character in the De Musica, where she is simply the 
background figure in Diogenes’ example of the wisdom of the court’s bard; and 
then Odysseus, Achilles, Penelope and Orestes of those who have earned fame 
through good deeds. Whilst as an Epicurean, he might not have sought fame for 
itself, he seems to imply that if one’s fame has come about for being a good 
ruler, then this would not be a bad thing. 
  In the final column he remarks to Piso that ‘these starting points may be 
taken from Homer’ (emphasis mine). However, implicit is the fact that it is also 
necessary  to  use  philosophy  to  make  use  of  these  starting  points.  The  same 
phrase  ‘starting  points’  (ἀφορμάς)  is  found  at  Sextus  Empiricus  Against  the 
Grammarians  I.270,  when  Sextus  states  that  the  Grammarians  claimed  ‘for 
poetry furnishes many [starting points] to wisdom and a happy life’, asserting 
that ‘this is plain from the fact that the best and character-forming philosophy 
had its original roots in the gnomic sayings of the poets’.
44 Perhaps Sextus again 
might have been using Philodemus or even Zeno, Philodemus’ own teacher, as 
his source;
45 Sextus counters the arguments of the Grammarians in a similar 
fashion to that of Philodemus – only philosophy can distinguish the harmful 
from the useful statements within poetry. Thus poetry can only ever provide 
starting points to any moral use, and then only if one has had the philosophical 
education to interpret it. 
 
It is clear, I would suggest, that in utilising Homer for this treatise, Philodemus 
also chooses his examples very carefully, extracting only the topics he finds 
positive in Homer, and having chosen them, he uses them in very specific ways. 
                                                 
43 On the Good King, column 31. 
44 M. 1.271. 
45 Asmis’ suggestion, 1991: 12.   206 
Nor  does  he  leave  his  reader  free  to  interpret  the  examples  for  himself  (the 
reader, from Philodemus’ point of view is also specific – he is writing primarily 
for  Piso),  but  rather  explains  precisely  why  the  figure  has  been  chosen  to 
illustrate the point.
46 He concedes nothing to Homer’s theology, which would be 
anathema to an Epicurean, with the gods interceding on behalf of favourites, or 
punishing others for a supposed insult, but seems to look favourably on Homer’s 
politics. There is perhaps, however, another, unstated, purpose in Philodemus’ 
writing. Whilst supposedly writing a didactic treatise, aimed at the young Piso, 
Philodemus is also illustrating his own erudition. Of course, Homer would have 
been ‘common property’, and known to all who had listened to any poetry, but 
Philodemus  is  surely  also  displaying  his  familiarity  with  the  texts,  and 
emphasising his knowledge of the detail in choosing his examples so carefully. 
Unlike Diogenes of Babylon, who cites his Homeric examples by name, but 
without explanation, Philodemus explains in detail how his characters should be 
seen.  Whilst  Philodemus  rejected  the  requirement  for  utility  in  poetry,  and 
suggested that only pleasure was needed, it is clear that he also saw that whilst it 
could not have any moral utility of its own, when interpreted and explicated by a 
person educated in Epicurean philosophy, then any value could be recognised, 
extracted, and utilised. 
 
(ii) Philodemus’ On Poems and Diogenes of Babylon on the kritikoi   
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, above, at column 48, Diogenes suggests that the 
musical  theorists  with  their  skills  resembled  the  kritikoi  of  poetry.
47 
Unfortunately any further detail or explication is now lost as the remainder of 
that column is badly damaged. However, Philodemus’ criticism of the claim, at 
column 136, 10–137, 2 is better preserved. He strongly refutes Diogenes’ claim 
stating: 
 
                                                 
46 Asmis remarks that in this, Philodemus’ method ‘invites comparison with Plutarch in his On 
How a Young Person Should Listen to Poetry. Plutarch also finds that poetry, whilst pleasing, 
can confuse “if it is heard without guidance”’, De Aud. Poetis 15C; Asmis 1991: 21. 
47 It seems from Plutarch Non posse 1095c that Epicurus might also have linked these mousikoi 
and kritikoi, as Plutarch reports, ‘[Epicurus] allows no place, even over the wine, for questions 
about music and the enquiries of critics and scholars’.   207 
[T6.ii.1]  τῆι δὲ κριτικῆι λέγων πα-      10 
ραπλησίαν τινὰ θεωρί- 
αν ἔχειν τοὺς φιλομουσοῦν- 
τας, οὐ μόνον ἀγνοεῖ καθό- 
σον, ὡς ἐμ μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς 
πρέποντος καὶ ἀπρεποῦς ὄν-        15 
τος καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ, 
κριτικὴν αὐτῶν ἀπέλειπε 
θεωρίαν *, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθό- 
σον, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἦν, οὐχὶ 
τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἀπεδίδου       20 
τὴν κρίσιν, καί, νὴ τὸν Δία, 
καθόσον τὴν κριτικήν, 
ἧι τι παραπλήσιον ἔχειν 
τὴν μουσικὴν ἔφασκεν, οὐ- 
χὶ τούτοις, ἀλλὰ [τ]οῖς ὀνομα-      25 
ζομένοις κριτικοῖς [συν]ε- 
χώρει· καὶ τῆι ποητικ[ῆι] δὲ 
γράφων ἀναλόγω[ς] ἔχ[ε]ιν 
κατά τε τὴν μίμησ[ι]ν [κ]αὶ 
κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην εὕρ[ε]σιν,        30 
κατὰ μὲν τὴν μίμησιν  
οὐκ ἂν ἀπέδειξεν· κατὰ δὲ 
τὴν εὕρεσιν οὐ ταύτ[ηι] μᾶλ- 
λον ἢ ταῖς ἄλλαις [τέχ]ναις. 
κατὰ μέντοι τὸ γρά[φεσ]θαι        35 
καὶ ἀνταποδιδόναι τ[ὸ] μέ- 
λος, ἔστω τι παραπλήσι[ο]ν αὐ- 
τ]ῆς καὶ τῆι γραμματι[κῆι· 
τί γὰρ δεῖ φθονεῖν αὐτ[ῶι 
γι]νομένωι περὶ [τοι]αύτας        40 
ἀ[ν]αλογίας; εἰ δ[ὲ. . .π]ρὸ[ς 
τ]ό τε ἄιδειν καὶ [κιθ]α[ρί-   208 
ζ]ε[ιν .]σ[. . . .]ντιο[. . . . . 
θ᾽ ὑποκρίσει δῶμεν αὐτῶι καὶ      1 
ὑποκριτικῆι. 
 
But when he said that practitioners of mousikē have a theory similar to kritikē , 
he not only falls into error inasmuch as he admitted a critical theory of these 
items  as  if  fitting  and  unfitting,  and  good  and  bad,  existed  in  melodies  and 
rhythms, but also inasmuch as, if any such things existed, he did not give the 
critical judgement of them to the philosophers,  and by Zeus inasmuch as he 
allowed kritikē, to which he says music has something similar, not to these (sc. 
philosophers)  but  to  the  so-called  kritikoi.  And  when  he  wrote  that  it  was 
analogous  to  poiētikē  as  well,  in  respect  of  both  imitation  and  the  rest  of 
invention, he would not have demonstrated this in respect of imitation, and in 
respect of invention (he would not have demonstrated this for music) any more 
than for the other arts. However, with respect to the melody’s being written and 
responding, let there be some similarity between music and grammar; for why 
should one begrudge it in relation to such correspondences . . .  in performing let 
us grant him (that music is similar) to acting too.
48  
 
  Within  his  criticism,  Philodemus  is  suggesting  that  Diogenes  has 
removed the responsibility of judgement from the philosophers, and has assigned 
it to the so-called ‘experts’, the mousikoi and, in the case of poetry, the kritikoi. 
Although  Philodemus  seems  to  refer  to  these kritikoi  as  though  they  were  a 
formal group, it seems that there was no such formalised grouping; rather the 
term was simply used to refer to literary theorists, some of whom might have had 
some theories in common, and in particular, regarded the sound of the language 
used in a poem as the most important element, and what made it ‘good’ or not.
49 
However, Crates of Mallos did indeed identify himself as one of these kritikoi,
50 
and  also  insisted  that  to  be  recognised  as  skilled,  the  practitioner  should  be 
                                                 
48 Trans Blank 1994: 58, with amendments. 
49 Asmis 2004: 5; see also Janko 2000: 125; Blank 1994: 55. 
50 S.E. M. 1.79. Suda s.v. Crates notes him to be a contemporary of Aristarchus in the first half of 
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experienced in pasa logikē epistēmē.
51 In order to ascertain just what Diogenes 
was asserting in his own theory, when he claimed that the mousikoi were similar 
to the kritikoi
52 in poetry, therefore, it will be useful to look into the views of 
Crates and the other poetical theorists whom Philodemus attacks.  
  In On Poems book V, Philodemus continues to assert the Epicurean view 
that if something gives pleasure, then it is of some value simply because of that, 
whereas for Plato and, later, the Stoics, to have value a thing needed to have 
moral  value,  and  perhaps  this  is  why  Philodemus  attacked  their  theory  of 
aesthetics generally. The Stoics would always argue for moral worth, whereas 
for Philodemus, as mentioned above, poetry could be regarded as good poetry if 
it  fulfilled  his  criteria  of  ‘giving  pleasure’  –  even  if  the  subject  matter  was 
immoral. For example, in On Poems V, col. 1.10–31 Jensen,
53 he complains that 
Heraclides of Pontus censored many of the most beautiful poems: 
 
[T6.ii.2]  Also, the finest poetry of the most famous poets, since it gives no profit 
whatever – of some poets, indeed the majority of their poetry, and of several 
poets all of it – he expels from excellence altogether. 
 
This suggests that Heraclides, like Plato before him, required that to be 
considered  of  any  worth,  a  poem  had  to  contain  ‘some  profit’,  presumably 
‘moral  value’,  and  if  this  requirement  was  not  met,  the  poem  would  not  be 
considered ‘good’, a theory with which Philodemus disagreed. 
  Philodemus later states: 
 
[T6.ii.3]  [Heraclides’ opinion should be thrown out] also because it jettisons so 
much of the most beautiful poetry, some of which is useless.
54 
 
                                                 
51  Janko  (2000:  125)  suggests  that  ‘the  use  of  the  term  [kritikos]  in  the  plural  must  be 
Philodemus’. He used it as a  convenient way to denote theorists whom he believed to share 
certain views about euphony.’ This would indeed seem to be borne out by the extant evidence. 
See also Asmis 2004: 13. 
52  For  detailed  discussions  on  the  kritikoi,  see  e.g.,  Schenkeveld  1968;  Asmis  1990;  1992a; 
1992b; and more recently 2004; Blank 1994; Janko 2000; Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004. 
53 = Mangoni col. 4, trans Armstrong in Obbink 1995. Unless otherwise stated, all translations 
from On Poems V are Armstrong’s. 
54 Jensen col. 29; Mangoni col. 32.   210 
  Philodemus seems to claim that bad men could make good poets ‘if they 
could write movingly and well about bad things’,
55 as confirmed at his work 
entitled On Rhetoric at col. 21.12–15, where he similarly asserts that bad men 
can  produce  good  literature.
56  The  context  of  that  discussion  is  of  course  in 
respect of speakers, but it seems plausible that the same could apply to poets as 
well.
57  Some  slippage  seems  to  be  indicated  therefore,  between  Philodemus’ 
claims in the On Music and On Poems, where he claims that poetry holds no 
moral, practical function, and his practice in the context of On the Good King, 
where he clearly felt that Homer could have some use morally, even if Cicero at 
N.D. I.41 has the Epicurean Velleius refer to the writings of Homer and Hesiod 
as ‘fairy stories’ (Latin fabellas).
58 Philodemus wrote his educational treatise On 
the Good King in prose, however, and not poetry – prose was the correct medium 
for educational writing in his view, and he affirms that any moral improvement 
that results from reading poetry is incidental. Moreover, he took care to interpret 
his  examples  for  his  reader,  thus  leaving  no  room  for  mis-interpretation.  He 
states that poetry dulls any message held within words, and so in seeking to 
‘educate’ his patron he would necessarily write in prose.  
  For  Philodemus,  the  excellence  of  poetry  comes  from  the  aesthetic 
qualities – use of euphony and word order, although the language should never 
be considered separately from its meaning,
59 and in On Poems V, he elucidates 




[T6.ii.4]  [F]or diction, that it should imitate diction that also teaches what is 
useful; and for thought, that it should partake of thought that is intermediate 
between the thought of the wise and that of the vulgar. This is the case whether 
one thinks so or not, and one must judge by referring to these [standards].
61 
                                                 
55 See Clay in Obbink 1995: 9. 
56 Sider 1997: 31. 
57 See discussion at Sider 1997: 31 and n. 37. 
58 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, trans. P. G. Walsh, OUP 1997: 18. 
59 On Poems V, 13.32–14.2; Asmis 2004: 6. 
60 Column 26 Mangoni; xxii Jensen. I use Asmis’ translation for this extract, 1992a: 147. 
61 This last remark, notes Asmis, could also be read as an attack on Plato’s poetic theory. At Rep. 
III. 398a–b, Plato demanded that the poets must ‘imitate the diction of a good man’ (Princeton 
Plato, p. 643). As Asmis remarks, therefore, Philodemus asks for ‘thought between that of the   211 
 
Philodemus  absolves  the  poet  of  the  need  to  instruct;  for  him  the 
excellence of a poem lies in its artistic merging of thought and the standard 
elements of poetry: composition, diction and, to a lesser extent, euphony. He 
then turns his criticism to Crates, who, Philodemus implies, ‘took the extreme 
view that the goodness of a poem lies entirely in good sound or euphony’ rather 
than euphony plus composition and diction (Crates’ criterion of goodness, as 
Asmis remarks, being not the pleasure produced by the sound, but the fact that 
the  poem  has  been  worked  out  according  to  certain  principles  of  sound; On 
Poems book V, column 24.33–25.4).
62 But first, Philodemus remarks that: 
 
[T6.ii.5]  He [Crates] departs from the opinion of Heracleodorus
63 and of the like 
– for instead of praising the composition, he praises the sound displayed by it, 
just as he also departs from the opinion of Andromenides, although he thinks that 
Andremonides agrees in every respect and totally with what he says.
64 
 
   According to Philodemus, Crates in fact misunderstood Andromenides’ 
theory. Unfortunately, Philodemus does not explain what these views are.
65 At 
On Poems I, column 131 Janko,
66 Philodemus states that: 
 
[T6.ii.6]    [Andromenides]  posits  that  it  is  appropriate  for  poets  to  work  out 
dialect and wording, and that it is the function of poets not to say what no one 
[else would say], but to speak in such a way as no one else would interpret [a 
subject matter] and [to construct] a catharsis and . . . of Muses. . . of sounds. [He 
posits] that humans naturally care for. . . and have a self-learned kinship with the 
                                                                                                                                   
wise  and  of  the  vulgar’,  (my  italics)  i.e.  of  ordinary  people,  rather  than  Plato’s  demand  for 
morally  exemplary  characters.  Philodemus  requires  only  ‘commonplace  morality’;  so  Asmis 
1992a: 150. 
62 Asmis 1992b: 398. De Lacy (1958: 254) remarks also that for Crates, ‘the poem is not good 
when it pleases the ear, but because it is composed according to the principles of the art. But a 
poem composed to these principles will please the ear’ (my italics), or at least, surely, the ear of 
the kritikos, maybe not necessarily an uneducated listener or a theatre crowd generally. 
63 If this man was a literary theorist, ‘he seems to be unknown outside Philodemus’, so Janko 
2000: 155. 
64 On Poems V, cols. 24.27–25.1, trans. Asmis 2004: 12. 
65 For discussion, see Janko 2000: 143. 
66 Janko 2000. P.Herc. 460, fr. 26. I use Asmis’ translation here.   212 
Muses, as is shown by the inarticulate chants that are sung to put infants to sleep, 
and beautiful locutions. . . with respect to the hearing. . . 
 
  It  appears,  suggests  Asmis,
67  that  ‘Andremonides  took  these  lullabies, 
chanted  without  articulated  letters,  as  evidence  of  a  natural  bond  between 
humans and music’. She continues, ‘Since the sound of these songs is not verbal, 
their  effect  lies  entirely  in  their  musical  quality,  not  their  meaning.’  The 
implication of the passage is, therefore, that the poet should compose poems 
comprising words that contain a similar ‘musicality’.
68 Plato, too, referred to the 
use of tunes  sung by nurses ‘to put their fractious babies to  sleep’,
69 but he 
seemed to regard it as some sort of ‘spell’, and he compares it with a similar 
spell cast upon ‘the distracted in Dionysiac treatments by this combination of the 
movements of dance and song’.
70 I do not think that for Andromenides or Crates 
there is any sense of a suggestion of magic spells. If Philodemus had understood 
it as such, he would surely have used it as a part of his criticism. 
  Another ‘critic’, tentatively so identified by Janko
71 supported Crates in 
his claim that we are moved by sound even when we do not understand the 
semantics, citing birdsong as an example: 
 
[T6.ii.7]    So  one  must  observe.  .  .  the  sounds  in  itself,  separated  from  the 
underlying meanings, as it has the supremacy over the words. . .But [he says 
that]  when  a  mixture  of  [sound]  dominates  us,  it  arouses  us  to  sympathetic 
feeling. One can see from birds too that the voice is a sovereign principle. For in 
their case, as separable sound emerges, precisely a kind of articulated voice is 
produced just as is held to be true of the nightingale.
72 
 
  Clearly, for this ‘critic’, sound can affect us even when the sense it not 
articulated by words. 
                                                 
67 1992a: 145. 
68 Following Asmis 1992a: 145. 
69 Laws VII. 790d–e. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Janko 2000: 165, n.3. 
72 Philodemus, On Poems I, 114.10–115.1, trans Janko.   213 
  At  On  Poems  V,  col.  27  Mangoni,  Philodemus  criticises  Crates  for 
claiming that the composition is ‘not understood
73 by reason, but understood by 
the trained hearing’,
74 a criticism very similar to one he levels at Diogenes of 
Babylon in the context of music at De Musica column 115.28ff. (see chapter 2, 
above, section (v) and T2.v.1 and 2.v.1a), and also his Stoic opponent in this 
book of On Poems, as I will discuss below, pages 215–16. 
  The  ‘Stoic  theory  of  language  divides  it  sharply  into phonē  (physical 
sound) and lekton (meaning)’.
75 Like the Stoics, perhaps, ‘Crates thought that a 
poem should have enough pure sonic beauty to appeal to the trained ear (this first 
postulate he thought dealt with many topics put separately by non-Stoic critics); 
that its language should survive the examination of a Stoic grammarian trained in 
the technē of words; and that its meanings (perhaps as  Jensen argues, Stoic-
allegorical  meanings  present  ‘by  nature’  or  divine  inspiration)  should  reflect 
some kind of philosophical truth’.
76 However, I believe that whilst this may well 
be the Stoic view, and one to which Crates was, to a certain extent sympathetic, I 
do not believe that he required that poetry’s ‘meaning should reflect some kind 
of philosophical truth’. Asmis would seem to agree, as she writes, ‘There is no 
evidence that Crates did any philosophy except what kritikē and philosophy have 
in common, although there is evidence that he was affiliated with the Stoics’.
77 
Philodemus states quite clearly that although Crates demanded that the poem 
should  be  judged  ‘not  without  the  thoughts,  but  not  judging  the  thoughts 
themselves’; he did not require that thought itself to be ‘judged’, because such a 
judgement would be ‘non-technical’, i.e., it could not be judged by the sense of 
‘practised hearing’ alone; it would have required some technical expertise, that is 
the use of reason regarding the content of the thought. Crates’ point is that what 
makes the poem ‘good’ is the sound in relation to the meaning, regardless of 
what that meaning is.
78 One of Philodemus’ primary complaints about this theory 
                                                 
73 Armstrong’s insertion in his translation of the book in Obbink 1995: 265, n. 44. 
74 Crates is criticised separately from the Stoic Aristo (?) in book V. In his article ‘Stoic views of 
poetry’, De Lacy discussed Crates as a Stoic. However, Crates is now considered to have been 
rather  a  ‘specialist  of  language’,  a  kritikos,  than  a  member  of  a  school  of  philosophy.  I  am 
advised by Maria Broggiato that indeed Crates was not a member of the orthodox Stoic school. 
75 D. L. VII.55–7. 
76 Armstrong in Obbink 1995 at 265, n.47.  
77 Asmis 1992a: 139. 
78 On Poems V.28; Asmis 1992a: 160; Asmis 1995b: 152.   214 
is that the sense of hearing is an irrational sense, and so is not capable of making 
any judgement at all, it was merely the sense by which things were heard, it is 
the mind that makes the judgement. Asmis remarks that ‘strictly speaking. . . 
whenever a poem is judged. . . it is judged by the mind “through” the hearing’.
79 
Crates, however, asserts that it is this ‘practised hearing’ that does the judging. 
But as so often with the text that is still extant, and indeed, with the De Musica 
as  well,  Philodemus  does  not  go  on  to  explain  exactly  what  his  opponent’s 
theory involved; it appears that he has already done so in an earlier book, book 
II. At the end of the section he states: 
 
[T6.ii.8]  Now as for what he says about letters of the alphabet, on which he says 
depends the judgement of what is good poetry, what sort of folly that is full of, 
and how great it is, we have established in the second book on this work. . . and 
have decided not to repeat here.
80 
 
  This seems to suggest that Crates might have assigned certain characters 
or attributes to certain sounds, a practice developed in much detail by Aristides 
Quintilianus in his own De Musica in the second century AD. He assigned not 
only character to both notes (pthongai) and letters, but gender also, arguing that 
certain  letters,  e.g.,  lambda  were  regarded  as  softer  and  so  more  feminine, 
whereas a tau or a chi were harsher and therefore more masculine. See Aristides 
Quintilianus, book II chapters 12–13.
81  
 Philodemus’ argument against Crates seems to have a direct parallel with 
the argument he uses against Diogenes of Babylon’s theory of ‘knowing hearing’ 
in  the  De  Musica.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  Andromenides  and  Crates  held 
parallel beliefs to Diogenes: just as sound regardless of thought in poetry can 
affect the soul, so too could pure music, i.e., music not accompanying words, 
have a similar effect. If this is the case, and if it the case also that Crates thought 
that the harmony, or as Asmis puts it, ‘the musicality’ of the poem is what makes 
                                                 
79 Asmis 1992a: 160. 
80 Translation Armstrong’s in Obbink 1995: 265–6. 
81 Translated in Barker 1989: 479. Aristotle also discusses the letter sounds and language in his 
Poetics 1456b20–1458a22, but does not appear to assign such qualities to the actual sounds. But 
at the outset of his discussion, he does suggest that the study of letter sounds should ‘properly 
concern students of metre’.   215 
the difference between a good and a bad poem, then it would appear that the 
three  men  held  some  view  in  common  in  their  aesthetic  theory.  This  notion 
would  seem  quite  plausible  for  the  Stoics,  and  indeed  Crates  if  he  was 
sympathetic to their theory of sound. Diogenes  Laertius VII.55–7 attests that 
Diogenes of Babylon was interested in sound, as shown in Chapter 2, section ii 
above. At D.L. VII.44, Diogenes (Laertius) specifically states that the Stoics 
were interested in ‘poetical diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music’. 
  But Philodemus continues to assert that the primary importance of poetry 
is to provide the listener with pleasure, of a correct Epicurean sort. Any moral 
use, as mentioned earlier, is purely incidental. He mocks Heraclides of Pontus at 
column  5  Mangoni  for  ‘loading  down’  the  poet  by  recommending  that  all 
branches of learning are necessary for the education of the perfect poet, i.e., 
expecting the poet to write knowledgeably and instructively about anything he 
includes in his poetry. In this, Heraclides would seem to agree with not only 
Crates,  but  Plato  also,  see  above, T2.v.6.  For  Plato  in  the Phaedrus  passage 
quoted there, ‘until a man knows the truth about what he to speak or write, he 
will be unable to speak or write well’. For Philodemus, as mentioned previously, 
if  poems  do  benefit  the  listener,  they  do  not  do  so  qua  poems.  Similarly, 
Philodemus claims in the De Musica that if poets were to know virtue, they 
would  not  know  virtue  as  poets,  but  as  philosophers.  This  maintains  the 
Epicurean dictum that the wise man should not over-exercise himself with the 
composition of poetry: Sider suggests that original compositions should look as 
though they have not required any effort, an argument that he suggests resolves 
any potential contradiction in Philodemus’ writing of his epigrams. Epigrams 
meet this requirement of not taking any effort ‘as no other genre does’.
82 
  At  column  17  Mangoni  (On  Poems  V),  Philodemus  commences  his 
report of the poetic theory of, and his attack on a Stoic, as mentioned above, 
traditionally believed by scholars to be  Aristo of Chios.
83 For this Stoic, the 
thought and the composition have equal importance when judging if the poem is 
good, bad, or indifferent. Asmis ‘attributes moral qualities to aesthetic properties 
to resolve the dilemma’,
84 and applies the terms good, bad, or intermediate to the 
                                                 
82 Sider 1997: 32. 
83 Book V, columns 13.28–21.22 Jensen, translated and analysed by Asmis 1990: 147–201. 
84 Porter 1994: 66, n. 15.   216 
poetry’s qualities, to comply with the traditional Stoic division of things into 
categories. 
  These three predicates may then be applied to both the thought and the 
composition  individually.  The  Stoic’s  term  for  fine,  asteion,  meant,  in  the 
traditional  sense,  witty  or  elegant.  The  particular  use  for  the  Stoics,  Asmis 
suggests,  is  a  ‘striking  example  of  the  Stoic  habit  of  transforming  ordinary 
meaning into new technical meaning’.
85 The Stoics gave the term connotations 
of good as virtuous good, a usage also found in connection with music at S.E. M. 
VI.48: οὕτω τὶς μὲν μελῳδία σεμνά τινα καὶ ἀστεῖα ἐμποιεῖ τῇ ψυχῇ κινήματα 
‘and a certain kind of melody produces in the soul stately and fine motions’. 
  For the Stoic, a poem cannot be good as an object in itself, but only 
insofar as it portrays the action of a good person. So it can ‘participate in virtue 
only as an action performed by the poet – the thought of the poem is an activity 
of  the  mind  of  the  poet;  it  is  expressed  in  linguistic  sound,  an  activity  that 
originates in the mind. But since, according to the Stoics, a good person had a 
mind that is perfectly in harmony with the nature of the universe, a good poet 
will present, in a perfectly harmonious manner, truths about the world while 
expressing his own thoughts’.
86  
  Blank  suggests  that  Diogenes  of  Babylon  might  have  used  artistic 




[T6.ii.9]    But  that  duty  which  those  same  Stoics  call  ‘right’  is  absolute  and 
perfect and ‘satisfies all the numbers’. . . and is attainable by none except the 
wise man. On the other hand, when some act is performed in which we see 
‘intermediate’
88 duties (media) manifested, that is generally regarded as fully 
perfect, for the reason that the common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend 
how far it falls short of perfection; but, as far as their comprehension does go, 
there is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the estimation of 
                                                 
85 Asmis 1990: 159. 
86 Asmis 1990: 160–1. 
87 De Off. 3.3.15. Blank 1994: 58–9, supported, in my view, by the analysis in chapter 2 of 
Diogenes’  analogy  between  musical  and  ethical  harmony.  See  above,  section  2.v,  and  in 
particular the excerpt from Stobaeus T2.v.8. 
88 ‘Intermediate’ i.e. those which are not perfect because not performed by a wise person.   217 
poems, paintings and a great many other works of art: ordinary people enjoy and 
praise things that do not deserve praise. The reason for this, I suppose, is that 
those productions have some point of excellence, which catches the fancy of the 
uneducated,  because  these  have  not  the  ability  to  discover  the  points  of 




  De Lacy suggests that for Philodemus’ Stoic opponent of book V, the 
uneducated are ‘unable to appreciate philosophical discourse and must be drawn 
to philosophy gradually through poetry and music’.
90 Certainly both poetry and 
music are regarded as a preparation for philosophy in the thought of Diogenes of 
Babylon in the De Musica, and the Cicero passage quoted above would seem to 
confirm the Stoic view that men are unable to judge correctly without expert 
tuition, a view also held by Plato in both the Republic and the Laws. At De 
Musica column 136, music is considered as analogous to poetry ‘in imitation and 
in  the  rest  of  invention’  κατά  τε  τὴν  μίμησιν  καὶ  κατὰ  τῆν  ἄλλην  εὔρεσιν, 
strongly refuted, of course, by Philodemus. Sextus Empiricus further remarks at 
M.  VI.7  ‘.  .  .  we  welcome  music  because  it  produces  the  same  results  as 
philosophy not by commanding us in a violent manner but by means of seductive 
persuasiveness’. For the Stoics, therefore, poetry and music were important not 
for the pleasure they might give the listener, but as important educational tools, 
for  the  moral  benefit  the  right  poetry  could  offer  the  listener,  contrary  to 
Philodemus’ view, but exactly the view that one would expect of a Stoic. Galen 
reports also at PHP III that Chrysippus also made a habit of quoting lines from 
the poets in support of some doctrine.
91  The worth of the poetry was defined, 
therefore, in terms of what is rational and beneficial rather than pleasure. 
  At  column  23  Mangoni  (20  Jensen),  Philodemus  attacks  his  Stoic 
opponent,
92 again on the judgement of a poem’s ‘worth’: 
 
                                                 
89 Trans.  Miller in  Loeb edition, with  amendments.  Compare also, Plato’s comments on the 
‘common crowd’, above chapter 4, T4.19 and 20. 
90 1958: 269. 
91 Galen PHP III.2.2, where Chrysippus quotes Iliad XVIII.109–10 as part of his argument that 
‘the passionate part [of the soul] is in the heart’; De Lacy 1958: 264. 
92 Possibly Aristo, see text at n. 83 above.   218 
[T6.ii.10]  But it is laughable for him to lay down that even good composition is 
not  recognisable  through  reason,  but  just  the  exercise  of  one’s  hearing.  It  is 
wretched when he introduces the notion that euphony arises by the composition 
of the style, and ascribes the criticism of it to the exercise of hearing, and more 
wretched still to take the composition itself of the words, which is recognised by 
thought as being good or bad, and ascribe it to the reasonless centre of hearing 
that has no business with its successes and failures. . .  
 
  Perhaps, Asmis suggests, Philodemus is here referring to ‘experienced 
perception’;
93 it is certainly reminiscent of his ridicule of Diogenes of Babylon’s 
‘epistēmonikē aisthēsis’ in the De Musica (see above, chapter 2, section v, and 
above,  this  chapter,  pages  213–14).  As  De  Lacy  notes,  ‘the  musician  is 
concerned with certain dispositions of sounds, which are apprehended by a kind 
of  perception  distinct  from  that  by  which  simple  qualities  of  sound  are 
perceived’.
94  
  As  already  mentioned,  Philodemus  attacks  Crates  for  his  similar 
suggestion that ‘trained hearing’ could judge the worth of a poem. The criterion 
for ‘goodness’ was, of course, different for the kritikoi and the Stoics, but it does 
suggest  that  Aristo,  Crates,  Andremonides  and  Diogenes  of  Babylon  all  had 
theories that placed great importance upon the sense of some sort of ‘trained 
hearing’. The other similarity between these ‘kritikoi’ and Diogenes would seem 
to be the requirement of some knowledge of the thing about which they write 
either poems or music. 
  The overriding similarity, however, would appear to be the requirement 
of  harmony.  As  mentioned  above,  for  the  kritikoi,  the  sound  was  the  most 
important thing, and for Diogenes, the correctness of the musical line was of 
paramount importance. I would suggest, that it  is this respect, that  Diogenes 




                                                 
93 1990: 192. 





I would suggest that at the heart of Philodemus’ intentions in the De Musica is a 
defence, an apologia, for the followers of Epicurus against those who accused 
them of a lack of culture. Philodemus makes it quite clear throughout this work, 
and indeed throughout his writings on poetry as well, that he had read, and was 
familiar with, many works that had been written about music and poetry, as well 
as the works of Homer and Hesiod. Indeed, he even wrote some epigrams of his 
own. I will discuss what his writings on poetry suggest about his own intentions 
a little later in this chapter. My initial intention, however, is to sum up what can 
be said with any confidence about Diogenes’ own musical philosophy.   
  The evidence discussed in the preceding chapters strongly suggests that 
Diogenes, far from holding a completely new view on ēthos in music, fits very 
well  into  the  traditional  historical  orthodoxy,  beginning  with  Damon  of  Oa, 
perhaps,
1 but which developed into a more intellectual arena by Plato, and then 
made much more practical by Aristotle and the Peripatetics. The question must 
remain as to whether Diogenes had access to Aristotle’s writings on the subject; 
some of the evidence presented in chapter 5 strongly suggests that he had, but it 
would appear that in working to give a more scientific account of his views, 
Diogenes also had a unique approach in some important areas. 
  Education for the Stoics of course aimed at living a morally excellent life 
and working towards becoming a sage.
2 Respect for the gods would always have 
been uppermost in Diogenes’ mind, and to this end music had to accord that 
respect if it was to have any moral value at all. 
  Diogenes found, I believe, a place for the Stoic notion of oikeiōsis in his 
musical theory. He held that even the infant could absorb the virtues contained 
within the music itself before the age of reason,
3 and through habituation, much 
lauded by Plato. The importance of only being exposed during developing years 
                                                 
1 Always with the caveat, however, that his importance might have been exaggerated through 
traditional scholarship, as discussed above, in chapter 4. 
2 See chapter 2, section ii and D. L. VII.88. 
3 See chapter 2, section iv.   220 
particularly, to the ‘right’ or ‘appropriate’ music was of utmost importance, and 
to this end it was equally important to appoint the correct judges of music to 
advise which was or was not appropriate.
4 Important also, I believe, is the fact 
that catharsis did not play a part in Diogenes’ theory of music in education. 
  However, Diogenes also claimed that music itself contained ‘divisions, 
demonstrations and proofs’,
5 inherent, probably, I believe, in the tensions in the 
intervals and scales handed down by the ancients. As discussed in chapter 2, in 
this I support the view of Long and Scade that number and proportion were 
important in Stoic psychology and ethics.  
In seeming contrast to earlier writers on music, Diogenes talked about a 
‘knowing perception’, i.e., an ‘educated ear’, a means by which ‘that which is in 
harmony  and  that  which  is  not’,  could  be  recognised.  This  could  only  be 
achieved by the correct education in early years, and then in later times, the 
practise of listening and learning to recognise the appropriate tunes and watch 
and learn how they affected different people. 
Uniquely it seems, Diogenes not only recognised that music could set a 
soul  into  motion  from  rest,  or  similarly  could  calm  a  troubled  soul,  but 
importantly he also recognised that we are not all affected in the same way by 
the same music. It may be that he saw music as a stochastic art.  As such the 
right results could not be guaranteed every time, but would be aimed at, and 
more likely to be achieved by the trained craftsman, in a similar way to that of 
medicine. It may also be that the later writer Aristides Quintilianus, who himself 
discussed the homeopathic qualities in music, could have been influenced by 
Diogenes.
6 
However, I do not think that Diogenes would have needed to stray from 
orthodox Stoic psychology in his beliefs on music. As argued in chapter 2, there 
is  nothing  in  traditional  Stoic  psychology  to  preclude  Diogenes’  beliefs  in 
music’s power, and indeed there is evidence that an earlier Stoic, Cleanthes, at 
least, may have held similar views.  
Diogenes’ search for a scientific account of music is further evidenced, I 
believe  by  his  analogy  between  the  mousikoi  and  the  kritikoi  in  poetry,  as 
                                                 
4 Above, chapter 4, T4.15. 
5 T2.v.3, refuted by Philodemus at column 117.23–8, T5.i.9. 
6 See discussion above, chapter 3, pp. 82 ff.   221 
discussed in my chapter 6, part ii above. This, taken together with the claim that 
music contained ‘definitions, divisions and demonstrations, strongly suggests, as 
argued in chapter 2 above, that Diogenes was looking for the mousikos to be 
capable of analysing the music in a similar way that the kritikos would analyse 
poetry, in order to identify ‘good’ from ‘bad’ music.  
  It is clear, however, that Diogenes also believed in, and wrote about the 
use  of  music  in  traditional  ways,  as  is  indicated  in  his  listing  of  its  uses  in 
weddings, funerals, to help when working or going into battle, but none of these 
uses deviate in any significant way from the traditional uses listed in many other 
writers. It seems also that Diogenes told a number of standard anecdotes in his 
tales of musicians of old, and his disapproval of the ‘New Music’ would seem to 
be  on  common  with  most  of  the  musical  writers.  There  seems  to  be  much 
common ground between the stories told by Diogenes, and those recounted by 
[Plutarch], and indeed in one instance Diogenes’ writing clarifies details of an 
anecdote previously held in some doubt by scholars.
7  
  It is clear from chapter 4,
8 that Diogenes had not only read Plato, but had 
read him closely and consulted his works when writing his own musical theory. 
Like  Plato  before  him,  Diogenes  advocated  the  use  of  Dorian  and  Phrygian 
scales in the first instance.
9 That he chose to quote, almost verbatim, such a long 
passage  from  the  Laws  must  raise  a  number  of  questions.  First  of  all,  what 
purpose would be served by using an earlier, albeit distinguished, philosopher’s 
words rather than his own? As mentioned, the state of the evidence precludes us 
from telling how Diogenes introduced the passages; he might well have opened 
with ‘As Plato said’. However, nothing in Philodemus’ critique of these claims 
suggests that he did. If then he did not, did he consider that by quoting Plato’s 
words he would give his own words more authority? If so, then he must have 
expected readers to recognise his authority without his naming him. Views on 
plagiarism were, to be sure, very different in antiquity, but it was not unknown 
for such accusations to be made.
10 But equally, if Plato’s name was there, why 
quote him at such length? Did Diogenes believe that any work treating a subject 
                                                 
7 See above, chapter 3, T3.i.9 and discussion. 
8 Especially T4.3; T4.13 and 14; T4.15 and 16. 
9 T4.3, above. 
10 Chamaeleon accused Heraclides of Pontus of plagiarising material from his own work for the 
latter’s On the Age of Homer and Hesiod; see Heraclides frr. 176–7 Wehrli. See above, p. 157.   222 
previously studied by such a famous predecessor needed to show that the latter’s 
work had been studied closely before the newer work could be taken seriously? 
Perhaps it was used to indicate that Plato’s theory was seen as a starting point 
from which to build his own more scientific theory. The fact that Philodemus 
mentions Plato by name in the closing columns
11 of his critique of Diogenes’ 
theory  suggests  that  Diogenes  had  mentioned  Plato  somewhere  in  his  own 
writing. But if Philodemus is following his usual pattern of parallel criticism, he 
is not in column 138 referring to Diogenes’ longer quotations. 
  Diogenes may well have mentioned Theophrastus in his writings, but the 
only other possibly Peripatetic’s name still extant in Diogenes’ own writings is 
that  of  Heraclides  of  Pontus.
12  The  fact  that  Philodemus  himself  mentions 
Archestratus, Theophrastus and Aristoxenus might indicate that Diogenes did 
also.  However,  it  may  also  be  that  Philodemus  was  using  these  writers  as 
evidence  to  refute  a  suggestion  by  Diogenes;  evidence  too,  perhaps,  of 
Philodemus’ own wide reading on the subject. Unless and until better readings of 
the relevant columns of the work can be made, then that will not be known.  
  One  fundamental  point  against  which  Philodemus  and  any  Epicurean 
would have railed was, I suggest, the notion of the sense of ‘hearing’ as having 
logos.  To  attach  any  reasoning  to  the  ear  was  anathema  to  Philodemus,  and 
without that reasoning, Diogenes would indeed be ‘searching for a science of the 
inexistent’ as suggested by Philodemus himself.
13  
  In rejecting out of hand Diogenes’ claims for music, as mentioned above, 
I believe that Philodemus was also constructing a defence against accusations of  
ignorance  made  against  the  Epicurean  school.  In  his  refutation  of  Diogenes’ 
views, he continually claims that Diogenes confuses poetry with music,
14 and 
claims that any use in the music will be contained in the words that go with the 
music and not the music itself.
15 He cites Ibycus and Anacreon as examples of 
                                                 
11 Column 138, see above T4.28. 
12 Column 49, if indeed Heraclides should be described as a Peripatetic; see chapter 5.iii above. 
13 Col. 117, see p. 84 above. 
14 E.g., column 119.13 ff. 
15 Col. 73 – it is the words in the war songs that incite men to bravery, not the music itself. Also 
columns 128 (it is the ideas within the words rather than the tune); col. 140, again it is the 
thoughts within the words rather than the melodies and rhythms.    223 
poets  who  could  affect  men  with  the  power  of  their  words  rather  than  their 
music.
16 
  His criticisms make it clear that for him, and the Epicurean school, the 
value of any music and poetry was precisely for the non-essential pleasure it 
gave  to  its  listeners.  And  as  argued  in  chapters  4,  5  and  6,  it  seems  that 
Philodemus particularly took issue with Plato’s and indeed the Peripatetics’ and 
Diogenes’ insistence on moralising these pleasures. In chapter 6 above, he is 
seen to criticise Heraclides of Pontus for censoring many of the most beautiful 
poems,
17  and  attacking  another  Stoic’s  method  of  judgement  of  a  poem’s 
worth.
18 In the De Musica, Philodemus makes it clear that he knows the Homeric 
tales Diogenes uses as evidence of music’s power, but also knows them well 
enough to disparagingly refute Diogenes’ claims. This knowledge of the detail of 
the  Homeric  tales  is  also  shown  in  his  didactic  work  On  The  Good  King 
According to Homer, which I discussed in chapter 6.i. 
  The very fact that Philodemus wrote his four books on music, and at least 
five books on poetry show that he had studied these fields in some depth. Indeed 
his three aesthetic works (he also wrote a number of books on rhetoric) could be 
seen as a defence against any claims of ignorance.  
  The main purpose of my study has, of course, been to analyse and place 
into their historical context the musico-ethical theories of Diogenes of Babylon. I 
think this has now been possible due to the recent reconstruction of Philodemus’ 
treatise. It remains to be seen whether these theories may be further clarified if 
and  when  more  advanced  techniques  become  available  to  read  the  currently 
illegible columns of this very important work. 
                                                 
16 These poets do not appear to have been quoted by Diogenes in his own claim. 
17 On Poems V, col. 1, T6.ii.2 above. 
18 T6.ii.9 and discussion.   224 
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